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THEMATIC INTRODUCTION
Meditations on the phenomenological problems
of the previous issue
The initial idea for this Culture and Philosophy journal-yearbook occurred at an
international philosophical conference held in Tbilisi in 2007, and was first expressed in a
conversation by Professor George McLean. This journal has only recently been established
(2008) by the Council for Research in Values and Philosophy (Washington, DC) and the
Phenomenological Society and Centre for Interdisciplinary Sciences of Georgia (Tbilisi,
Georgia). The Phenomenological Society of Georgia was founded in 2004 as a part of the
World Phenomenology Institute. The president of this institute, Professor Anna-Teresa
Tymieniecka, played an active part in its establishment. The editors of the journal are Fa-
ther George McLean and Professor Mamuka Dolidze. The Executive Secretary is Profes-
sor Hu Yeping.
The first issue of this journal was published with the financial support of the Georgian
Academy of Sciences (President: Academician Tamaz Gamkrelidze) and the Georgian
State Academy of Art (Rector: Professor Gia Bugadze). This second issue of the journal is
published with the financial support of Tbilisi City Hall and thanks to a scientific contract with
Tbilisi State University.
This journal reflects the scientific and creative life of Tbilisi, the Georgia capital, and
its philosophical contacts with the USA and Great Britain. This vast sphere of observation
would threaten to cloud the clear intention of the journal without a definite method of integra-
tion with the various fields of research. The method of phenomenological philosophy plays
a role this. Its method consists in arranging the content of the journal so that it can unfold the
philosophical essence of the culture from a selection of scientific works. One should realize
that this is only a normative way of creating order from diversity as a great number of pa-
pers are required to distinguish the phenomenological development of an idea of culture. It
is an ideal maxim that urges us to select works according to how they contrast with and
differ from each other.
Scientific works should reflect a wide range of problems. This is an interdisciplinary
journal striving for the phenomenological illumination of the philosophy of culture. Despite
the wide scope of science and art, scientific research can merge with artistic-creative thinking.
The first issue of this journal contained sections on the history of philosophy, political
philosophy, philosophical problems of physics, phenomenology, and the globalization of
culture. A thematic introduction and an introductory dialogue between the editors of the
7journal, Father George McLean and Professor Mamuka Dolidze, preceded the main con-
tent. At the end of the journal there were some observations on philosophical events in
London University in 2006-7.
The introductory dialogue centred on the problem of the globalization of culture. If
globalization offered to construct one supranational culture instead of a diversity of cultures,
such a mixture of disordered values could lose the face of culture. Phenomenology offers a
new solution to this problem. It is the uniqueness and originality of national culture which is
open toward the other culture and, thanks to such intentionality, the intersubjective essence
of the phenomenon of culture can be revealed. Globalization seeks to discover this
intersubjective essence, providing the culture with originality and uniqueness. So the way of
the individualization of culture presents the way of the globalization of cultures.
 The content of the previous issue of this journal began with a paper by Guram
Tevzadze elucidating the state of Georgian philosophical thinking through the twentieth cen-
tury down to our times. This was a heroic intellectual effort, especially because of the ob-
stacles raised during the Soviet era to freedom of thought. Ideological hardships seem to
prevent the development of mental life but it is strange that, as a matter of fact, the deepest
and most important achievements of Georgian philosophy and culture coincided with the
period of the greatest repression of intellectuals. This paradoxical nexus between violence
and creativity would be inexplicable unless we appeal to the phenomenological standpoint.
Indeed, the development of thinking in a way depends on the external limits the conscious-
ness must overstep to unfold its hidden and internal essence.
Thus the phenomenological effect of ideological pressure became obvious: the less
the language of the Soviet reality was acceptable for intellectual life, the more the thinker
would address a phenomenological attitude: to take this language in brackets, that is to
say, to keep and follow this dogmatic language externally, in a formal way, but to shift its
meaning internally according to contemporary thinking.
Thus, in the case of the soviet regime, ideological hardship played the role of a
provocative factor such that the philosopher could deceive the censor by furtively changing
the sense of the concepts and ideas he was urged to use as an unavoidable standard.
Eventually, the thought of soviet thinkers become more flexible. In the case of Georgian
thinkers, this flexibility did not transform philosophy into a sophistical tendency creating
disorder and anarchy within it but, thanks to strong national cultural traditions, it kept its
spiritual face. Flexibility of philosophical language acquired a positive value, enriching Geor-
gian philosophy by foreign influences which, thanks to the traditions of the culture, could not
destroy the originality of Georgian mental life.
One such significant influence of modern European thinking leads us to the impact
of phenomenology on twentieth-century Georgian philosophy. The creative works of Kote
Bakradze, Angia Bochorishvili, Zurab Kakabadze, Merab Mamardashvili, Givi Margvelashvili,
Guram Tevzadze, Nodar Natadze, Geronti Shushanashvili, Geja Bandzeladze, Anzor
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Bregadze and Mamuka Dolidze presented examples of this philosophical inheritance and
new, original developments of phenomenology. The director of the Institute of Philosophy,
Niko Chavchavadze, heroically supported the creativity of his colleagues under the soviet
regime. The current (second) issue of this journal offers the reader the theoretical part of
Georgian phenomenology of the twentieth century.
The incompatibility of being and thinking clearly revealed in the example of the soviet
system and beyond, in the wide scale of the internal / external schism in the world, is consid-
ered to be the source of phenomenological insight. This problem needs to be developed in
the field of the relation of person and society. Mamuka Dolidze’s paper Personal Freedom
and Open Society deals with this problem. The conflict between the soviet system and the
person was not accidental. It was not even the result of a distortion in the development of
society. This conflict had its roots in the duality of subjective and objective beings. It is the
intentionality of the subjective self which helps him out of this duality. A person has intentional-
ity which does not depend on relation to another person. Here, the author encounters with
difficulty Aristotle qualified as a problem of individual substance. An individual thing would
include its idea if it existed not per accidents, but per se, or according to itself. (Robert
Sokolovski in his article Knowing Essentials also touched on this theme.) What does the
existence of the individual according to itself mean? It means the existence of a thing accord-
ing to its subjective essence, since the latter attaches the unique self to this thing. This unique
form is not accidental: it is essential; it derives from God, from the ‘form of form’.
Thus ‘this thing’ avoids contingency as it is opened to the form of form or to the
relation which goes beyond all relations to other things. We can call this pure relation inten-
tionality.
Intentionality reveals the subjective essence of the individual person. If personal free-
dom could avoid contingency and anarchy it would design personal existence according to
himself or according to his subjective essence. Aristotle showed that the essence of ‘this
thing’ is revealed in relation beyond all relations so, therefore, personal freedom reveals the
subjective essence through intentionality, which does not depend on relations to other people.
Eventually, the intentionality of a person appeals to God, who is the source of the individual-
ization of being.
Thus the author determines the constitution of personal freedom. Intentionality pro-
vides the person with a subjective self, facing God through the relation of relation which
means the integration of all possible and real interactions between humans.
The open state of society presents the result of this integration. An open society is
considered as a subject that refers to the total world as the creation of an absolute subject.
Comparing the phenomenology of personal freedom with the metaphysical estab-
lishment of individual substance by Aristotle, the author endeavours to extend subjectivity
beyond the person. He is searching for a point of rest for existential phenomenology. Aristotle
had revealed the process of individualization of being showing, as the author sees it, the
9intentionality of ‘this thing’. Indeed, if ‘this thing’ communicated with the form of form which is
pure intentionality, it would exist according to itself and, in this case, have the full power to
embrace its essential idea.
Intentionality penetrates the world, as the latter arises as a consequence of the indi-
vidualization of being. The author introduces the principle of distinction as a source of this
individualization and asserts that it is an act of individualization leading us to the generali-
zation of being. What is the difference between live and lifeless systems? The author makes
the point that in case of life the generalization of the system is obtainable through keeping
the distinction and autonomy of its parts. A live system keeps wholeness not only through
the autonomy of its parts but also by self-separation and differentiation from other objects
which eventually unite it with them. For precisely this reason the method of phenomenology
requires abolishing the existential claim of phenomenon and thus separates conscious-
ness from an external object.
As far as dead matter is concerned, individualization of being means the generali-
zation of its parts according to their similarity. Accordingly, the intentionality of a ‘dead’
object consists in fact that it strives for merging with other objects or follows the general
rules so that its individual face could be lost. Therefore the individuality of a dead object is
accidental, while the individuality of a live one is essential.
In unfolding this idea the author considers the freedom of a quantum particle as the
emergence of life within a physical system. Therefore, a phenomenological approach is
acceptable for a quantum system and we are on a threshold of establishing the phenom-
enological conception of quantum theory.
Because of the individualization of life, a quantum system is comparable with a so-
cial system and it is not senseless to speak about the quantum conduct of a person within
an ‘open’ society.
Similarly, one could match the social system with artistic reality if the latter had the
‘open’ structure of a live being.
* * *
The first issue of this journal presented a range of papers by Georgian philosophers:
The Interpretation of Kant’s Theory of Knowledge in Russell’s Philosophy (Nino Pipia),
Responsibility to the Fatherland (Paata Chkeidze), The Philosophical Interpretation of
Political Pluralism (Kakha Ketsbaia), Political Thinking and Identity Crisis (Givi
Amaglobeli), The Philosophy of Pseudo- absolute (Sergi Avaliani), and The Puzzle of
Time (Irakli Batiashvili).
Visual Intelligence in Painting by Professor Robert Sokolowski drew an analogy
between the art of language and the art of painting. If thinking were expressed in the use of
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language, that we ‘thought in the medium of words’ it would be also true that we could think
in the medium of pictures. These two ways of thinking are interrelated. The author asserts
that, philosophically, words and pictures can be used to illuminate one another and to shed
light on what it is to think.
In The Mental Causation Debate Professor Tim Crane considered the problem of
the compatibility of physical and mental causations. Ultimately he concludes that mental
causation is a problem for those who reject the identity theory. However, given the standard
response to this problem, it is puzzling that physicalists think there is still a need to answer
the question: What is an adequate version of physicalism? If this is a significant question,
then physicalists still have to explain why.
Papers by Georgian scholars Irakli Kalandia and Marina Ambokadze dealt with the
issue of the globalization of culture. This issue had also been discussed in the introductory
dialogue.
Finally, the first issue of this journal offered observations based on several discus-
sions held in the Institute of Philosophy of London University in 2006-7. These international
contacts were made possible by exchange programmes between the British Academy of
Scienses and the Georgian Academy of Sciences. The observations include discussions
of the works of Anthony Savile (Kant’s Aesthetic Theory), Mark Kaplan (Austin’s Way with
Skepticism), Jenefer Robinson (Some Problems Relating to Emotion in Art) and Christo-
pher Coope (The Doctor of Philosophy Will See You Now).
The editors would like to take this opportunity to express their gratitude to philoso-
phers taking an interest in the development of this journal and to those submitting papers
for future issues.
* * *
Please note that correspondence regarding subscriptions and manuscript publica-
tion should be sent to <mamuka_dollidze48@hotmail.com> or to <mclean@cua.edu>.
Old Tbilisi. Painter: Elene Akhvlediani
HOSPITABLE TBILISI
Tbilisi has been a source of inspiration for many generations of Georgians. The
city’s past is related to the great achievements of poetry and to the romantic tendency of
music. Tbilisi bears all the tragic burden of the heroic history of the Georgian people. This
terrifying story has left its impression on the appearance of the city, but it could not remove
its optimistic striving for life. It only coloured this aspiration in various shades of repentance
and regret. Tbilisi has been destroyed many times, but the invaders were never able to
banish the spirit of the city, the very heart of Georgia.
Tbilisi saw in the twentieth century with a new flourishing of literature and art. Given the
phenomenological profile of our journal, we may permit ourselves to view Tbilisi at the dawn of
the twentieth century through various philosophical inquiries in poetry and the fine arts.
The famous school of Georgian philosophy of the last century had its roots a psycho-
emotional bohemian mood among the artistic circles of the Old Town. We are eager to find
some kind of phenomenological attitude in this all-powerful creativity, since those of a
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philosophical bent, inclined to merge the emotional and intellectual ways of thinking, seem
to have anticipated the esoteric experience of phenomenology to look for the subjective
essence of an artistic world and to grasp the source of this researches. The space and time
of Old Tbilisi were permeated with a mood of creative investigation in all spheres of bohemian
life, from folk poems and songs to great masterpieces of philosophical poetry. A romantic
vision of life enveloped the city like a mist, so that Old Tbilisi could exist as if it were a
brilliant work of art by an anonymous genius.
In keeping with the phenomenological inclination of this journal, it is worth noting that
the hurricane of historical events so fatal for our city has led the nation to a perception of
reality as a phenomenological attitude. The major strive for the perfection of life deriving
from the nature of Georgians had been kept through the confession of mankind because of
the vanity of the world. Such a double, alternative vision of life, which was the result of the
co-existence of the optimistic spirit of the nation with the nightmare of its bloody history,
resonated with the viewpoint of existential phenomenology. The phenomenological approach
is based on some stable system of human values and, at the same time, takes into account
the instability of this system that leads eventually to not being. It therefore it takes the giveness
of reality in brackets, in an alternative way of describing and at the same time a rejection of
being. Here the rhythm of a Georgian folk poem would not be out of place:
bindisferia sofeli, ufro da ufro binddeba
ra aris Cveni sicocxle, CitiviT gagvifrindeba.
This twilight-coloured world grows ever duskier.
What is our life? Like a bird it will slip away.
We can begin our story with a historical review of Tbilisi, which has been the capital
of Georgia for the last 1,500 years. Ever since the fifth century when it took control of the
Kingdom of Kartli, Tbilisi has had to disguise its face to resist whatever the current invading
army decided to inflict. Despite the obstacles resulting from the heroic struggle of the
Georgians against innumerable invasions, Tbilisi has always strived to enlarge its cultural
contacts. The capital of Georgia was destroyed so many times, but the enemy was unable
to break the will of a nation rooted in strong national traditions and in an inexhaustible thirst
for creativity. The history of Tbilisi astonishes the reader by the remarkable architectural
achievements against this background of bloody invasions.
Prior to soviet repressions, at the beginning of the twentieth century Tbilisi was rich
in masterpieces of modern art and the brilliant fruits of poetry. A stream of creative life
surmounted the anarchy of political crises, and during the short period of independence
(1917-21) Tbilisi became a meeting point of Eastern and Western cultures. Such an
interesting synthesis held the enchanting prospect of development, one which was ended
by the soviet regime.
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The appearance of the current journal could be considered as a sign of the revival of
such cultural contacts. After the collapse of the soviet system there was a strong tendency
towards realizing freedom, overstepping forbidden borders, opening the space of post-
soviet culture and making a contribution to the development of the world. Our society has a
calling for resolving political conflicts so that it can focus the will of the people on the problems
of philosophy, science and art.
The tendency of our time – the globalization of cultures – does not mean striving for one
super-national culture. Quite the contrary: it is the uniqueness and originality of national cultures
that makes possible spiritual interactions among the countries leading to the process of
globalization. The uniqueness and traditions of Georgian culture are the guarantee of its openness
toward the cultural world. This is the phenomenological solution of the problem and the journal
Culture and Philosophy follows the same vocation of inspiring the intellectual life of Tbilisi.
Three main philosophical contacts anticipated the emergence of this journal:
Tbilisi – Washington DC
Scientific interaction between the Institute of Philosophy of Georgia and the
Council for Research in Values and Philosophy at the Catholic University of America.
Tbilisi – Hanover (New Hampshire, USA)
The establishment of the Georgian Phenomenological Society at Tbilisi State
University (2004) which became part of the World Phenomenological Society (see
Phenomenological Inquiry 28, 2004, p. 210).
Tbilisi – London
Scientific exchange programmes between the Georgian National Academy
of Sciences and the British Academy of Scienses and between Tbilisi State University
and the University of London.
The journal aims to enhance the philosophical spirit of the heart of Georgia so that
Tbilisi can regain its status as a hospitable centre where contemporary Western and Eastern
cultures meet.
In keeping with this spirit the journal was launched at the World Congress of
Philosophy in Seoul in August 2008. This was an opportunity for scientific interaction between
Western and Eastern philosophers. Eighteen international scholars from nine Eastern and
Western countries volunteered to participate in preparing the second issue of the journal.
They have been included in the project as authors and members of the editorial board.
During the Russo-Georgian armed conflict last year the same scholars sent letters
of support for the Georgian people. These were published in Sakartvelos respublika
newspaper (155, 20 August 2008).
Hospitable Tbilisi
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A launch event was held in December 2008 at the Institute of Philosophy of London
University to mark the journal’s featuring of philosophical events at the University.
The University of Antwerp hosted the 59th International Congress of Phenomenology
in July 2009. The current issue of the journal includes works by participants in this congress:
Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (President of World Phenomenological Society), Erkut Sezgin
(Professor at Istanbul Culture University) and Mamuka Dolidze (Institute of Philosophy of
Georgia).
Launch events for the journal in Georgia were held at the Georgian State Academy
of Art (April 2008), at Tbilisi State University (May 2008) and at the Institute of Philosophy of
Georgia (June 2008).
Copies of the first issue of the journal were widely distributed to various institutions,
including the following:
Catholic University of America (Washington, DC)
Council for Research in Values and Philosophy (Washington, DC)
Culture University (Istanbul)
Institute of Aesthetics (Chongqing)
Institute of Philosophy and Political Science (Almaty)
Institute of Philosophy, London University
Ivan Franco Lviv National University
Library of Congress (Washington, DC)
National University (Madrid)
National University (Seoul)
People’s Friendship University of Russia (Moscow)
University of Antwerp
University of Latvia (Riga)
World Phenomenology Institute (Hanover, NH)
A copy of the journal was deposited in the National Library of Georgia.
An online version of the journal may be accessed at <http:// www.crvp.org>.
An initial aim was for Culture and Philosophy to help build cultural bridges between
Tbilisi and Washington, Hanover and London. Now, owing to growing interest in this venture,
we seek to reflect the cultural and philosophical life of the capital of Georgia so that Tbilisi
may become a centre of modern interaction between Western and Eastern cultures.
PROBLEMS OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL
PHILOSOPHY

PHENOMENOLOGICAL THINKING
IN THE GEORGIAN PHILOSOPHY OF XX CENTURY
MAMUKA DOLIDZE
Institute of Philosophy of Georgia. Tbilisi
For a long time phenomenology has been a subject of thorough investigation in the
Georgian school of philosophy. Suffice it to name Georgian philosophers like Kote Bakradze,
Angia Bochorishvili, Zurab Kakabadze, Guram Tevzadze, Merab Mamardashvili and Givi
Margvelashvi, whose works are devoted to this area. My objective is to review
phenomenological studies in contemporary Georgian philosophy. Besides Husserl, this
review concerns the problems of Hartmann’s epistemology and existential ontology.
Professor Kote Bakradze was the first Georgian philosopher who focused on
phenomenology. He spent part of his life in Germany attending Husserl’s lectures. Later, his
comments on the lectures served as a basis for his works in phenomenology1 . In particular,
Bakradze investigated Husserl’s anti-psychological position, leading him to the problem of
objective truth. He believed that the anti-psychological attitude originated from Kantian philosophy,
but Husserl offered a new solution to the problem, one different from that of the Kantian school.
The Georgian scholar considered issues like the object of consciousness, meaning
and the truth, the relationship between the individual and general essence. He was inter-
ested in a new method designed to determine the general essence. Here the act of
determination was directed toward the general essence, going beyond the similarity between
individual things.
Kote Bakradze demonstrated the ability of phenomenology to bring into correspondence
the internal and external aspects of consciousness. When identifying the general essence
with the pure self, a phenomenologist assumes that the psychological level of consciousness
has its existential basis. Therefore, he first emphasizes the self as the experience of being
and then as the experience of - self. As an inner expression of absolute existence, the self has
a phenomenological value for this component of cognition has a quality of being present
always and everywhere. His work Essays on New and Contemporary Bourgeois Philosophy
highlights an important feature of phenomenological thinking – the appearance of a new
relationship between consciousness and the existential world.
Angia Bochorishvili’s contribution to phenomenological investigation and
phenomenological aesthetics is especially worth noting here. This Georgian scholar notes
that Husserl’s phenomenology can be considered as one of the greatest achievements of
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twentieth-century philosophy. Phenomenology is a method of investigation, a specific
approach, an attitude applied to different fields of philosophy. This is also true for aesthetics.
Application of phenomenology to aesthetics, resulted in phenomenological aesthetics which
like phenomenology in general, is aimed at overcoming psychologism. Overcoming
psychologism in aesthetics implies defining aesthetics without referring to psychological
concepts. Phenomenological investigation by means of different categories should reveal
the essence of aesthetics as an anti-phenomenon, Otherwise psychologism, as well as the
resulting skepticism and agnosticism, is inevitable.
Thus, according to Bochorishvili phenomenological aesthetics should certainly be
taken into consideration by modem Georgian aesthetics since a tendency to attribute
cognitive functions to aesthetics can definitely be observed. The difference between them
becomes evident only in terms of cognitive means. Appropriate development of aesthetics
certainly requires the overcoming of the so-called gnoseologism, which threatens the
autonomy of aesthetics.
Zurab Kakabadze belongs to the new generation of Georgian phenomenologists.
His major work “The Problem of Existential Crisis and Edmund Husserl’s Transcendental
Phenomenology”2  is dedicated to this subject. He entered the international forum through
the World Phenomenology Institute3 .
This author presents a comprehensive and clear review of Husserl’s approach with
respect to its relationship with existentialism, and proceeding from this material he gives a
unique understanding of phenomenological ontology. He notes that from the ontological
perspective phenomenology is distinctive owing to a radical view of the problem of existence
in accordance with which any statement about the existence of the world should be preceded
by a determination of essential meaning, “indicator” of existence. For this purpose,
phenomenology proposes that one perform “epoche”, i.e., avoid any statements regarding
the world’s existence. In the context of the “phenomenological epoche”, the world’s existence
transforms into a mere claim to existence and the essence/essential meaning/indicator of
existence is represented in the form of this claim. Based on the “epoche” we ask the following
question: what is existence in terms of its claim, in terms of its “idea”, i.e., what is the essence,
meaning, essential “indicator” of existence?
The relevant analysis points to the following: claiming to exist, the world at the same
time claims to be perceived and to be perceivable, to be discovered and to be discoverable,
to be revealed and to be “reveal able”. Inability to be revealed or perceived is equal to non-
being, but the ability to be perceived and to be perceivable, to be revealed and to be “reveal
able” means the ability to be definite, to have a definite look, to have a definite meaning and
a definite image, i.e., to be “formed”, to be “constituted”.
However, a thing may manifest itself, that is, have a definite meaning and image,
be “formed” or “constituted” thanks to or through something else, or thanks to or through
oneself. If something manifests itself, i.e., has its definite meaning and is formed exclusively
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through something else, and if the latter also manifests itself and is also “formed” through
something else and so on, infinitely, then “self-manifestation” and “formation” are lost in
“infinity”, which is equal to indefiniteness, i.e., non-being. An object manifests itself and
has a definite meaning, a definite image only in the case that it manifests and forms itself
directly through oneself or manifests and forms itself through something manifesting and
forming itself directly through itself.
When we limit ourselves to looking directly forward, in the direction of the external
transcendent world, we do not find anything that would manifest itself or have its meaning,
its definite image directly through itself.
As mere objects, as things, objects of the external world are related to each other in
a definite way. Every object is surrounded by other things that are related to it in a certain
way. When describing a thing, we describe, characterize it via these relations. A thing “is
what it is in its relationship with circumstances”. A thing is inert and indifferent. It has the
same meaning in the same circumstances and a different meaning in different circum-
stances. In other words a thing acquires its meaning, its image through circumstances. A
thing is what the circumstances are. But what are the circumstances? They are the same as
some other circumstances and so on, infinitely. Due to this, a thing, manifesting and “forming”
itself exclusively through other things, through circumstances, docs not manifest or “form”
itself at all.
But if the world of things still manifests itself and has its definite image, it means that
it belongs to something manifesting and ‘“forming” itself through something that manifests
and “forms” itself directly through itself. But what could be identified as a self-manifesting
and “self-forming” instance?
I, manifesting myself in my “life of consciousness”, which is first of all characterized
by “intentionality”, i.e., by “directedness” toward the world, toward “circumstances”, exist
and determine, “form” myself in my relationships of “directedness” towards the world, towards
the “circumstances”. However, by their essence “intentionality”, “directedness” imply “goal
directedness”, which, on its part, implies freedom. I as a freely goal directed being,
overcoming inertness and indifference, plan and realize something definite, something that
has not been totally conditioned or “prompted” from outside, by external circumstances. I
plan and realize something independently. I am still something more than what I am when
depending on circumstances. As a freely goal directed being, I manifest and “form” myself
through myself. I am something definite, irrespective of circumstances, and maybe in spite
of circumstances, I exist and manifest myself within the mode “I, myself”.
Thanks to such an advantage of “self-manifestation” and “self-formation”, I represent
an initial-final instance of “self-manifestation” and “self-formation”, i.e., of the existence of
all the rest, of the existence of objects, of world existence. I manifest and form myself
directly through myself, and objects related to me manifest and “form themselves”, that is,
exist through myself. In me, as in “self-manifesting” and “self-forming” being, objects find
Problems of Phenomenological Philosophy
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the necessary initial-final instance of “self-manifestation” and “self-formation”. By
understanding and “forming” myself through myself, i.e., through my “intention” and “form”,
objects stand in their relationship with myself; I understand and “form” them depending on
how they meet my “intention”.
Consequently, having an advantage of self-manifestation and self-determination, I
represent the orienting and determining centre of world relationships, and, in this sense,
represent a fundamental, constituting factor of the world’s being. In this context it becomes
obvious that according to phenomenology, the problem of the existence of my Self, as of a
freely self-determining being, becomes a fundamental ontological problem, and that,
therefore, the methods of self-reflection and self-analysis acquire the meaning of a
fundamentally ontological method. (Of course, other subjects, other “selves” are also
characterized by such an advantage of self-determination and for this reason represent
“constituting factors” of the world’s being. However, I cannot discover another “Self” directly,
only through my look directed forward. It is revealed to me through insight, based on self-
analysis. Due to this, insight, based on self-analysis and opening the “inter-subjective” as a
“constituting factor” of the world’s existence, belongs fundamentally to ontological method).
Kakabadze notes that by accepting the “intentional life of my consciousness”, i.e.,
freely-self determining action as a primary basis of world existence, phenomenology accepts
existence in being. In this respect Husserl’s phenomenology differs from the classical
tradition and is close to “life philosophy”, to the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche, in particular.
A thing determines itself through external circumstances. It is inert, which means that
not having its own “claim” or its own “initiative”, it does not change its relationship with
circumstances on its part or on its initiative. It always maintains the same relationship with
the same circumstances, exists for ever in this relationship, does not plan or realize new
relationships. In this sense, in the being of an object, in the form of an object prevails the
point of the monotonous repetition of a relationship. By its essence, the being of an object
is a monotonous repetition. Just for this reason classical traditional philosophy, limiting
itself to the look directed outwards, at the world of objects and searching, the primary factor
of world formation, found it in the form of a “substance”.
Differently from objects, I form, determine myself through my self. I am freely active,
which means that I change on my own initiative my relationship with circumstances and
continually plan and realize new relationships. The essence of the “life of consciousness”, as
of a “teleological” process, consists in the realization of something that has not been realized.
From this perspective- in my being, in being in form of subject prevails the point of becoming,
development. Monotonous repetition here has a subordinated secondary meaning. By its
essence, being in the form of a subject is equal to becoming, creativity, development.
Thus, according to phenomenology, subjective being as the process of formation
creativity, development and “history”, by its essence constitutes a fundamental layer of
existence. In this connection, it becomes evident that according to phenomenology, induction
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and deduction as methods based on belief in monotonous repetition cannot serve as
fundamental ontological methods. The fundamentally ontological method is the analysis of
the intentional life of consciousness as of an essentially teleological process, the opening
of the potential horizons of history.
Subjective existence, being in the form of Self acquires the meaning of absolute
existence. It is absolute in terms of “fundamentality” and due to the fact that, by revealing
and determining itself through itself, it reveals and determines, “forms”, the existence of the
world that depends on relationship with it. However, the problem of absolute existence in
phenomenology requires further explanation.
Subjective being as an infinite process of becoming and transformation can serve
as a “constituting” factor, i.e., as an orienting and determining world centre, if it is “focused”
by nature rather than being absolutely dispersed or changeable. In other words, without
having a stable or definite face, the “life of consciousness” cannot give the world a definite
image, a definite face. As a continually infinite process, the “life of consciousness” cannot
be absolutely individually different or discrete. It should combine the primacy of becoming
of the individually different with some super-individual, stable, absolute aspect. According
to Kakabadze, Husserl has the following understanding of such a combination.
Subjective existence naturally contains some super-individual aspect in itself.
However, we should always keep in mind that the super-individual component of the intentional
life of consciousness is radically different from the general structure of objects, from the law
of object existence. The more monotonously an object repeats the structure and relationship
of other objects, the more lawful it is in its existence. But this statement can not be applied
to a subject. The more monotonously a subject repeats the life of others, the less lawful it is
in its existence. The super-individual aspect of subjective being consists in some primary
intention as in an infinite goal striving for realization. The infinite goal, which is never fully
realized, requires realization at more and more new levels, and, due to this, requires the
individualization of the realization process. A real subject that complies with its own super-
individual law cannot monotonously repeat activity, or a relationship with other subjects, or
its own past actions or relationships. It is natural that some relationships are repeated and
should he repeated in people’s lives, but completely monotonous repetition in this area
means the violation of the law. When we totally repeat ourselves and stop at an already
realized level, we cease to further realize the infinite goal and by doing so, contradict the
law of our existence, which is the tendency of realizing an infinite goal.
Realization of the infinite “telos” of the life of consciousness is never complete or
absolute. Any realized formation, or any realized aspect of formation, is relative to the infinite
“telos”. The constituted, formed world is relative to the constituting process of the life of
consciousness, but any realized constituting process of the life of consciousness is relative
to the primary fundamental intention, to the infinite “telos”. Absolute existence is existence
that is being infinitely realized and also the partially-relatively realized “telos”.
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Out of the different positions in Georgian phenomenological thinking, I would like to
single out the works of Guram Tevzadze. Within the conception of Hartmann’s epistemology,
Tevzadze investigated the object of knowledge. We have the knowledge of things represented
in our consciousness. Simultaneously, knowledge, as a cognitive act, implies the
transcendence of its object. Due to this, for Hartmann, a cognitive theory cannot exist without
ontology. The mentioned qualities of the object of knowledge contradict each other, but a
cognitive act that forms a basis for the unity of such a contradiction does exist. Hence, since
an object of cognition is represented in consciousness and at the same time transcends
consciousness. The object of knowledge is consciousness itself and nothing more than
that. This is the only way of identifying the given thing with a transcendent object. Thus, the
existence of knowledge points to the fact that consciousness, as a given phenomenon,
presents itself as a transcendent thing. As a result fact of the existence of consciousness is
regarded as a phenomenon itself. Therefore, Hartmann defines knowledge as a pure phe-
nomenon (the first stage of the new cognitive theory).
When analyzing epistemology, Guram Tevzadze states that the above definition is
unacceptable since a cognitive act contaminates the purity of the phenomenon. Due to this,
in Hartmann’s theory, the phenomenology of knowledge has a methodological meaning
only. According to Tevzadze the development of phenomenology into a conception requires
a real transition from the immanent sphere of consciousness to its transcendental basis. To
accomplish such a transition or find an absolute basis of consciousness, Tevzadze uses
Descartes’ methodological principle. In particular, as the absolute basis of cognition is
inaccessible, there is only this way of attaching absolute meaning to the real content of
consciousness. The act of attaching meaning is a real, unconditional act and it is just this
act that presents an absolute basis for the phenomenology of knowledge. Thus, by applying
Descartes’ methodological principle to Hartmann’s theory, Tevzadze elaborates
phenomenology of knowledge as a conception.
When considering the problems of existential ontology, Givi Margvelashvili, a
Georgian philosopher and writer was unable to avoid the issues of phenomenological
philosophy. He, in particular, focused on the phenomenological modes of consciousness
that gain their meaning thanks to some phenomenological effort. The latter is a way of
revealing consciousness as a form of existence.
According to Margvelashvili, apart from methodological resemblance there is a
deep conceptual similarity between the works of Heidegger and Husserl. Existential
ontology is an absolutely modal theory. When defining existence through existential time
Heidegger reveals being in its modal manifestation. On the other hand, Husserl considers
consciousness as a field of vision. The present is the brightest point of the field. Brightness
diminishes in the areas related to the past and the future, which creates a darker area in
the field. Thus, consciousness in its existential dimension looks like a field with a brighter
centre and darker borders.
23
Margvelashvili compares this ontological picture of consciousness with Heidegger’s
idea of existence, instead of referring to the field of consciousness, Heidegger views
existence without any centre, as an ecstasy of time. The past, the present and the future are
equal points of existence, but despite this equality existence keeps its centralized structure,
since it has an ability to bring together past, present and future points of time.
Margvelashvili dedicated most of his works to Heidegger’s ontology, but his later
creations “Phenomenological Codes of Consciousness” and “The Problem of the Cultural
World in the Existential Ontology of M. Heidegger”4  lead us to the depth of Husserl’s
transcendentalism. According to Margvelashvili, Heidegger did not inherit Husserl’s
phenomenology only in terms of methodology. As a result Margvelashvili obtains a theory
throwing light on a deep unity between Heidegger and Husserl.
Another contemporary thinker revealing the phenomenological roots of aesthetic
thinking was famous Georgian philosopher Merab Mamardashvili. In his lectures
“Psychological Topology of the Way”5 , Mamardashvili examines Marcel Proust’s novel The
Remembrance of Things Past. The past is an unreachable phenomenon, and when the
French author thinks of his childhood he refers to a present state of his mind, which acquires
the meaning of the past. This is a great miracle of time – way the present is designated as
the past.
The problem leads us to a phenomenological problem: a phenomenon reveals itself
and at the same time it represents a thing in itself. Similarly to this, the past exists separately,
as a thing in itself and at the same time it is revealed as a phenomenon by the present, or
the present, due to some necessity, turns into the past. The purpose of the author is to
create conditions for such a transformation- The Remembrance of Things past is an
aesthetic experiment using the phenomenological way of thinking in literature.
Mamardashvili examines the phenomenon of the past in greater detail. We are unable
to control or recollect the first, marginal period of our childhood when the unconscious prevails
in the mind. The unreachable experience abides in the dark. This is the period of first
perceptions and at the same time the period when the intellectual organs of perception are
created. This is an indivisible process. The creation of organs of perception and the act of
perception totally merge with each other. Because of such unity the entire content of the first
perception exists in the dark, for there is no organ of perception, separate from the object of
cognition that could shed light on it. In other words, the remote past has an unconscious
existence (as a thing in itself) because it merges with the process of the crystallization of a
human being. In his work “Classical and Non-Classical Ideals of Rationality”6 , Mamardashvili
explains the difference between the classical understandings of the event and of the
phenomenon. Differently from the event, the phenomenon has ontological existence or
significance. The difference between a classical event and essence is that ontological
characteristics belong to essence, whereas essence itself has no existence in a certain
sense. Phenomenological reduction implies the differentiation of the content of consciousness
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from the cognitive act, which recognizes in the content of consciousness the reflection of
the objective, real world.
Mamardashvili’s experience in revealing paradoxical situations and the construction
of the cognitive picture of the world prove to be extremely interesting. The paradox consists
in the fact that the more we consider events and objects of the world as movements and
bodies deprived of a soul, i.e., without any inner life principle, the less we can free ourselves
from absolutely mental conditions of understanding the external physical world. Physical
events are coordinated and constructed in the integrally comprehended field of infinite
intellect.
If objects are regarded as conscious objects, as phenomena having souls, i.e., as
the source of existence in itself, the integral mental field of comprehension splits into numerous
spatial-temporal real layers that ensure the independent existence of phenomena.
Consequently, Mamardashvili concludes that there exists the integrity of phenomena,
on the one hand, and dualism in understanding them (understood as physical and conscious
objects), on the other hand. This enables the author to draw a certain analogy between
Descartes’ dualism and Husserl’s phenomenology, in spite of the contradictions observed
between them.
This brief review of the phenomenological studies of Georgian authors reveals once
again the enormous impact of Husserl’s conception which, in spite of the obstacles thrown
up in the Soviet era, is reflected in a distinctive and quite deep way, in twentieth- century
Georgian philosophy.
Reprinted with permission from Encyclopedia of learning – Phenomenology World-
Wide. (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002.)
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SUMMARY IN GEORGIAN
fenomenologiuri azrovneba me-20 saukunis
qarTul filosofiaSi
mamuka doliZe
saqarTvelos savle wereTlis filosofiis instituti
reziume
avtori ganixilavs me-20 saukunis qarTvel filosofosTa wvlils feno-
menologiuri filosofiis ganviTarebaSi. am TvalsazrisiT gaSuqebulia cnobil
qarTvel filosofosTa – kote baqraZis, angia boWoriSvilis, zurab kakabaZis,
guram TevzaZis, givi margvelaSvilis da merab mamardaSvilis filosofiuri
koncefciebi.
germaniaSi yofnisas, kote baqraZe uSualod eswreboda edmund huserlis
leqciebs. miRebuli STabeWdilebebi da TandarTuli komentarebi safuZvlad daedo
mis fundamentur naSroms „eseebi axali da Tanamedrove burJuaziuli filosofiidan.“
kote baqraZis mosazrebiT, fenomenologiurma meTodma anti-fsiqologizmis poziciidan
gadawyvita kantis problema WeSmaritebis obieqturobis Sesaxeb. igi xazs usvams,
rom me-s gancda, rogorc sakuTari arsebobis gancda, scildeba fsiqologiuri
movlenis farglebs. es TviTrefleqsia ki ar asaxavs subieqtis arsebobas, rogorc
Sinagani garegans, aramed wvdeba da emTxveva mas im zRvrul wertilSi, sadac
garegani da Sinagani erTad arsebobs da sadac gvecxadeba subieqti da obieqti
ganuyofeli erTianobis saxiT.
angia boWoriSvili anti-fsiqologizmis pozicias icavs esTetikuri
fenomenologiis sferoSi. es koncefcia gadmocemulia mis wignSi “fsiqologiis
principuli sakiTxebi” (2 nawili, 1959, “mecniereba”). angia boWoriSvilis azriT,
esTetikuri kategoriebi ise unda davadginoT, rom gverdi auaroT fsiqologiur
cnebebs. fenomenologiam unda dasZlios gnoseologizmi, is, rac esTetikas
avtonomiurobas ukargavs. esTetikam TavisTavad, fsiqologiisa da Semecnebis Teoriis
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daxmarebis gareSe unda daadginos sakuTari obieqti, romlis safuZvelia me-s,
rogorc egzistencialuri da SemoqmedebiTi sawyisis gancda.
zurab kakabaZe qarTuli fenomenologiuri skolis axal Taobas ganasaxierebs.
misi cnobili naSromi _ “egzistencialuri krizisis problema da Eedmund
huserlis transcendentaluri cnobiereba” fenomenologiis ontologiur versias
gvTavazobs. filosofosis azriT, intersubieqturobis gagebis da filosofiis,
rogorc mkacri mecnierebis dadgenis sirTule ar warmoadgens braldebas
fenomenologiis mimarT, aramed gviCvenebs huserlis koncefciisa da meTodologiis
Riaobas, misi subieqturi arsis amboxebas samyarosa da codnis obieqtivaciis
winaaRmdeg. fenomenologias ar aintersebs arc gare samyaro da arc gnoseologiuri
subieqti; misi sagania transcendentaluri subieqtis mier obieqturi samyaros
konstruirebis ontologiuri procesi.
aseve mniSvnelovania guram TevzaZis Tvalsazrisi Eedmund huserlisa da
maqs Seleris Sesaxeb, romelic ganviTarebulia mis wignSi “XX saukunis filosofiis
istoria“ da fenomenologiuri koncefcia Semecnebis obieqtis Sesaxeb, gadmocemuli
mis naSromSi _ “nikolai hartmanis ontologiis kritika”.
guram TevzaZe SeniSnavs, rom hartmanis mixedviT, Semecnebis sagani
cnobierebisTvis imanenturic aris (raki azri mxolod azriseuls Seimecnebs) da
transcendenturic (radgan Semecnebas daekargeba azri, Tuki azrovneba ver gascda
Tavis Tavs). es, ra Tqma unda, winaaRmdegobaa, magram cnobierebaSi arsebobs mocemul
winaaRmdegobaTa daZlevis da gaerTianebis safuZveli.
aRniSnuli erTianoba miiRweva im SemTxvevaSi, Tuki Semecnebis obieqtad
iqceva TviTon cnobiereba, rogorc wminda fenomeni, magram wminda cnobiereba
realurad miuwvdomelia, amitom TevzaZe fiqrobs, rom hartmanis Tvalsazriss
aaqvs mxolod meTodologiuri mniSvneloba, rom Semecneba ka ar wvdeba Tavis
obieqts, aramed miuwvdomlad saxavs mas da miznis am usasrulo miswrafebaSi
axorcielebs sakuTar sazriss.
hartmanis meTodologiis koncefciad Camoyalibebis mizniT, avtori gvTavazobs
mivmarTod dekartes meTods; ra Tqma unda, wminda cnobiereba miuwvdomelia, magram
me SemiZlia cnobierebis realuri Sinaarsi Cavsva brWyalebSi, anu mivaniWo mas
wminda fenomenis mniSvneloba, romlis siwmindeSic, dekartes msgavsad, SemiZlia
Sevitano eWvi, magram TviT mniSvnelobis micemis aqti aq ueWvelia, rac safuZvels
maZlevs davadgino Semecnebis sagani – es aris fsiqikuri SinaarsisTvis arsiseuli
fenomenis mniSvnelobis miniWebis aqti. amrigad, sazrisis micemis fenomenologiuri
procesi hartmanis meTodologias Semecnebis koncefciad aqcevs.
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qarTveli mwerali da moazrovne givi margvelaSvili Tavis filosofiur
Semoqmedebas haidegeris ontologias uZRvnis, magram misi naSromi – “cnobierebis
fenomenologiuri kodebi” warmoadgens huserlisa da haidegeris koncefciaTa
SedarebiT analizs.
SeiZleba iTqvas, rom haidegeric da huserlic erTi da igive meTods
iyeneben, oRond Sebrunebuli niSniT;
huserli auqmebs arsebobis sazriss arsis ideaciis procesSi.
haidegeri axdens arsis reduqcias arsebobis sazrisis dadgenis mizniT.
magram haidegeri ar aris huserlis memkvidre da oponenti mxolod
meTodologiis TvalsazrisiT. givi margvelaSvilis kvlevebi naTels hfens Rrmad
Sinaarsobriv mimarTebas XX saukunis am or did moazrovnes Soris. orive
filosofoss aerTianebs amboxeba filosofiuri tradiciis mimarT, oRond, huserli
axdens gadatrialebas transcendentaluri cnobierebis sferoSi, haidegeri ki
qmnis axal ontologias, sadac yofiereba struqturirebulia drois eqstazis
mixedviT.
merab mamardaSvili ZiriTadad axali, araklasikuri racionalizmis problemebs
ikvlevda, magram misi wvlili Tanamedrove fenomenologiaSi metad sayuradReboa
Tundac marsel prustis romanis originaluri interpretaciis gamo.
krebuli “gzis fsiqologiuri topologia” aRniSnuli romanis _ “dakarguli
drois ZiebaSi”, fenomenologiur gaazrebas eZRvneba.
dro, rogorc cxovrebis erTxel Cavlili mdinare, ganumeorebelia; rac iyo,
is aRar aris, magram rac aris, mas SeiZleba mivaniWoT gardasul movlenaTa azri.
mamardaSvilis interpretaciiT, marsel prusti mogviTxrobs ara Tavisi cxovrebis
Sesaxeb, aramed is gadmogvcems Tavis amJamier Semoqmedebas; Tu rogor iqmneba da
ibadeba xelaxla is, rac samudamod Cabarda warsuls. saqme gvaqvs awmyosTan,
romelic mniSvnelobs rogorc warsuli da ara gardasulis mogonebasTan. axali
drois gardasaxva, Zvel, bavSvobisdroindel periodSi, fenomenologiuri aqtia,
romelic warsulis idealizacias axdens, mis faqtobriobas, arsiseul fenomenad
gardaqmnis. amitomac arsebobs frangi mwerlis gonebaSi warsuli aseTi romantiuli
da amaRlebuli saxiT.
mamardaSvili SeniSnavs, rom usazRvroa mwerlis nostalgia dakarguli
drois mimarT, magram SeuZlebelia mexsierebaSi ase wvrilad, ase gafaqizebulad
arsebobdes misi bavSvoba. aq mogoneba gamogonebad iqceva; mwerali igonebs ara
Tavis bavSvobas, aramed qmnis warsulis ekvivalentur axal realobas. iqneb, arc
arasodes yofila is, rasac mexsiereba ase mondomebiT gvixatavs? warsuls xom
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awmyos gadasaxedidan eniWeba gansakuTrebuli azri da xibli, is, misi Ziebis, misken
ukuqcevis ZaliT itvirTeba axali, arsobrivi mniSvnelobebiT da Tu es Zieba
dausrulebelia, maSin bavSvobis samyaroc usasrulod farTovdeba; mwerali gadadis
realobis yovelgvar sazRvars, raTa dakarguli drois amao ZiebaSi, mogoneba
gamogonebad aqcios, cxovrebiT damZimebuli xsovna “axali warsulis” Tavisufal
Semoqmedebad gardaqmnas.
marsel prustis romanis aseTi interpretacia gviCvenebs, Tu rogor esmis
merab mamardaSvils fenomenologia; es aris azrovnebis, rogorc SemoqmedebiTi
procesis realizaciis aqti.
dasasruls, daskvnis saxiT SeiZleba iTqvas, rom XX saukunis qarTuli
filosofia fenomenologias gaiazrebs cnobierebisa da yofierebis erTianobis
Suqze, romelic, amave dros, maT Soris arsebul principul gansxvavebasac
gulisxmobs. metic SeiZleba iTqvas: swored subieqturi arsisa da obieqturi
arsebobis erTmaneTisgan gansxvavebis meTodi warmoadgens maTi gaerTianebis da
ganuyofeli Serwymis fenomenologiur gzas.
Catarebuli mokle mimoxilva qarTvel filosofosTa Semoqmedebis Sesaxeb
imasac cxadyofs, rom dRes, Tanamedrove filosofiuri azrovneba, warmoudgenelia
edmund huserlis fenomenologiasTan mimarTebis gareSe. avtori gviCvenebs,
rom miuxedavad siZneleebisa, romelsac qmnida sabWoTa ideologia, fenomenologia
Rrmad aisaxa da SemoqmedebiTad ganviTarda qarTvel filosofosTa originalur
SromebSi.
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HUMAN DEVELOPMENT BETWEEN IMAGINATIVE
FREEDOM AND VITAL CONSTRAINTS
ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA
President of World Phenomenological Society
I present in what follows an interdisciplinary inquiry following my theoretical/practi-
cal approach. I abandon, in fact the stereotypical classification of philosophical problems
with their separated realms of inquiry, and in contrast approach their common ground-
work which is life itself at its basic onto-metaphysical level. Phenomenology/ontopoiesis
of life is a descending intuitively to the level of the pristine logos of life in which all the
scientific and philosophical problems find their common roots. It is on this level that cer-
tain philosophical and scientific problems, which have remained unsolvable for centuries,
find their natural setting and solution. Therefore, using the basic metaphysical-ontic plat-
form, I will attempt to show how the question of “human development” may be treated
profitably.
First of all, let us correct some of the classic preconceptions about our point of
departure. As a matter of fact, the misunderstanding of the conception of what is “human”
calls for transformation. Traditionally human being has been specified by its “nature” which
is defined by the salient features that distinguish him/her from other living beings. With
the penetrating progress of natural science, this approach cannot be upheld.
Biological, chemical, and medical sciences of today demand that we change this
approach. The human being in its salient specific characteristics is not a once and for-
ever established entity. On the contrary it is, first of all, the fruit of a long line of develop-
ment within the natural unfolding of life as a type. Furthermore, each individual unfolds,
grows and shrinks, remaining dependent throughout upon his/her natural milieu with its
laws and rules. In agreement with concrete statements of science, our inquiry into the
logos of life reveals that the human being cannot be defined by its specific nature but by
the entire complex of the individualizing life of which it is vitally a part and parcel. That is,
instead of talking about human nature we must switch to a conception of the Human Con-
dition-within-the-unity-of-everything-there-is-alive.
However, this must be done with a very essential specification, namely the “HUMAN
CREATIVE CONDITION”.
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1. POINT OF DEPARTURE OF OUR ONTOPOIETIC INQUIRY: HUMAN CREATIVE
CONDITION WITHIN THE UNITY OF LIFE
It is precisely by the human creative act— instead of the cognitive act - that we may
enter into the innermost plane of the workings of the logos of life, which in its basic thread of
vital force -vis vitale - brings individualizing life about, promotes its unfolding and controls
its course.
It is the descent into the becoming of beings, living creatures and non-living objects in
their origination, generative ties, existential connectedness, interactive unfolding - and this
in their innermost logos which prompts them - that is indispensable to understanding the
intricacies of existence. Following Periander, I usually say that to understand one thing you
have to know them all. Logos of this origination and becoming is the crucial point of all our
projects.
Human creative condition as a conception of the human being is the fruit of such ontic
discovery. As a matter of fact, as much as this continuity of the living process/progress/
regress is the basic question of epistemology as well as of the major part of our knowledge
at large, it is by focusing upon the nature and extent of the human creative act that we
discover Human Condition-within-the-unity-of-every thing- there-is-alive.
We thereby discover the ontologically basic plane of life’s generation and becoming -
a plane upon which, in contrast to classic ontologism focusing upon the structure of things
and beings, we inquire and may follow the POIEIN, the making, the becoming, the unfolding
of these structures themselves in their circumambient context of resources, forces,
intergenerative energies in their basic self-individualization - in existence. In the onto-poietic
level we find confirmation that life consists of constructive poiein, becoming, unfolding, de-
velopment. That is to say that through the ontopoietic level of the logos of life, we uncover
life’s incipient forces, its directional law, its LOGOS.
To understand the Human Condition-within-the-unity-of-everything-there-is- alive we
have to focus upon two of its basic features:
(1) Discreet continuity or disruption of its unfolding, and
(2) The ingrowness of the individual existence into its circumambient existential net-
work.
Ingrowness is a paradoxical way of becoming. Establishing order to particularize,
individualize itself and to unfold the incipient beingness existentially implies a radius of
external conditions that are themselves suspended upon a system of life which subtends
them in living beingness. No living element may be seen apart—never beyond its
circumambient co generic radius or outside of its inscription within the network of the earth
(its groundwork) and the cosmos with its rules and laws. These two spheres of existential
dependencies co-determine the autonomy of the living/becoming individual
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2. THE MATRIX OF BECOMING
In order to grow in selfhood from within the living beingness, this twofold inward/out-
ward oriented existential route manifests by drawing upon forces and energies from the
“outward” circumambient sphere. This sphere remains in the center of our attention, always
asking how the direction can be found from “within,” how to find fulfillment within the sphere
of their application. In this respect we have to differentiate within the stretch of life between
the two essential matrixes of poiein, individualizing-becoming, and a third one “in between”.
1. The ontopoietic vital matrix of generation, unfolding, development of organic/vital
significance of individualizing life.
2. The transformatory climax of the unfolding of living types which goes in between the
vital and the creative, that is specifically human phase of unfolding life, with the advent of
Imagination Creatrix.
3. The creative matrix of the specifically human development.
It is of primary importance to differentiate these three matrixes with their specific func-
tional systems, yet see that inside they are fused in a collaborative variability, precisely from
the differentiation of their guiding principles, on the one hand, and their innermost existen-
tial — ontopoietic discreet continuity of developmental advance, on the other hand. There
lies the key to understanding human development with its autonomy on the one side and its
existential dependencies on the other.
I. Let us first of all come back to the incipient instance of life. It is in its self-individualiza-
tion from the prompting vis vitale (vis viva) of the logos that beingness sets out its life-career,
carrying with itself its entire initial endowment concentrated in its ontopoietic sequence. The
ontopoietic sequence carries not only its germinal/ seminal endowment but simultaneously all
the indispensable dynamic directional devices to make it unfold within favorable rudimentary
circumstances in a way that using them according to their fitness with its own material it works
out its unfolding. Simultaneously it transforms this circumambient groundwork, preparing it for
further propitious conditions allowing further development of its sequential virtual ties. It ini-
tiates thereby a thread of unfolding developing its beingness according to the constructive
design which it brings with itself. It is this constructive encounter of the inward virtual ties
prompted by the forces of the logic tendencies with the propitious, fitting material that consti-
tutes in tandem the individualizing beingness and its vital matrix. It is of crucial significance to
recognize this doubly working dynamic matrix of individualizing life.
To summarize: the ontopoiesis of nature - vitally significant — progresses and pro-
motes the flow of life, organizing it around the self-individualization of beingness flowing out
of coalescing moves of’ becoming following the intrinsic line of the directional sequence in
constituting a circumambient radius in fitness with appropriate favorable conditions. Its
telos is set up by its intrinsic logic sequence transformed in the course of unfolding into a
self-prompting agency to be followed.
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II. With the perfecting of agency’s progress in unfolding its organs of sharing-in-life,
the phase of life’s ontopoiesis enters into the play of imagination Creatrix.
In fact, this is the vitally significant ontopoietic matrix; which in this constructive unfold-
ing leads to a more developed sharing-in-life matrix of communicative animalism. Upon its
climatic constructive apex when the inward agency of the self-individualizing beingness
acquires the basis for higher communicative sharing of life’s necessities, one truly enters
into the play of becoming.
Indeed when in the course of the progressive unfolding of the receptive/remitting organs
of the living agency, the system is ready, there enters into the game of life a unique force,
Imagination Creatrix, which dramatically converts the functional system of the ontopoietic/
animal matrix with its directional program of an inwardly programmed and selective system
into a self directed but autonomously imaginatively programmed projected and deliberatively
selected autonomy that is the creative matrix of the specifically human significance of life.
It is in this intermediary field of essential transformations that the metamorphosis of
the animal/vital functions occurs. All the life-significant forces, the organic, vital, and psychic
of the soul meet at this field with the essential constructive functional links that transform the
living agent into a self conscious selective agency. This transformed functional field with the
leading orientation of creativity opens a new theatrical stage for the logos of life.
3. THE HUMAN CONDITION COMING INTO ITS OWN:
IMAGINATION CREATRIX BRINGING IN THE FREEDOM TO INTERROGATE AND
THE POWERS OF CREATIVE INVENTION
When we stand back and ponder it, we are amazed at how the ontopoietic unfolding in
self-individualizing life for so long “tacitly” and obscurely carried our various functional spheres
and then how, all of a sudden, our beingness was extended into the sphere of feelings toward
ideas, projects and community. The infinity of our circumstances became apparent. Life sud-
denly resonated with countless voices, shimmered with shades, assumed all manner of shapes.
The life that sustains us became something we could configure. After submersion in the veg-
etative-vital-organic spheres, we surface into the glaring light of the spirit. Within the sphere of
the spirit, we at last find ourselves free and empowered. In “our” body-flesh-psyche-conscious-
ness we become the focus of cosmic forces, the center of the universe.
For us, “living” means being alive in the sphere of this empowerment. The living indi-
vidual raises itself above the enactment of the virtual ties inherent in its ontopoietic se-
quence and acquires personal stature as a self. This is obviously a new phase in our condi-
tion. It is attained with the emergence in our constitutive system of Imagination Creatrix.
Two major steps follow on that, the genesis of the specifically human mind and of the
human person.
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4. FROM THE LIVING AGENT’S VITAL CONSTITUTIVE SYSTEM (THE BRAIN)
TO THE HUMAN MIND
We have been surveying those spheres of the human condition, how the feelers, hooks,
antennae thrown out by living beings are accompanied by an ingrown self-individualizing
beingness inscribing its autonomous selfhood within the cosmos. In the realm of universal
law, living beings come to lay down their own basic rules of life enactment.
As we were summarizing the main knots or phases of metamorphosis marking the
growth of autonomy in living beings, we dwelt on the body-flesh-psyche-spirit progression
or are, on the continuity in this progression, and in particular on the fabric that tends toward
the emergence of each and of specific novum of sense in each.
In the “brain” we have the great apparatus bringing together the entire functional net-
work of the physical-organic-corporeal-psychic unity. This apparatus is intrinsically tied to
the living agent and is for it a platform for the expansion of powers. In its performance the
brain plays a preparatory role in establishing the fully autonomous living being that appears
only with the emergence sua sponte of Imagination Creatrix. The highest level of animal
development is the platform for the appearance of what we acknowledge to be human
beings. For the last phase of the transformation-metamorphosis of life, the logos prepares
its own transformation into the creative logos, which derives its dynamism and direction
from the human being. At this juncture the human being is empowered by the creative logos
to invent and forge, which transforms the human condition itself. All of this occurs, of course,
in strict coordination with the givens of nature/life.
The course of life was from its incipient moment carried by individual living beings,
each following its very own ontopoietic sequence. But now at this point, where life has at-
tained a new functional platform, the constitutive apparatus of the organic brain is informed
by Imagination Creatrix and myriad transformative devices are crystallized into the func-
tional system of the mind so that this particular living being acquires the power of invention
and the power to project lines of conduct.
That amounts to saying that the vitally operative logos of life is progressively prepar-
ing, through its diversification, just this radical step, the entrance into the game of life of
Imagination Creatrix. Imagination Creatrix proceeds from the womb of life and depends on
it, yet it lifts the logos, thus far subservient to meeting the needs of survival, to the level of
autonomy, in which the living subject becomes endowed with a far-reaching range of con-
scious intellectual performance. We have the self-directing sphere of consciousness in a
fully conscious human individual.
This is not the place to enter into a discussion of the creative powers of the logos
instrumental in the constitution of the human mind with all its faculties. What is here at stake
is the differentiation of the logos of life in its specifically human constructive expressions
and devices, that which characterizes the human being within his circumambient world and
the commonly shared universe of life.
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5. THE HUMAN WORLD OF LIFE: DEVELOPMENT IN A CONFLICTION SITUATION
BETWEEN THE HUMAN INVENTIVE PROJECTIONS AND VITAL NECESSITIES
With the human creative mind we have entered the specifically human plane of exist-
ence, developing the human significance of life. Having laid down the ontopoietic corner-
stones of such an investigation in which the fruits of the encounter between the vital-natural
functions of animal life become unfolded further and further until their essential encounter
with the rays of creative imagination (with the living agent being transformed through this
metamorphosis into a human creative mind), it remains now only to review the main traits of
this metamorphosis to bring out the specificity of the human constructive/destructive devel-
opment in its multisided confliction and somewhat enigmatic features.
First of all, let us compare and emphasize the new directional lines in the develop-
ment of the human being as well as the influx of new resources and forces. There is no need
to emphasize the emergence of the individual personal will which conducts the specifically
human progress/regress in contrast with the ontopoietic design which subtends the progress/
regress of the living agent within the natural sphere of existence. Let us repeat that, while at
the natural level the law of the fitness reigns according to which selection of food, shelter,
pasture, and higher functions of the sharing-in-life (following a pretraceable line in beingness),
with the emergence of the will also emerges an entire apparatus of intellective interroga-
tion, deliberation, selection and planning. While the existential progress/ regress of the
natural/vital development consists of instances of coalescing moves toward a constructive
project laid out and fore traced in its essential virtuality by the intrinsic ontopoietic sequence,
complex as they may be advancing in a quasi “linear” fashion of Chronos, in contrast, the
human advance in moving and unfolding - proceeding from within the new prompting force
of the will and through the mental network of deliberative power, the selective and decisive
moves of the human mind— takes on a special form: the planning of the mind in which all
the faculties take part. We now see a form of “achievement” being planned. No matter how
simple the human act, it stems from an imaginative propulsion of the mind, it carries an aim
of “achievement.” This essential feature endows human self awareness with an inner con-
viction of being “free.” Free to project, free to choose, but does it mean free to achieve?
Here we come back to our initial ontopoietic statement which confirms itself. Namely,
as I have emphasized above, the individual existence within its existential unfolding re-
mains part and parcel of its existential context - that is, it maintains a crucial interplay with
the circumambient life network within which it is ingrown. The specifically human creative
sphere of life — the human world of life — not only remains existentially/vitally founded
within the natural sphere of life, dependent upon its fluctuating conditions, but the personal/
individual unfolding and undertaking within the creative sphere of life is also essentially
ingrown into the closer and further Intersubjective extending context - the network of vital
existence -consisting of other human creative individuals planning their moves toward
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achievements of their own aims, according to their inventive powers, but also according to
their strictly subjective appetites, tastes, inclinations and deep elementary inclinations com-
ing from natural strivings and drives.
Beyond the “rationally” calculable motives we have to work with the third quasi matrix
of becoming: the in-between sphere in which the elementary functions of the natural-animal
development encounter the specifically human imaginatively lifted powers. Here we come
to a culminating point of our consideration. On the one hand, the creative/inventive swing
and deliberative mind gives the human being an imaginatively expanded self awareness of
his/her powers; it makes him/her feel an agent of his/her life course, and a master of “blind”
forces which he/she may direct to his/her advantage. On the other side, he/she is grounded
in them and subject to innumerable influences in his/her unfolding and acting from the co-
existential circuits.
At present, with its capacities to calculate and cognitively encompass life, Life-world,
cosmos, etc. human life appears to be expanding within the individual frame. As a matter of
fact, we speak about the evolution of types having concentrated now upon the evolution of
the human individual who appears to be already endowed with consciousness greatly en-
larged compared to humans of one hundred years ago and appears also to have found the
secret of further, seemingly infinite, expansion of human potential. Such expansion mani-
fests itself not only within the individual but in the transformative progress of the entire life’s
and world’s network. We see the expansion not only in the technological growth of the indi-
vidual and societal existence but also in the growth of human consciousness and of spiritual
dimensions of experience. Each day we are faced with new inventions and new turns of
mind. We presume an infinite progress ahead. This progress creates new demands upon
the individual and society as well as creating new problems which society will have to solve.
Ever new sources of force emerge and the human being believes to be able — as master
— to foresee and control their effects to lead their course. Yet, like the sorcerer’s appren-
tice, having found the key to release the current of power, human beings do not possess
either the key to stop the course nor to entirely control its achievements. They remain al-
ways subject to the whims of natural, cosmic, and human forces.
This course involves not only individual natural endowment and inclinations but the
entire network of sharing-in-life within the circumambient and further circles. It depends
upon ontopoietic fitting directions, ontopoietic rules of the circumambient contexts, on the
one hand, and the individual creative genius, on the other.
The question: “how to master the routes of the human development within the individual
as well as within its interactive world, society, culture while navigating upon the stormy sea
between and among conflicting forces without a compass” is beyond the scope of my presen-
tation, which intends merely to trace its ontopoietic groundwork. We may, however, draw from
it an essential indication. Human mastery being out of reach, there seems to be an indispens-
able measure for human conduct if you want to safeguard human existence upon earth. That
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is, in order to control in some way the flux of human development for its existential advantage,
human being has to assume a special frame of mind. Keeping in sight the ontopoietic ground-
work sketched above, human calculation and balancing out of life’s conditions should be
handled according to it with measure, proportion and temperance.
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SUMMARY IN GEORGIAN
adamianis ganviTareba warmosaxvis
Tavisuflebasa da sasicocxlo
aucileblobas Soris
ana-tereza timieniCka
msoflio fenomenologiuri institutis prezidenti
(Sejameba da kritikuli Sefaseba)
 avtoris mier SemoTavazebuli Tema, misi mravalwliani SemoqmedebiTi
Ziebis sferos ganekuTvneba. sakiTxi exeba sicocxlis samyaros gaazrebas Tanamedrove
fenomenologiuri filosofiis Suqze. uaRresad saintereso da Rrma moazrovnis
TvaliT danaxuli sicocxle, misi safuZvliani da metad gafaqizebuli detalizacia,
misi warmoSobis urTulesi meqanizmis Cveneba...… yovelive es scildeba mecnierul-
filosofiuri analizis tradiciul farglebs. avtors sicocxle ainteresebs
ara misi formadasrulebuli da bolomde determinirebuli struqturis saxiT,
romlis gamovlenaTa mixedviT tradiciuli ontologia ganazogadebs sicocxlis
arss, aramed misi mizania Cawvdes sicocxlis majiscemas, cocxali arsis warmoSobisa
da qmnadoba-ganaxlebis dausrulebel mdinarebaSi. sicocxlis ganumeorebel nakadSi
Sesvla SesaZlebelia mxolod erTxel, amitom filosofiuri ganzogadoeba aq ver
gascdeba cocxali arsis Wvretas mis unikalur da ganumeorebel xdomilebaSi.
klasikuri racionalizmis gza, erTeulTa msgavsebidan zogad-logikuri cnebisken,
aq CixSi Sedis da intuiciis SemoqmedebiT wiaRsvlaSi gardaisaxeba. es
fenomenologiuri intuicia ar uaryofs, piriqiT, afarToebs da ganaaxlebs Zvel
racionalizms, romlis maradiul niSansvetad kvlav gvecxadeba “logosis” idea,
magram gansxvavebiT heraklitesgan, avtori sicocxlis logoss xedavs ara
SemecnebiTi gonebis TvaliT, aramed SemoqmedebiTi intuiciiT. “logosi” aq gvevlineba
sicocxlis unikaluri fenomenis SemoqmedebiTi struqturirebis matricis saxiT.
  aranakleb saintereso da originaluria avtoriseuli msjelobis stili.
azris cocxali pulsacia logikuri sicxadiT da Tanmimdevrulad ki ar viTardeba,
aramed miiswrafis erTbaSad da deskrifciulad moicvas is uamravi faqtori da
niuansi, rac aryofnis wiaRidan warmoSobs da aagorebs sicocxlis talRas. yoveli
winadadeba, Tavisi rTuli, sintaqsuri TanwyobiTa da qvewyobiT miiswrafis srulad
gamoxatos sicocxlis fenomenologiuri koncefcia, rac, ra Tqma unda, SeuZlebelia,
magram swored am SeuZleblobasTan WidilSi ibadeba movlenaTa aRweris Ria da
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mravlismetyveli stili. msjeloba azris mravalganzomilebian moZraobaTa gadakveTis,
zeddebis da Serwymis integrirebul Sedegs Seadgens, sadac “arqeologiuri gaTxrebi”
sicocxlis sxvadasxva mniSvnelobaTa moZiebis mizniT, mravalmxriv SeiZleba vawarmooT.
teqstis aseTi garTulebuli forma Sinaarsobriv datvirTvasac iZens; sicocxle
unda Seicno da SeigrZno ara mis kerZo SemTxvevaTa gansazRvrisa da martivi
ganzogadebis gziT, aramed winaswar unda Cawvde mas im uzogadesi da ganusazRvreli
procesis wiaRSi, rasac yofierebis individualizacia hqvia. yofna-aryofnis moZraobaSi
arsebuli sicocxle upirvelesad aris Semoqmedebis TavisTavadi aqti, procesi,
romelSic uamravi faqtori monawileobs. sicocxlis scenaze moTamaSe es faqtorebi
“logosis dramaturgiis”, anu movlenaTa xdomilebisa da ganviTarebis matricis
mixedviT qmnian e.w. “sicocxlis agents”, romelic emateba da erwymis biofizikur
realobas, raTa Seitanos materiaSi Tavisuflebisa da avtonomiurobis principi. es
principi cocxali arsis sasicocxlo garemosTan Tavisufal urTierTqmedebasa da
albaTur mizez-SedegTa urTierT TamaSiT ganisazRvreba. aq filosofosis gafaqi-
zebuli Tvali xedavs, Tu rogor egueba organuli naerTi garemos, rogor Cndeba am
nebayoflobiT SeguebaSi Tavisufali neba, rogor funqcionirebs Tavis tvini da
rogor maRldeba centraluri nerviuli sistema gonebisa da cnobierebis donemde;
rogor egzistirebs adamianis cnobiereba sociumSi, intersubieqturobisken da
sabolood, idumali zeamocanis mixedviT, rogor miiswrafvis yoveli arsi usasrulo
telosisaken. iqmneba STabeWdileba, rom “sicocxlis agenti” mudmivad gaurbis
materiis determinizmsa da inertulobas, sasicocxlo sinTezis Tavisufali TamaSis
gziT. amitom materias, mizezobrivi da miznobrivi aucileblobis miRma, axasiaTebs
TviTinterpretaciis unaric, rac mis Tavisuflebas moaswavebs sakuTari Tavisgan.
sicocxle TiTqos Tavisuflad, SemoqmedebiTi naxtomebis gziT viTardeba
martivi SenaerTidan rTuli organizmisken, rac niSnavs, rom WeSmaritad es
procesi Sebrunebuli saxiT mniSvnelobs da rom RmerTi, samyaros individuaciis
umaRlesi da saboloo Sedegi, sinamdvileSi am procesis pirvelsawyissa da
safuZvels Seadgens.
yoveli cocxali arsi da umTavresad adamiani Tavis SemoqmedebiT
TavisuflebaSi miemarTeba iqiT, saidanac is aucileblobiT momdinareobs. amitom,
Tavisufleba sulac ar niSnavs Tavisuflebas. avtori SeniSnavs, rom gvaqvs
Tavisufleba realur ZalTa moqmedebaSi, gvaqvs Tavisufleba Semoqmedebis sferoSi,
magram gvaqvs Tu ara Tavisufleba dasaxuli miznisa da miswrafebis mimarT?
pasuxi am SekiTxvaze Tavisuflebisa da aucileblobis erTianobas gulisxmobs.
es aucilebloba sxva araferia, Tu ara sicocxlis samyaros intencionaloba, misi
metafizikuri mizanmimarTeba, romelic arasodes amoiwureba sicocxlis realizaciis
ukve ganxorcielebuli da Semdgari formebiT, aramed grZeldeba yvelasa da
yvelafris miRma, usasrulod, yofierebis SemoqmedebiTi individuaciis Tvaluwvdenel
perspeqtivaSi.
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THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL CONCEPTION
OF QUANTUM THEORY AND THE POLYPHONY
OF MODERN FICTION
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Preface
The problems under discussion refer to the following topic: the phenomenological way
of thinking in various fields of human activity. The phenomenological conception of quantum
theory, resulting from the analogy between Husserl’s phenomenology and Bohr’s interpretation
of quantum theory is used as a basic conception here. We certainly realize that the hypotheses
and results of our investigation go beyond Bohr’s interpretation, but at the same time, they are
a logical extension of Bohr’s position to the field of existential phenomenology. By extending
Bohr’s interpretation through the complementarity principle, we link “orthodox” quantum theory
with the stream of consciousness and polyphony in contemporary fiction. The basis of such an
analogy is the fact that both fields (that of the atomic world and that of artistic reality) are
committed to the same phenomenological method of object construction.
By treating the following assertions on the basis of existential phenomenology we try
to reveal how consciousness, as a stream of existence, acts in both the physical and artistic
realms. All this reflects modern scientific thinking and the art of fiction; it highlights an important
feature of contemporary thinking - the appearance of polyphonic forms in the existential
unity of human consciousness.
I. EXPANSION OF BOHR’S INTERPRETATION OF QUANTUM THEORY
We expand Bohr’s principle of complementarity and assert that it expresses not
only a new situation in quantum physics, but the essence of contemporary thinking in science.
For us the prime feature of this way of thinking is its rejection of a common basis of cognition,
which is responsible for the grounding of consciousness in terms of the truth.
Thus, “complementary” acquires a meaning in a new context, that of the independent
and self-existent layers of consciousness, which are mutually exclusive and imply non-
existence beyond themselves. According to the principle of complementarity, we have in
spite of the denial of the common world, a meaning of existence which comprehends the
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mutually exclusive parts of the mind. Therefore, it is advisable to regard them as mutually
complementary. We do not mean the existence of things surrounding us. Complementarity
is a regular principle of subjective being, which is a process of the acquisition of meaning.
This process creates existential meaning in the perspective of infinity.
By asserting that complementarity introduces the meaning of subjective being into the
quantum realm, we also confirm the integrity of atomic experimentation, i.e., the observed
interaction between micro particles and measurement instruments which are indivisible and
cannot be subject to control, does not reflect the interaction between the classical and quantum
object, but between the subject and object, or strictly speaking, between subjective and objective
being. Otherwise, the uncontrolled character of the interaction would be impossible to explain.
Only the assumption of subject-object interaction explains this. The subject can control this
interaction, as it can objectify itself, but this act of objectification can not exhaust it. There is
always a certain extant subjectivity which ensures objectification. In the classical approach,
this subjective component is outside the picture of physical reality, but in a quantum realm this
is an integral component of atomic action and the picture-of reality. Therefore, the interaction
between particles and instruments has an uncontrolled nature.
Thus, we receive an important result: In contrast to classical physics, subjective exis-
tence is an integral part of quantum reality (we mean the picture of reality, but the denial of
the basic world beyond quantum descriptions opens the possibility of identifying the picture
of reality with the reality itself, by stating, that the act of description as an ontological act,
reveals, and hence, creates the different aspects of quantum reality). But according to our
suggestion, subjective being is an ontological act of the acquisition of meaning and no
more than that. Therefore, the measurement and classical language applied to atomic events,
by means of which the theory gains physical meaning, are not the components of knowledge
(as it was in the case of classical physics), but the components of physical reality itself.
Bohr realized these difficulties. He understood that despite the non-existence of an
individual subject in the quantum realm, atomic measurement involves more than the mere
action between classical and quantum objects, for that alone cannot explain its integrity.
Bohr assumed a new form of existence in the atomic world, one beyond that of physical
being and its necessity in classical terms, one of inequity, of indeterminacy, and the principle
of complementarity. We call that existence subjective being - the being of consciousness.
Another feature of subjective being is an aspiration for independence and self-existing
status. In our opinion, this is expressed through the indeterminate and individual conduct of
atomic particles (they are undetermined in so far as they are found by subjective existence).
Therefore, quantum probability, in contrast to classical quantity, is a peculiar reality due to
its irreducible nature.
Quantum probability is bound by the inequity of indeterminacy. Therefore, statistically
it excludes any probable error, exactly maintaining its internal (determined by Schrödinger’s
equality) probable meanings. This peculiarity of quantum probability contradicts the general
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classical concept of probability. Therefore, for that reason, basing themselves on quantum
probability and using the theory, physicists could successfully solve physical problems and
consider the quantum dualism and indeterminacy as non-physical, metaphysical problems.
But their approach was not justified. The wave-particle dualism is, first of all, a physical
problem; but the examination of wave and particles as mutually exclusive aspects is a
classical abstraction which is far from atomic reality. A mutually exclusive relationship means
that a particle is measured absolutely precisely, is located at a certain point while a wave
spreads infinitely and the information on its location cannot be made available. But such a
state of affairs cannot exist in quantum reality because the precision of measurement is
limited to the integrity of h. In quantum reality the wave and the particle do not in fact exclude
each other, but they can coexist, unless their exact values are lost. In short, instead of precise
wave-particle parameters we have probability quantities.
Quantum probability (i.e., statistical exclusion of probable error) found a statistical
theory contrary to the classical theory with its complete and full predictability; the non-exclusive
actual correspondence and simultaneous preservation of wave-particle dualism requires
fuller and deeper explanation.
Our explanatory model is the following: the wave-corpuscular atomic dualism echoes
the total dualism of existence; the dualism between spirit and matter, physical being and
spiritual reality, subjective and objective being. The great miracle of life and existence is the
fact that in spite of the mutually exclusive dualism between matter and spirit and the non-
existence of a logical bridge between them. Our consciousness as a living entity is
permanently transformed from spirit into matter and vice versa. Simultaneously life keeps
together the exclusive aspects of existence, even though this is logically impossible. How
can it happen? This question has no answer. Since life is miraculous, we should not search
for a solution but accept the dualism containing integrated reality, instead. Existence is an
indivisible result of the interaction of mutually exclusive sides - subjective and objective
being, which is obviously revealed in the atomic field. Microphysical reality is an integral
result of the interaction between subjective and objective being, and wave-particle dualism
is an unsolved phenomenon just like the miraculous exclusive integrity between matter and
spirit. By eliminating dualism we destroy life in the atomic world. The principle of comple-
mentarity, on the contrary, helps us to maintain the dualism and liken it to the real wave-
particle wholeness, just us living consciousness keeps the physical and mental aspects of
existence together despite the dualism.
The fact that wave-particle dualism and irreducible quantum probability cannot prevent
physicists from successfully solving various physical problems shows that there are some
interconnecting wave-corpuscular sides of the atomic world maintaining the dualism
simultaneously. Therefore, we can use the principle of complementarity with regard to the
above dualism, and state that wave-particle dualism is an individual case of dualism between
matter and spirit.
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II. PHENOMENOLOGICAL CONCEPTION OF QUANTUM THEORY
The interpretation of quantum reality as displaying the result of subject-object
interaction creates an opportunity to connect quantum theory with Edmund Husserl’s
phenomenological concepts, Husserl aspired to discover the basis of existence. He thought
that the way of traditional philosophy was wrong, for it used the concept of causality. Causality
implies an infinite chain of reasons and results and is thus useless as a foundation. Another
way of defining existence is to search its meaning. Phenomenology investigates the factors
creating the meaning of existence. These factors exist in an ontological depth of intelligence.
Thus, Husserl emphasized that consciousness forms reality.
Husserl criticized the natural position of science, which unreservedly assumed the
existence of reality. He remarked that abstention from the assertion of existence is a way of
revealing its meaning. Such an abstention is not the same as a doubt about or denial of the
existence of reality, for these imply an understanding of the meaning of existence. The goal
of this phenomenological abstention is to throw light on this meaning only. Therefore, the
phenomenological method puts the assertion of reality in brackets, retaining it conditionally.
All this means that Husserl requires that we break the chain linking consciousness and
external world, for being as an absolute, self-existing essence exists not outside of consciousness,
but in the depth of its ontological level. Thus, in searching for the absolute source, Husserl turned
his mind away from its relationship to the external world and toward the absolute clarity of
consciousness. Such a difficult task requires a definite method, the method of so-called
“phenomenological reduction”. According to this method, the first step in the purification of
consciousness from alien elements is the removal of any orientation toward the external things.
Thus, consciousness gets rid of the actual world and the content of consciousness acquires a
conditional nature, unrelated to reality, it lying beyond the issue of objective substantiation. This
is called “putting consciousness in brackets”, it is remarkable that the non-existence of the
relationship between consciousness and existence is a way of revealing the meaning of existence
and of presenting consciousness as the constructor, of reality.
The situation is the same with quantum theory. Because of the integrity of actions,
there is a prohibition against representing the atomic object beyond the classical conditions
of its measurement and cognition. These conditions do not apply to the subject as an
individual. Nevertheless, they are not a mere system of objects, surrounding the atomic
world. They acquire the meaning of cognitive conditions. The latter play the part of
consciousness which attaches physical meaning to a quantum object and thus forms the
atomic reality. Husserl turns his attention to pure consciousness by substantiating being
through the existence of consciousness. Perceiving classical instruments as conditions for
quantum cognition, Bohr substantiated atomic being by using these conditions, i.e., through
subjective existence. Bohr brings classical terms into the quantum realm and at the same
time limits their use in describing the inequity of uncertainty. In short, his non-classical
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description is composed of classical elements. This means that he breaks the link between
classical terms and classical reality, putting the classical picture in brackets.
Let us compare this manner of substantiation with the first step of phenomenological
reduction. According to Husserl, while putting in brackets the actual givenness of being, we
then consider it as the content of consciousness and raise the issue of the conditions of
their emergence. This means that we consider it not as the only reliable picture of the world,
but as one out of many probable pictures, which appear in various conditions. Thus, each
reflection of being is surrounded by various pictures, the possible reflection of the same
object in other cognitive conditions. Husserl denotes this as “unrevealing the horizon of
possibilities”. Here, he implies that possibilities are not an outcome of the actual picture,
but precede it instead. Therefore, “The science of pure possibilities precedes the science
of reality and makes the latter possible as a science” (1). Here we observe the resemblance
to a quantum situation: the classical experimental picture of the atom is the empirical
givenness of quantum reality, Quantum theory, as a microstate theory, is a theory of
possibilities, but not of the reality. The theory is not a result of generalization made on the
basis of atomic experiments conducted in the terms of the classical language. Therefore,
the latter, in particular the continuity of classical terms, contradicts quantum theory.
Quantum theory, the theory of quantum possibilities, precedes the classical
description of quantum reality and substantiates it, but there is no agreement between them;
the formalism of quantum theory and the classical picture of atomic reality are mutually
exclusive and are complementary ways of describing the atomic world. Hence, as is the
case with phenomenology, Bohr considers the actual quantum picture to be a probable
picture, one which is surrounded by the pure quantum possibilities that arise in different
experimental conditions. This is reflected in the following inequity of uncertainty:
dpdx > h
Opening the horizon of possibilities, Husserl intends to reveal some stable and
constant value which is maintained through all these changes. He considers every actual
state of mind as probable, putting it in brackets. Passing from one kind of possibility to
another, he gradually pulls free from the actual givenness and tackles the pure form of it,
which is nothing more than the experience of the pure self as a form of absolute being, for
this subjective component is present in all cases. Thus, according to Husserl, the fundamental
being that constructs the world is a subjective being, which is given through the experience
of the pure self the invariant value in the various possible pictures of reality. To continue our
analogy with quantum physics, it should be noted that while passing from one picture to
another (in particular we have in mind the wave-particle pictures of the atomic world)
everything changes, for, according to quantum theory, while there is no common ground
beneath, there is an unchangeable point, maintaining itself through the mutually exclusive
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states - the integrity of the quantum experiment based on the indivisible measurement
process, i.e. on the interaction between a measurement tool and the quantum object. This
interaction maintains its uncontrollable integrity through all quantum states. It is remarkable
that tool-object integration is a result of quantum theory, the theory of pure quantum possibilities
while it is also a result of applying Bohr’s principle (Bohr insists on the classical description
of measurement tools).
Consequently, we have on the one hand a classical picture of atomic measurement
and, on the other hand, pure quantum possibilities expressed in terms of quantum theory.
The actual atomic state somewhat agrees with probabilistic quantum theory, even though,
because we use mutually exclusive languages, there is no functional dependence between
them. This situation bears a strong resemblance to phenomenology, which implies that the
classical picture of atomic experimentation is open to the horizon of quantum possibilities.
Therefore, it is not surprising that we obtain an indivisible (instrument-object) system thanks
to a phenomenological approach to the quantum realm. The integrity of quantum
experimentation as an unchangeable point maintained through all quantum states is
comparable with the phenomenological invariant of the pure self.
As shown above, the invariant is indeed the pure self - the subjective point that reveals
itself through various states of mind. This self exists only as an orientation toward the object.
This orientation means that pure self has an idea of the object and simultaneously some
relationship with this idea. The self is readiness to fulfil the idea, hence it is more than an
idea only; it can be considered as a possibility and motion towards the fulfilment of an idea.
Such a definition agrees with the thesis that the source of being (the subjective point) is the
act of attaching meaning.
Let us trace the link between the phenomenological self and the integrity of the
instrument object interaction in the quantum area. Our analogy leads to a subjective
understanding of this interaction. Otherwise, it would not correspond to the phenomenological
self or would not play the part of the invariant in quantum stales. The integrity of instrument-
object systems reveals itself in the process of quantum measurement. Hence, it is a system
which attaches to the quantum object a physical meaning. Thanks to its resemblance to the
phenomenological self, we can consider this system as a subjective being, creating the
meaning of quantum reality. But despite the resemblance, there is a difference there: Husse1
distinguishes the pure self as an integral component of experience, whereas the quantum
invariant is the external integrity of the instrument-object interaction.
Phenomenology makes it possible to bring into correspondence these inner and
external aspects of cognition. When considering the pure self, a phenomenologist implies
the existential basis of consciousness beyond its psychological level. Therefore, he first
emphasizes the self as an experience of being and then as an experience of self. The self
has a phenomenological value as an inner expression of absolute existence, for this
component of cognition has a quality of being present always and everywhere.
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Phenomenological analysis shows, that the sense of self-being is given through perception
of the actual world. I perceive the world, and thanks to phenomenological analysis I realize
that my self participates in the construction of the given world. Here we do not try to find out
whether the self really creates the picture of the world or not; we only assert, that the creation
of the meaning of existence is a way to reveal the self as a motion of being. When creating
the meaning of something, I experience my own existence. Hence, existence expresses
itself through the pure self, which constructs the meaning of the existence. The identity of
self-consciousness and existence is possible, if consciousness presents itself as an act of
attaching meaning. Thus, there is a constant entity - pure self - which is the act of attaching
meaning. Totally comprising the subject’s self, it presents itself as a dynamic form of self-
existence, as an indivisible and incognizable act, for there is no subject beyond this, that
differentiates or cognizes such an integral act.
The similarity with quantum physics is obvious here: although instrument-object
integrity presents an external fact, it corresponds to my internal self - both are subjective
beings. When creating a physical meaning for quantum particles, the instrument-object action
plays the part of self-existence in relation to the atomic world. Just as in case of
phenomenology, we also encounter an indivisible and incognizable act of attachment of
meaning - expressed through the uncontrollable integrity of quantum measurement. Niels
Bohr wrote that it was senseless to speak of the atomic object without referring to the act of
measurement (the latter being an indispensable and existential component of the former).
The above shows, that in the quantum realm the concept of physical value is replaced by a
symbol for integral action; this action, jointly with quantum theory, acts as consciousness
does by transforming the formal structure of the quantum state into the elements of physical
reality.
We intend to extend our analogy from quantum phenomenology to the art of fiction. It
clear to us that the quantum situation is comparable to Joyce’s stream of consciousness
technique, for the writer using it shows the miraculous unity of formal and objective-realistic
layers of consciousness. Therefore, Robert Humphrey remarks: “I should like at least to
suggest one important achievement of Joyce’s in ‘Ulysses’ which is central to his whole
purpose and which is greatly dependent on stream of consciousness techniques. This is
the marvellous degree of objectivity which he achieves. Joyce, more than any other novelist,
gains what Joseph Warren Beach terms ‘dramatic immediacy’”. (2) We see that Joyce
achieves objectivity through the stream of consciousness technique which has a formal
nature. In a similar way Niels Bohr arrives at the objectivity of quantum particles (gives them
physical meaning) through the integrity of quantum measurement, which acts as
consciousness and stems from formal quantum theory. Later we will come back to this
similarity between quantum theory and fiction, but before that we would like to define the
principles of quantum phenomenology once again:
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l a. Criticizing the natural outlook of science (i.e., the unreserved assumption of the world’s
existence), Husserl brings up the issue of the limits and conditions of correspondence
between scientific description and the world.
I b. Considering the quantum theory, the inequity of uncertainty prompts, Bohr bring up
the issue of the limits and conditions of the correspondence between our picture of
physical reality and the atomic world.
2 a. Husserl considers the picture of the world to be a phenomenon of consciousness
without any relation to objective reality, i.e., to use phenomenological language, he
puts the picture in brackets,
2 b. Bohr considers the wave-particle pictures of the atomic world as phenomena in
themselves for he implies the existence of a non-objective reality beyond them. Thus,
he puts the wave-particle picture in brackets.
3a. According to Husserl, every actual picture of the world, as a phenomenon of
consciousness, is surrounded by various pictures which are possible in other cognitive
conditions. This means that the phenomenon is opened to a horizon of possibilities.
3 b. According to Bohr, the actual picture of the atomic world is surrounded by possible
pictures, which arise in other conditions of measurement. Quantum theory anticipates
these possible states. The latter create a horizon of possibilities, preceding the actual
quantum picture.
4 a. Passing from one phenomenon to another, through conjuring various possibilities,
Husserl gradually frees himself from the phenomenon’s content and reaches a stable
and invariant component - the pure self as the ground for the construction of the
picture of the world.
4 b. In passing from wave to particle pictures, through mutually exclusive atomic states,
we distinguish a stable and invariant component - the integrity of the instrument-
object interaction as a ground for the construction of the atomic world picture.
5 a. We assert that the pure self, in its existential dimension, is the act of the attachment
of meaning. The latter is an indivisible and undifferentiated act, since it exists as a
subject-object whole and there is no subject beyond it serving as a basis determining
the act. Thus, the pure self, as mind orientation to an object, exists as the
undifferentiated act of the attachment of meaning.
5 b. We assert that quantum measurement is the act of attaching physical meaning to
quantum particles. This is an uncontrollable and undifferentiated act for it presents a
subject-object whole and there is no subject beyond it serving as a basis determining
the act. Consequently, the indeterminism and uncertainty in the quantum realm have
the nature of a principle.
As we see, the methodological structure of “orthodox” quantum theory resembles
the phenomenological method used by Husserl. Moreover, we think that Bohr unconsciously
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used the phenomenological method when framing quantum theory. Used in various fields of
human activity, phenomenology provides a strong basis for contemporary thinking and shows
that consciousness, as a motion of existence (as the act of the attachment of meaning), is
the factor giving form to objective reality.
III. QUANTUM PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE POLYPHONY OF FICTION
Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology has greatly influenced different spheres of
contemporary thought. This new viewpoint establishes a polyphonic style of thinking in
philosophy, science and art. Our objective is to investigate this way of thinking, particularly
as displayed in literary works. However, besides applying the phenomenological method, it
is advisable to use several components of Bohr’s conception of quantum theory, for, despite
the crucial difference, the same effects of phenomenological approach have occurred in
both above-mentioned spheres.
Thus, the aim of our investigation is to use the phenomenological approach and
Bohr’s quantum theory to explain the polyphonic style of literary works. Besides Joyce and
Proust, we will consider Dostoevsky’s novels and intend to research William Faulkner’s
works. It was these great writers, in our opinion, who developed the polyphonic prose in
modern literature.
We assert that the occurrence of a parallel between Bohr’s quantum theory and the
“polyphonic style” in literature was not coincidental, for this parallel had a philosophical
ground: i.e., in both fields the same phenomenological approach was used - one just deals
with the construction of the object of science and the other with the creation of an artistic
form.
The phenomenological approach shows that reflection on the premise of the mind
anticipates reflection on the objects and events of the cognizable world. The premise of the
mind includes the possibility of knowledge, i.e., the possibility of there being correspondence
between external things and the nature of thinking. Accordingly, a physical object is to be
considered in a whole with the conditions of its cognition, which determines the possibility
of such a correspondence. Therefore, a physical object apprehended in this whole is unique,
since it is determined by irreversibly changing consciousness.
Bohr’s understanding of quantum theory meets this phenomenological requirement.
The famous scholar emphasized the indivisible coexistence of subject and object when
speaking about the impossibility of considering an atomic object apart from its measurement
conditions. Consequently, and very differently from how matters are grasped in classical
physics, we observe the subject’s penetration into the quantum realm. Therefore, the
description of the atomic world disintegrates into two independent (wave-particle) parts
and instead of a single, integrated form we obtain polyphonic pictures of physical events.
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When moving from one to the other picture, subjective conditions irreversibly change with
no common integrating ground standing beneath; the subject takes part in the construction
of the quantum object not as a transparent, immaterial mirror, reflecting the atomic world,
but as a special form of existence, one which gives quantum particles physical meaning.
The subject’s consciousness is regarded as a vital essence but not as an absolute, all-
powerful mind, the determining basis of classical physics.
Now, let us trace the link between the construction of a picture of physical forms and
forms of fiction. When the scientific subject is substituted by the author of fiction, two different
forms of the subject-object relation arise. A literary work implies an author who is an
omnipotent subject, that is one who controls and fully determines his work, solving every
conflict within it. Here the author acts as a narrator who knows everything about the story
and tells the facts as if they have happened in reality. Therefore, such an impartial author is
beyond the story and his work acquires the objective form, a reflection of actual events. We
denote such literary works as “single base forms”.
This subject-object relation reminds us of the picture of classical physics, where
physical objects and interactions are depicted as objective forms of being, as if they were
independent from the subjective conditions determining the physical objects. These
conditions are considered to be beyond the physical picture.
Unlike classical physics, the quantum theory picture of the reality is constructed
according to the phenomenological method. That is why the mind participates as a subjective
existence here and instead of a physical object we have the concept of a quantum
phenomenon, which is an indivisible result of subject-object interaction.
If a writer is in a position to apply the phenomenological method to fiction, a situation
similar to that found in the quantum realm occurs. The phenomenological approach considers
a literary work as a phenomenon, which implies in itself the process of its creation. This
work involves the author’s stream of consciousness. The author, neither personally, nor
objectively, but as a subjective process of creation penetrates into the story and the work
loses its strictly objective form. The author does not intend to present facts in such a way, as
if they had really taken place. All this results in an impression that actually the stream of the
author’s consciousness runs through his creation, causing the erasure of the borders
between the characters and the author.
Thus, on entering his creation, the author destroys its objective form and the work
acquires the conditional nature of invention. Strictly speaking, the story unfolds itself in an
undetermined area lying between the forms of reality and invention, for no act of objectification
takes place with regard to the external world, or in the inner world of the author. On the
whole, the subject’s penetration implies the loss of the certainty and clarity of the objective
content of a fiction. Absurdity and uncertainty become features of artistic reality just as is the
case with quantum reality. Absurdity reflects not a chaotic state of external world, but the
uncertainty of our consciousness. Thus, the subject’s penetration disintegrates the single-
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base form of fiction, the mutually independent parts of which organize a polyphonic structure
of creation, wherein the author’s single consistent position is never revealed. The creator
neglects the verisimilitude of the story or, to use phenomenological language, place its
objectivity in brackets, and the literary work, instead of reflecting the “real facts”, shows
itself to be a phenomenon of consciousness in its existential dimension.
Before considering individual writers, we would like to explain once more how we
understand the author’s penetration into his novel.
As for prose, a phenomenologist should raise here the issue of correspondence
between reality and invention. When bringing up the correspondence issue, he is, at the
same time, posing the question of the limits of such a relationship and assuming the
possibility of non-correspondence between art and reality beyond those limits.
Finally, the phenomenologist evaluates creative work as being independent of the
external world.
But such an evaluation is somewhat dangerous. The thing is that while freeing itself
from the external reality, the work of fiction may find itself in the field of the author’s psycho-
emotional gravity. The existence of the creative work as an independent phenomenon means
its “non-inclination” to either external objects or the author’s subjective world. Therefore, the
writer has created an area of uncertainty and lack of clarity within his story to maintain the
independent position of his work midway between the external world and the psychological
subject. This effort means subject-object phenomenological integrity, for due to the uncertainty,
there is no distinct border between the subject and the object, between the author and the
object of his imagination. This is what an author’s subtle penetration into the fiction involves.
Now, to illustrate our way of conceiving matters, we will consider Dostoevsky’s novels
(Demons, first of all). The writer creates an impression that he knows no more about his
story than the characters do. The author’s voice is one voice among others. In denying
omnipotence to the author and absorbing him as one of its voices, the work seems to be
“hanging in the air”. Therefore, the dispute among the voices is endless; it may be interrupted,
but not completed, for there is no common position by which to resolve the conflicts. This
fact shapes the polyphonic structure of novels, and due to that fact a literary work acquires
the nature of an independent artistic phenomenon.
The same effect of author’s penetration can be found in Joyce’s prose. Therefore,
there is no distinct border between the characters of Ulysses. One character sometimes
speaks as another, the voice of whom intermingles with the voices of the others and so on.
... We think, then, that it is a phenomenological approach that was used by Joyce.
The stream of the author’s consciousness seems to penetrate his work. Because of
this penetration the writer manages to move in a subtle way from one to another character,
and by doing so, he gives to his work the conditional nature of invention.
The subject’s penetration into the story was a main principle followed by Marcel
Proust. The author for him is a sequence of mutually independent selves. Therefore, the
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past is unreachable for the memory, for it (i.e., the past) existed with a unique, irreversible
self, which is lost forever. Because of this loss of self we cannot reproduce past events. We
are only able to give the meaning of the past to our present condition. Thus, the writer does
not imply a common ground of consciousness beyond the novel, which determines the
mutually independent and irreducible nature of the selves involved, that of the author and
those of the characters.
Further development of this hypothesis calls for intensive research into William
Faulkner’s works, as the polyphonic style seems to be the main principle of his creative
activity. We focus on the following question: how is the polyphonic style connected-with the
stream-of-consciousness in Faulkner’s novels (As I Lay Dying and The Sound and the
Fury). Our analysis shows that both the polyphonic style and stream-of-consciousness are
based on the same ground, i.e., the non-existence of any absolute, omnipotent author and
the author’s penetration into the novel. As a result, the writer creates a work which seems to
move and develop spontaneously and independently from the author. Despite the difference
between Joyce and Faulkner (the first used stream-of-consciousness as a formal structure,
whereas the latter strove for and achieved the effect of verisimilitude of consciousness).
Faulkner, like Joyce, considered stream-of-consciousness to be a primary and independent
phenomenon of being in itself. Our own thinking is that instead of holding the determining
role of external reality, Faulkner assumed the existence of a correlation between the world
and consciousness. Such ‘an understanding implies a dualism that eventually results in
polyphony, since consciousness and the external world are represented as mutually
independent parts of being.
Had stream of consciousness been based on the external world, no polyphony would
have existed.
Only the assumption of the independence of the stream-of-consciousness from the
external world makes it possible to explain the polyphonic style of Faulkner’s prose. Stream-
of-consciousness acquires the features of external being, since the writer aspires to
comprehend consciousness not on the level of reflection, but through its ontological ground,
as a stream of being. Faulkner’s stream-of-consciousness is a stream of being in itself,
which implies a correlation between consciousness and the external world.
Finally let us establish an analogy between “orthodox” quantum theory and the
polyphony of modern fiction.
l a.  The picture of the world of classical physics appeals to the external position of the
omniscient subject; classical concepts are determined at the level of absolute
knowledge. Therefore, as there is a common ground of determination, classical
physics espouses a type of monologue, a completely determined picture. This picture
excludes the subject and has an objective form of description - as if events were
independent from the subject.
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I b. The single-based form of fiction appeals to the external position of the omniscient
author. The author creates a common ground of determination and thus resolves
every conflict within the story. Artistic reality assumes an objective form of expression,
then as if artistic events were independent of the author and took place objectively.
Here the author acts as a narrator who retells the story as if it happened in reality.
2 a. The picture of the world of quantum physics destroys the external position of the
omniscient subject. The subject, as a special form of existence penetrates into the
picture of quantum reality and destroys the object-single basis for the expression of
physical events. Introducing polyphonic forms (wave-particle dualism), the subject
creates an area of uncertainty, the area of the indivisible subject-object whole, where
no distinct border between subject and object appears.
2 b. The polyphony of modern fiction destroys the external position of the omniscient
author. The author as a special form of existence, as a stream of consciousness
penetrates into the story and the latter loses its objective way of expressing artistic
events. To maintain the middle position between the external world and the author’s
psychological sphere, the author creates an area of uncertainty within the story, where
no distinct border between hero and author exists.
Thus, the analogy between quantum theory and polyphony in fiction is not coincidental,
for it has a philosophical ground – both endeavours use the same phenomenological method.
One deals with the construction of the objects of science and the other with the creation of
artistic form.
As we see, in modern science as well as in modern literature there exist similar
forms of polyphonic thinking, which reject the omniscient subject as a common ground of
determination and are based on the phenomenological principle of subject-object integration.
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SUMMARY IN GEORGIAN
kvanturi fizikis fenomenologiuri
koncefcia da Tanamedrove prozis
polifoniuroba
mamuka doliZe
saqarTvelos savle wereTlis filosofiis instituti
gafarToebuli reziume
avtoris azriT, kvanturi Teoriis fenomenologiuri interpretacia
mikrosamyaroSi subieqtis Seyvanas gulisxmobs. es, ra Tqma unda, sulac ar
niSnavs, rom damkvirvebeli subieqti qmnis mikrosamyaros realobas. fizikuri
realoba arsebobs TavisTavad, miuxedavad imisa, akvirdeba mas adamiani Tu ara da
mainc,  dakvirvebis, anu gazomvis situacia atomur samyaroSi principulad
gansxvavdeba klasikur-fizikuri Semecnebis situaciisgan. igi ar daiyvaneba mxolod
fizikur urTierTqmedebaze gamzom xelsawyosa da atomur obieqts Soris. atomuri
situaciis “ucnauroba” avtoris azriT imaSi mdgomareobs, rom aRniSnuli situacia
erTgvarad “subieqtivirebulia”. gamzomi xelsawyo aq ar warmoadgens Cveulebriv
fizikur sistemas, igi TamaSobs subieqtis cnobierebis rols atomuri obieqtis
mimarT, ufro swored warmoadgens subieqtis eqstrapolacias adamianis gareT,
fizikur realobaSi. aseTi ram savsebiT dasaSvebia, fiqrobs avtori, radgan araTu
adamianis cnobierebaSi, mTel obieqtur sinamdvileSi mimdinareobs ideaTa
realizaciisa da sazrisebis warmoSoba – cvalebadobis “subieqturi” procesi,
ris gamoc fizikuri movlenebi ar daiyvaneba calsaxa mizez-Sedegobriv kavSirebze,
aramed gvaqvs maTi garkveuli Tavisuflebac, rac mikrosamyaroSi, atomuri procesebis
indeterminizmsa da albaTur xasiaTSi gamoixateba.
nils bori gveubneba, rom azri ara aqvs vilaparakoT atomuri obieqtis
arsebobaze gamzom xelsawyosTan mimarTebis gareSe, rac niSnavs, rom mikro-
obieqti ganuyoflad aris Serwymuli misi Semecnebisa da gazomvis situaciasTan.
es mosazreba subieqt-obieqtis erTianobas gamoxatavs mikrosamyaroSi. avtoris
msjeloba cxadhyofs, rom boris aRniSnuli principidan gamomdinareobs kvanturi
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meqanikis indeterministuli interpretacia, fizikur sidideTa ganuzRvreloba,
albaToba da korpuskularul-talRur dualizmi, anu mikrosamyaros suraTis
gaxleCva talRur da korpuskularul warmodgenebad.
1927 wels, kopenhagenSi, ainStainisa da boris cnobili diskusia faq-
tobrivad iyo brZola kvanturi meqanikis deterministul da indeterministul
interpretaciebs Soris. avtoris, azriT am brZolaSi gamarjvebuli ar gamov-
lenila. orive interpretacia Tanabrad misaRebia kvanturi meqanikis mimarT.
Tuki gaviTvaliswinebT warmodgenili kvlevis perspeqtivas Tanamedrove feno-
menologiis Suqze, SeiZleba iTqvas, rom boris principi kvanturi obieqtisa da
xelsawyos erTianobis Sesaxeb aucilebelia, magram sakmarisi ar aris mikrosituaciis
sruli daxasiaTebisTvis. mas unda daematos, avtoris azriT, sicocxlis
fenomenologiis idea, materiis TviTinterpretaciis unaris Sesaxeb:
subieqturi yofierebis SeWra obieqtur realobaSi imas niSnavs, rom materias
(fizikur realobas) gaaCnia unari TavisTavad, adamianis Carevis gareSe moaxdinos
sakuTari SemecnebiTi situaciis interpretacia. amitom, konkretul kvantur
situaciaSi obieqturad gveZleva ara mxolod subieqt-xelsawyos sistema, aramed
is gzac, ra gziTac es situacia Tavis Tavs gviCvenebs deterministuli an
indeterministuli interpretaciis saxiT. marTali iyo ainStainic da boric,
radgan materiis aRniSnuli TviTinterpretacia yovelTvis axdens konkretul
arCevans da gamoricxavs erTi, saerTo WeSmaritebis mocemulobas kvanturi
determinizmis arsebobis an ararsebobis Sesaxeb.
naSromis meore Tavi eZRvneba urTierTobis garkvevas “orTodoqsalur”
kvantur Teoriasa da edmund huserlis fenomenologiur filosofias Soris.
siZnele aq imaSi mdgomareobs, rom kvanturi Teoria Seexeba mikrosamyaros, romelic
cnobierebis gareSe, obieqturad arsebobs, huserlis interesis sagans ki Seadgens
subieqtis cnobiereba, rogorc codnis konstruqciis Sinagani wyaro. avtoris
azriT, es siZnele, kvlevis gansxvavebul saganTa gamo moCvenebiTia. iseve, rogorc
huserlis intencionaluri cnobiereba aris Ria obieqturi samyaros mimarT,
kvantur-fizikuri situaciis obieqturobac aris gaxsnili subieqturi yofierebis
winaSe. es ormxrivi Riaoba saSualebas gvaZlevs davsaxoT kvanturi fizikisa da
fenomenologiuri filosofiis erTmaneTTan Sexvedris sasazRvro sfero, sadac
subieqtis da obieqtis erTianoba Tavisuflebisa da indeterminizmis samyaros
Seqmnis.
avtori gviCvenebs, rom ganuzRvrelobis intervalSi, albaTur  mikromovlenaTa
TamaSis scena trialebs erTaderTi invariantis garSemo; es aris kvantur-
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meqanikuri eqsperimentis mTlianoba, anu xelsawyosa da mikroobieqtis erTianoba,
rac SeiZleba SevadaroT arsobriv invariants fenomenologiuri reduqciis sferoSi,
huserlis intencionalur cnobierebas.
iseve, rogorc intencionaluri cnobiereba mizandasaxulia gare obieqtis
mimarT da misi arsebobis obieqturi sazrisis gauqmebiT (brWyalebSi CasmiT)
daadgens Tavis Tavs, rogorc am sazrisis qmnadobis subieqtur process, kvanturi
gazomvis procesic, fizikuri reduqciis gziTa da boris principis mixedviT,
auqmebs xelsawyosgan damoukidebeli mikroobieqtis arsebobas, raTa gadmoitanos
es arseboba im subieqturi yofierebis wiaRSi, sadac gvaqvs subieqt-obieqtis
dinamikuri erTianoba, kvanturi eqsperimentis mTlianobis saxiT.
amitom, Tuki intencionaluri cnobiereba, fenomenologiuri reduqciis gziT,
isev daadgens obieqtis arsebobis sazriss, kvanturi gazomvac, fizikuri reduqciis
gziT, qmnis atomuri obieqtis fizikur azrs.
yovelive es kidev erTxel adasturebs avtoris mosazrebas, rom kvanturi
situacia ontologiurad “subieqtivirebulia” da rom gamzomi xelsawyo am
situaciaSi TamaSobs intencionaluri cnobierebis rols mikromovlenaTa mimarT.
kvanturi fizikis fenomenologiuri interpretacia avtors saSualebas aZlevs
gaafarTovos Tavisi Tvalsazrisi da daadginos erTgvari analogia kvantur-meqanikur
Semecnebasa da Tanamedrove polifoniur prozas Soris, romlis arsebiT saxeobas
“cnobierebis nakadis” literatura Seadgens. aseTi analogia ar aris SemTxveviTi,
gveubneba avtori, radgan erTi da igive fenomenologiuri meTodi intuiciurad
gamoiyeneba rogorc kvantur fizikaSi, atomuri obieqtis modelirebis mizniT, aseve
Tanamedrove prozaSi, mxatvrul saxeTa Semoqmedebis dros.
analogia kidev ufro gamWvirvale xdeba klasikuri da kvanturi fizikis
dapirispirebis fonze:
klasikur fizikaSi sidideebi, kanonebi da principebi dadgenilia obieqturi
codnis uzogadesi da abstraqtuli sistemis mimarT, romelic absoluturi
subieqtis ideiT sazrdoobs. mTeli klasikur-fizikuri samyaro Semecnebis obieqtad
aris qceuli Zveli racionalizmis am absoluturi kerpis winaSe. amitom, codna
fizikuri realobis Sesaxeb mTlianad obieqtivirebuli da Caketilia materialuri
sinamdvilis farglebSi. cdis monacemebi, saTanado sidideebi da kanonebi pretenzias
acxadeben asaxon cdisgan damoukidebeli obieqtebi da TavisTavad mimdinare
procesebi.
klasikur racionalizmTan Tanaziar literaturaSic, mxatvruli realoba
obieqtivirebuli da fsiqologiuri realizmis farglebSia Caketili. Semoqmedi
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gareSe momentia sakuTari qmnilebis mimarT. mas absoluturi da yovlisSemZle
subieqtis gvirgvini amSvenebs, rac imas niSnavs, rom avtori mTlianad akontrolebs
Tavis nawarmoebs da qmnis gmiris moraluri Sefasebisa da siuJetis warmarTvis
erTian pozicias, raTa Tavis nebaze ganaviTaros yoveli saxe da moagvaros
nebismieri konfliqti Txrobis dramaturgiaSi. mxatvruli obieqtivaciis Sedegad,
nawarmoebi sinamdvileze orientirebuli, racionaluri da erTiani sistemis formas
iZens, saxeebi da gmirebi baZaven realur pirebs, xolo ambavi ise viTardeba,
TiTqos is namdvilad xdebodes. avtori am SemTxvevaSi ubralod mogviTxrobs
namdvilad momxdari istoriis Sesaxeb.
absoluturi subieqtisa da yovliSemZle avtoris swored aseT kerps
amsxvrevs fenomenologia kvantur meqanikaSic da polifoniur prozaSic. ab-
solutis taxtidan Camogdebuli subieqti, mikrosamyaroSi Sedis gazomvis procesis
saxiT. igi aRar ubrundeba racionalizmis klasikur qimeras, amitom SeuZlebelia
misi ganyeneba da gatana kvanturi realobis miRma, raTa subieqtma garedan, mTlianobaSi
ganWvritos es realoba da daikavos atomur movlenaTa ganzogadebisa da codnis
sistematizaciis erTiani pozicia. gansxvavebiT klasikuri fizikisgan, mikrosamyaroSi
aRara gvaqvs fizikuri realobis obieqturi, erTiani da mkacrad determinirebuli
suraTi, gvaqvs ganuzRvreloba, gvaqvs albaToba, gvaqvs indeterminizmi, ris gamoc
fizikuri aRwera ixliCeba mikromovlenaTa urTierTgamomricxav, korpuskularul
da talRur warmodgenebad.
igive situacias vakvirdebiT Tanamedrove polifoniur prozaSic. subi-
eqti-avtori CarTulia Tavis nawarmoebSi cnobierebis nakadis saxiT. avtoris xma
imdenad Serwymulia personaJis xmasTan, rom SeuZlebelia avtoris xmis gamorCeva,
misi SemoqmedebiTi procesis diferencireba da gatana mxatvruli realobis
miRma, raTa mweralma garedan dainaxos Tavisi nawarmoebi da daikavos mxatvrul
saxeTa ganviTarebisa da siuJetis warmarTvis erTiani, avtoriseuli pozicia.
subieqtis SeWra mxatvrul realobaSi imas niSnavs, rom nawarmoebi ar warmoadgens
mxolod Semoqmedebis Sedegs, igi sakuTari qmnadobis subieqtur processac moicavs
Tavis TavSi. fenomenologiuri intuiciiT STagonebuli qmnileba Serwymulia im
sulier aqtivobasTan, cnobierebis im intenciasTan, saidanac is aRmocendeba, rogorc
warmosaxvis nayofi. fantaziis am warmonaqmnis genezisSi xorcieldeba
fenomenologiuri reduqcia. nawarmoebis Sinaarsi Tavsdeba brWyalebSi. amieridan
gauqmebulia misi pretenzia obieqtur arsebobaze, rogorc gare samyaros mibaZvis,
aseve gmiris Sinagani, fsiqologiuri realobis Cvenebis TvalsazrisiT. amitom,
Seqmnilia ganuzRvrelobis sivrce, absurdis situacia, sadac nawarmoebi Tavis
57
Tavs aCvenebs rogorc pirobiTobas, rogorc TamaSs. gancda iseTia, TiTqos bolomde
axdilia nawarmoebis farda da cnobierebis scenaze naCvenebia TamaSis is qvecnobieri,
faruli wesebi, romlebic mis literaturul pirobiTobas qmnian.
yovelive es aSkarad mogvagonebs fenomenologiuri subieqtis SeWras
kvantur meqanikaSi, rac iwvevs fizikur sidideTa albaTobas da ganuzRvrelobas
mikromovlenaTa TamaSis scenaze. msgavsad kvanturi fizikisa, aqac irRveva
mxatvruli realobis obieqturi forma, Cndeba SemoqmedebiTi Tavisufleba, Cndeba
indeterminizmi, Cndeba ganuzRvreloba da personaJTa mravalxmiani kamaTi
polifoniur JReradobas iZens.
sagulisxmoa, rom Tanamedrove literaturis analogia kvantur meqanikasTan
garkveulad exmianeba kvlevis axal Sedegebs sityvier xelovnebaSic: kerZod,
“avtoris sikvdilis” faqtsa da mxatvruli teqstis TviTmoZraobis princips.
daskvnis saxiT SeiZleba iTqvas, rom Tanamedrove mecnierebasa da
literaturul xelovnebaSi, Semecnebis da Semoqmedebis sagnebi emsgavsebian erTmaneTs.
subieqtisa da obieqtis erTianobis ZaliT maT eniWebaT Tavisufali neba. am
nebayoflobiT miswrafebaSi isini gadadian materialuri samyaros sazRvrebs da
qmnian axal, “araklasikur” realobas, romelic yovelTvis Riaa cnobierebis winaSe
da rogorc intencionaluri fenomeni, arc arsebobs Tavis SemoqmedebiT procesTan,
Tavis subieqtur yofierebasTan erTianobis gareSe.
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Abstract
The founder of phenomenology Edmund Husserl was convinced that he worked out
a method the creation of which completed Kant’s task of making philosophy a rigorous
science. This meant getting beyond metaphysics and reaching the realm of phenomenol-
ogy. This realm can be reached by applying the eidetic reduction, the transcendental reduc-
tion and combining them into the phenomenological reduction. Dagfinn Føllesdal has pre-
sented an analytically clear description of the three reductions. However, as Husserl has not
been consistent in addressing the order of reductions, we cannot be sure about his under-
standing of the method and subject-matter of phenomenology. The analysis of Wolfgang
Huemer does not help us to resolve the issue, although the author claims to be presenting
analytic clarity. It is still the more traditional approach of Maurice Merleau-Ponty that helps
us to elaborate on Husserl’s ideas concerning the phenomenological reduction. However, it
still remains an open question, whether and to what extent we can speak about a method in
phenomenology.
INTRODUCTION. THE NEED FOR THE METHOD
 It is widely known that the term “phenomenology” has been in common use in
philosophy since Hegel’s monumental work, The Phenomenology of Mind (1807)
(Wrathall,Dreyfus 2007:2). As a discernible movement, however, phenomenology starts
from Edmund Husserl. “The Oxford Companion to Philosophy” (1995) calls phenomenol-
ogy a powerful movement in philosophy and links it directly with the twentieth century.
Moritz Geiger, Aleksander Pfaender, Max Scheler and Oscar Becker are mentioned as
the followers of Husserl in the Oxford Companion (1995: 658). Today, it is just Scheler,
whom we still often discuss of this group. Therefore, phenomenology definitely has a his-
tory and the movement today is quite different of what was witnessed in early twentieth
century. “The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy” (1996), however, leaves just a mar-
ginal role to phenomenology, addressing it briefly only in the chapter dedicated to Mod-
ern European philosophy. The author of the chapter David E. Cooper uses the theme of
anti-scientism for explaining the main thoughts of several continental thinkers, including
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Husserl. Nevertheless, he gives a hint about there being a method present without any
further explanation (Cooper 1996: 702).
Often, phenomenology has been compared to the other influential movement in phi-
losophy in the twentieth century, namely analytic philosophy. The analytic tradition definitely
has a method. Therefore, it is normal to look for a method in phenomenology as well. The
method ought to be different of the analytic one, but still appropriate to qualify as a method.
Quite often, phenomenology is really taken not just as a new philosophical view about old
epistemological problems, but as a new method of doing philosophy, the phenomenologi-
cal method. As we know, there are even talks about the science of phenomenology, which
has not just its own method but subject-matter as well (The Oxford … 1995: 659). Below, we
shall take a look at the problem of the method from different angles, not paying special
attention to the subject-matter.
Edmund Husserl’s basic demand for philosophy was fulfilling the task of describing
the structures of experience as they present themselves to our consciousness. It is generally
accepted that Husserl began using the term ‘phenomenology’ in the 1890-s in his lectures
“Phänomenologie: ein Abschnitt in Brentanos Metaphysik (Klärung von Grundbegriffen)”.
Husserl firmly believed that he had a method in phenomenology, which could be systemati-
cally applied. The essence of the method concerned the so-called “bracketing” of the objects
outside of our consciousness itself. Doing so, it should be possible to proceed to reflect and
systematically describe the contents of the conscious mind. According to Husserl this method
“could ground our knowledge of the world to our lived experience, without in the process
reducing the content of that knowledge to the contingent and subjective features of that expe-
rience” (Wrathall, Dreyfus 2007: 2). Husserl believed that this method enabled him to com-
plete the task set by Immanuel Kant, namely establish philosophy as a rigorous science,
because it could discover the structures common to all mental acts.
Intentionality, object-directedness, became the mark of the mental, the central issue
of the approach. It is the idea of Franz Brentano, which Husserl eagerly borrowed. For
Husserl, intentionality had a meaningful structure through which the mind can be directed
toward objects under aspects. Therefore, Husserl recognized both features of intentionality
addressed by contemporary philosophy of mind, object-directedness and aspectual shape.
Temporality became another essential structural feature of the mental highly regarded by
Husserl. Both could be most efficiently studied if there was a method at our disposal.
PHENOMENOLOGY AND EXISTENTIALISM
It is an ongoing debate in contemporary metaphilosophy, whether phenomenology
and existentialism are two distinct branches of philosophy or they belong together. Here,
we shall address this issue only very briefly, not willing to make it central. Both belong to the
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so-called continental tradition in the twentieth century philosophy. However, this term is hardly
appropriate any more as analytic philosophy is being extensively developed on the conti-
nent of Europe. At the same time, phenomenology and existentialism are important topics
for many contemporary thinkers, who work outside the boundaries of the ‘old world’.
Recently, the term “phenomenological paradigm” has sometimes been used as a
supposedly more appropriate synonym to “continental philosophy”. This could be accepted
if existentialism and the works of the French postmodernists could be fully included into
phenomenology. Such approach should probably raise some doubts. In the end, however, it
is a matter of deciding the formal borders of phenomenology. As we are looking for a method
here, this question cannot be central for us. In the end, it is at least their not belonging to the
analytic tradition that unites the branches of philosophy, which were initially developed on
the ‘continent’.
HUSSERL’S REDUCTIONS
Getting to the heart of the matter, let us remember that Husserl really did believe in
his method. Next, we shall take a closer look at what he was presenting as his method,
attempting to be as analytically clear as possible. “Bracketing” is definitely not a clearly
defined concept, but rather a metaphor. Therefore, Husserl elaborated his idea through the
conception of reductions.
It is interesting to note that Husserl first used the word “reduction” in his first work,
Philosophy of Arithmetic, in 1891. There, however, he meant reducing one mathematical
representation to another, something very widespread in mathematical thought. Still, this
fact may be of significance to our survey. It shows that Husserl probably took mathematics
as the basic example of systematic and rigorous thinking and attempted to adhere to the
same kind of rigor in his philosophy.
Reductions in the new sense were introduced by Husserl as part of his transcenden-
tal turn that took place around the year 1905. As we know, the main reductions he used
were the eidetic, the transcendental and the phenomenological reduction.
There is no agreement between Husserl scholars about what the reductions really
mean and how do they relate to each other. It is obvious, however, that the reductions are
the basic methodological tools for Husserl. It is a pity that he failed to apply these tools in a
systematic manner. However, if the reductions are meant to present a method or at least a
framework of a method, it has to be possible to make sense of its essence. That’s exactly
what we intend to do next in the current analysis. In order to achieve analytic clarity, we are
going to dwell on the approach of Dagfinn Føllesdal, one of the outstanding contemporary
analytic thinkers, the Stanford philosopher of Norwegian background (Føllesdal 2007).
61
 The Eidetic Reduction
The name derives from the idea that it brings us to the eidos, or essences, of things.
What does that mean? For instance, driving into a big modern city, we anticipate seeing tall
buildings. In each particular city the buildings are somewhat different concerning their outlook
and positioning. However, if I anticipate seeing a city, my anticipations will not be violated,
unless I don’t see any buildings that rise above surface at all. “The object of my act in a given
situation need therefore not be a concrete physical object, it can be an eidos” (Føllesdal
2007: 109). The definite examples of essences, eide, can be very different. They may range
from mathematical objects to colours or even “humanity” as such. Each eidetic discipline
would study an essence or a group of essences. “One of the methods they would use would
be eidetic variation: one will focus on an essence and go through a number of examples that
instantiate that essence” (Føllesdal 2007: 110). The examples need not be physical objects.
Since the focus is on essences and not on the objects, it does not matter whether these
objects exist in the regular sense of the term or not. “The eidetic reduction is the transition
from the natural attitude, where we are directed toward particular material objects, to the
eidetic attitude, where we are directed toward essences” (Føllesdal 2007: 110).
The Transcendental Reduction
The transcendental reduction consists in our reflecting on the act itself rather than on
its object. Here our being directed upon the object consists of a complicated interplay of
three elements: the structuring experiences in the act, noeses, the correlated structure given
in the act, the noema, and the filling and constraining experiences, hyle (Føllesdal 2007:
111).1  According to Husserl, with some training we can concentrate on the above structure
by bracketing of the object. We will simply not be concerned with the object, but study the
act’s noesis, noema and hyle. The transcendental reduction is the change of focus from
our object-directed attitude to an act-directed attitude. One will disregard the object of the
act, will not doubt whether it is there or check out about the object by applying the scientific
research method on it. Husserl compares this mental change to the ancient Greek concept
of epoché, abstaining from judgment. On the other hand, this is the very spot, where Husserl
introduces the concept of bracketing. Obviously, this is the object as well as the eidos that
we are bracketing. We don’t forget about it, but shift it away from the focus. By the transcen-
dental reduction we become aware of our transcendental ego that is hidden from us until
we consider ourselves just as physical bodies in the material world.
The Phenomenological Reduction
This should be a combination of the former two reductions. “It leads us from the
natural attitude, where we are directed toward individual, physical objects, to an eidetic
transcendental attitude, where we are studying the noemata, noeses, and hyle of acts di-
rected toward essential traits of acts directed toward essences” (Føllesdal 2007: 112).
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Dagfinn Føllesdal has presented a clear generalization of the picture that derives
from Husserl’s treatment of the reductions. The reductions separate the objects of acts into
four realms as four main disciplines. The first realm is that of physical objects studied by
natural science. The eidetic reduction leads us to the general features of objects, which are
studied by mathematics and other eidetic sciences. The transcendental reduction brings
us to acts directed toward physical objects enabling us to study the noemata, noeses, and
hyle of such acts. Husserl has proposed to call this realm metaphysics. The fourth realm
contains the noemata, noeses and hyle of acts directed toward essences. This is finally
phenomenology, the final goal for Husserl’s studies and the main focus for us here.
Obviously, Husserl did present a method that explained, how we are meant to reach
phenomenology, the realm we are supposed to perform our thinking in. It is not clear, how-
ever, what is the ‘method of action’ for us in phenomenology. The clarity of the method
becomes even more questioned when we look at the order of applying the reductions.
Normally, Husserl applies the eidetic reduction before the transcendental one. However,
sometimes he seems to permit either order. The problem is that the result, namely what do
we really mean by phenomenology, depends on the order of application of the reductions.
By reversing the order, we arrive at the essential features of noemata, noeses and hyle of
acts directed toward individual objects. Does that mean that phenomenology should also
include the latter, i.e. that it should still be studying the physical world as well probably as a
special case of a more general approach? This is an open question so far.
HUSSERL’S REDUCTIONS AND ANALYTIC PHENOMENOLOGY
One of the characteristic traditions in philosophy today concerns attempts to ad-
dress different traditional branches of philosophy from the point of view of the analytic method.
This has happened to phenomenology as well. Can we have some help from here in secur-
ing the method?
For instance, Wolfgang Huemer writes: “… by developing an account that combines
Husserlian phenomenology with analytic philosophy, I will show that these two traditions are
not two opposite and mutually repellent poles in the history of twentieth century philosophy;
they should rather be seen as allies when it comes to systematically address problems in
the philosophy of mind” (Huemer 2005: 1). Obviously, it is a fruitless try to oppose the two
main traditions of the twentieth century philosophy to each other. However, it is not so easy
to find the common ground. Clearly, in general terms philosophy of mind is a common ground
where both traditions can meet and work together. But how could we manage to specify?
From the historical point of view we know that Husserl’s ideas had many parallels
with Frege’s and early analytic philosophers took serious interest in phenomenology. To-
day, however, history is taking a new turn and attempts to do analytic philosophy using
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Husserl’s terminology and results have started. In the course of this activity, it is more than
natural to focus on the method of Husserl exhibited most clearly by his reductions.
An attempt to discuss phenomenology in the analytic style has been performed by
Wolfgang Huemer in his book “The Constitution of Consciousness” (Huemer 2005). How-
ever, then Huemer explains the essence of phenomenological reduction (Huemer 2005:
23), it is difficult to realize, what is really analytic about it. For instance, compared to the
approach of Dagfinn Føllesdal addressed above.
As the title of his book suggests, Huemer concentrates rather on the problem of
constitution of consciousness, which enables him to address the problematic issue of the
existence of the intentional objects. Some of the objects our mind is directed to, do not
really exists. For Husserl, this is not a problem. The method of phenomenological reduction
enables him to bracket all the physical characteristics anyway. However, if we study per-
ception, existence of external objects becomes relevant as in that case we are obviously
directed towards physical rather than mental objects. According to Huemer, Husserl’s use
of the notion of constitution might help us here.
Looking for the unfolding of the use of the notion of constitution by Husserl, we once
again need to look back as far as his first philosophical work, Philosophy of Arithmetic.
The notion is really there, but as some Husserl scholars suggest, is not operative yet. There
is no doubt, however, that it is operative in the Logical Investigations. “It is developed in
three contexts, the constitution of meaning, the constitution of perception, and the categori-
cal constitution” (Huemer 2005: 20). Obviously, one can find some parallel here with the
initial analytic approach of Frege. Still, without a clear linkage to the reductions, we do not
progress any further in establishing the phenomenological method with the help of the analysis
of the constitutions of consciousness.
MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY AND A NEW PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION
After looking at some analytical attempts to make sense of the method of reduc-
tions, we turn to a more traditional elaboration of the method. Simon Glendinning has re-
cently presented a new look at Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s treatment of the phenomenologi-
cal reduction (Glendinning 2007).
Merleau-Ponty finds the methodology of phenomenology in describing rather than in
explaining or analyzing (Merleau-Ponty 1962: viii). According to Glendinning, Merleau-Ponty
is seeking for a return to perception as it is immediately enjoyed (Glendinning 2007: 124).
Next, we are going to take a closer look at ‘the new phenomenological reduction’ as under-
stood by Merleau-Ponty with the help of Simon Glendinning. Obviously, our basic interest is
in answering the question, whether we have a method here?
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Let us note that in the next part of our search for a method in phenomenology, we are
dealing with phenomenology of perception. In case of Husserl we can speak about phe-
nomenology requiring a forswearing of all factual and in the world of sciences because its
proper things themselves are intuited ideal essences to be reached by the reductions.
Merleau-Ponty, however, demands a shift away from scientific investigations. Therefore,
the return striven for by Merleau-Ponty is rather directed by Heidegger’s than Husserl’s
ideas. We seem to be drifting away from any possibility for rigorous method. Still, Merleau-
Ponty’s return to the immediately perceived world is neither Heideggerian nor Husserlian.
For Merleau-Ponty, it is particularly important to understand what takes place when ‘I exist’.
This problem calls for an enquiry which is not scientific in the sense that it would grasp the
who that I am as ‘the outcome or the meeting-point of numerous causal agencies which
determine my bodily and psychological make-up’ (Merleau-Ponty 1962: viii). As the so-
called priority argument states: the terms of the sciences, including the so-called sciences
of man, presuppose, as a condition of their intelligibility, a more basic experience of that
which the sciences are the second order expression.
At this point, we need to address Merleau-Ponty’s priority argument. First, we have
to recall Brentano’s claims that the genetic studies which would show the dependence of
our mental lives on occurrences in the brain must be founded on a prior descriptive inquiry.
“The problematic oddness of this priority is that the phenomena identified in the founding
inquiry are held to depend on states and processes studied by the founded discipline”
(Glendinning 2007: 127). The idea of Merleau-Ponty seems to be that a genetic inquiry has
and can have no genuinely adequate idea what it is investigating without the prior descrip-
tive one. This sounds like we are in the need for a prior empirical experience in order to
proceed with a general theoretical study. It would be more appropriate to say, however, that
this is just a common sense idea we are in need of and not a direct personal empirical
experience. Merleau-Ponty’s ‘primordial faith’ could rather be compared to Wittgenstein’s
‘primitive trust’, a non-empiricist conception developed in On Certainty. According to this
idea, there are propositions that ‘stand fast’ for us ‘prior to any reflective method we have
for justifying our beliefs’.
Obviously, the primary interest for any phenomenological thinker should be scientific
research not into any empirical object but rather into any me. Any understanding of ‘my
existence’ should presuppose a pre-theoretical disclosure of myself to myself. Here we get
in touch with the second moment of Merleau-Ponty’s first methodological slogan. The de-
mand for pure description excludes scientific explanations, but does so with ‘the procedure
of analytic reflection’ as well. Here we come to the conception of the true cogito. The true
cogito of Merleau-Ponty does away with any kind of idealism revealing me as “Being-in-
the-world”. It is a true blow to the ‘scientific conception’ as the latter, at least in the classical
sense, does not like to deal with the subject at all. Therefore, realism is not so naturally
connected to the idea of the subject being in the world as it may seem. However, according
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to Merleau-Ponty, the same attitude applies to idealism as well. From this angle we always
are already situated within an ongoing historical-cultural drama-without-end (Glendinning
2007: 131). On such view, we cannot regard the ‘who’ that I am the constituting maker of the
world in its Being as well as I cannot be the constituting maker of the world in its meaning. “I
do not have the power to make the meaning of things ex nihilo, and I cannot radically es-
cape or suspend their historical meanings either” (Glendinning 2007: 131). There is an
irreducible thrownness into a meaningful historical world of things. This cannot be grasped
in the impersonal terms of scientific explanation or the idealistic terms of analytic reflection.
Now, we need to address the question of ‘phenomenological reduction’ as being
newly elaborated. According to Merleau-Ponty, what is bracketed is not the facticity of my
Being-in-the-world, but ‘the idea of “the world”’ embraced by traditional philosophical theory.
What we are left with after the reduction is a reformed understanding.
“In Merleau-Ponty’s hands, then, the project of a phenomenological reduction is dis-
placed: it no longer aims to reveal a universal constituting consciousness underlying the
formation of experience, but, still certainly in the spirit of Husserl, to enable a new beginning
for philosophy: to engage in unprejudiced reflection on a mode of worldly existence which
is prior to all reflection and makes it possible” (Glendinning 2007: 134). According to the
conception of the true cogito, the re-elaboration of the phenomenological reduction, the
analysis of ‘self experience’ begins not with self-consciousness, nor even with Da-sein in
the sense of Heidegger, but with the factual existence of the living human body.
Does such result mean that the new phenomenological reduction has brought us to a
trivial result that precedes all philosophy altogether, namely, that ‘the objectification of the
living body’ is massively foreclosing the possibility of achieving a satisfactory conception of
ourselves as an irreducibly worldly existence? Simon Glendinning replies: “… the resources
needed for coming to terms with the facticity of one’s existence are totally lacking, totally
invisible to philosophical theorizing which regards the living body as a psychological case,
every thought and judgment that belongs to such theorizing emerges precisely from ‘incar-
nate subject’ given immediately to itself in a ‘true cogito’ that gives the lie to every objectify-
ing word of the theory” (Glendinning 2007: 135). There is a conflict here. No psychology has
ever been able to proceed by treating the body as an object pure and simple. Philosophical
phenomenology is needed here, the first imperative for it being to rethink the sense of our
worldly existence.
CONCLUSION
Throughout this paper we have been taking the analytic method as a model for any
method in philosophy. However, in the Blackwell Companion we can find a nice explanation,
which is much more general: “Philosophical methods are combinations of rules, procedures
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and examples determining the scope and limits of philosophy and establishing acceptable
ways of working within those limits” (The Blackwell … 1996: 753). Obviously, Husserl’s under-
standing of doing philosophy in the sense of phenomenology meet the above requirement.
We can say so with even greater confidence if we remember that the question of philosophi-
cal method is itself a matter for philosophy, about which philosophers themselves often tend
to disagree. There would be nothing wrong in considering the method of reductions in phe-
nomenology just a method for the phenomenologists themselves and for no-one else. How-
ever, as the debate continues, there is hope for even more general agreement.
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 We shall remain with this brief explanation of Husserl’s noesis, noema and hyle here and keep a
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SUMMARY IN GEORGIAN
huserlis reduqciaTa meTodi
peter miurzefi
talinis teqnologiis universiteti
reziume
avtori fiqrobs, rom analitiuri tradiciisagan gansxvavebiT, sadac azrovnebis
meTodi gamoiyeneba garkveuli, winaswar mocemuli Sinaarsis mimarT, fenomenologiuri
meTodi warmoadgens Sinaarsis Seqmnis, garkvevisa da filosofiuri koncefciis
Camoyalibebis gzas. am azriT, fenomenologia enaTesaveba egzistencializmsa da
frangul post-modernizms, raki es mimdinareobani da maTi meTodologia ar
ganekuTvneba analitiuri filosofiis tradicias.
naSromSi ganxilulia huserlis reduqciaTa sami nairsaxeoba:
eideturi reduqcia – arsebobis sazrisis gauqmeba arsis Tematizaciis
mizniT.
transcendentaluri reduqcia – obieqtis brWyalebSi Casma da yuradRebis
gamaxvileba misi Semecnebis aqtze, raTa ganxorcieldes cnobierebis struqturis
analizi.
fenomenologiuri reduqcia, romelic warmoadgens aRniSnul saxeobaTa sinTezs.
metad sainteresoa avtoris da sxva Tanamedrove filosofosTa Sexedu-
leba merlo-pontis fenomenologiuri reduqciis Sesaxeb; gansxvavebiT huser-
lisgan, gvimtkicebs avtori, merlo-pontis fenomenologiaSi xdeba ganyeneba ara
saganTa da movlenaTa faqtiuri arsebobisgan, aramed aq xdeba samyaros arsebobis
klasikuri ideis gauqmeba, romlis mixedviT SesaZlebeli iyo cnobierebasa da
yofierebis erTmaneTisgan gaTiSva da maTi cal-calke moazreba.
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LANGUAGE AND WORLD.
THE  HUMAN  ASPECT  THAT’S MISSING
FROM  SCIENTIFIC  REALITY
ERKUT SEZGIN*
Istambul Culture University
 Abstract
The purpose of this  paper is to point out the logical priority of the existential grounds of
picturing reality by means of scientific representations, hypotheses as such. Also,  to clarify  the
meaning of the inscribing and reading  of the picture in terms of the existential conditions and
facts of  the human being who acts and reacts for survival, and who interprets its surroundings in
connection with the train of consequences that connects up with this human action.  The surrounding
world thus is recognized and interpreted in terms of playing and operating with signs, the
significations of which make up the horizons of the world of the human being. This clarification is
needed to throw  light on how concepts mean in the application of words in language. And the
clarity reached at this stage helps for us to clarify further the meaning of thinking and its relation
to language-use in terms of playing and operating with signs in the conditions of the surrounding
world, the action of the human body in its existential situation. Hence, the logical priority of the
human condition in terms of the use and application of signs in the  existential world of human
being  differs from the analytical representations of the world in science for scientific purposes.
Which means that  the representations of science are tools of the language, and that they are to
be treated and interpreted as signs used to represent reality only in the scientific contexts, for
the purposes of the language of science and scientific culture. Without such clarity, representations
of science, scientific descriptions of reality are open to misinterpretation even by scientists and
philosophers, let alone layman, to be so generalized to extend the bounds of its meaningful
application in the scientific context of explaining or describing phenomena experimented, or
observed under certain experimental conditions.
Science as a language activity: the  facts of language and life presupposed by scientific description
of reality. The world of life as the surroundings of the operations with signs, the use of words as such, which
is inseparable from the phenomenon of signification; language use as a move and human action in the
language-game, which is part of the “Life-world” (Lebenswelt, Heidegger)
The purpose of the paper is to draw attention to the facts of language, which are
presupposed together with its play-ground as the rules of the language-game - the language-
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game of playing and operating with signs.  The facts in question require a certain level of
awareness about the phenomena of signification. This is connected with seeing human
activity along with its surroundings, as the playground  where human thinking expresses or
displays itself,  by means of the performances, actions of the human beings, while using or
operating signs as tools of living so to speak.  This is where the use of words, in the form of
thinking, remembering, saying something, etc., cannot be thought intelligibly in isolation
from human actions and reactions that express significations.  Human behaviour  under this
aspect is an animal action in contact with its field of living, organizing and reorganizing its
attitude in the form of actions and reactions within its  horizons of life. Its main purpose
being the survival of the animal, it is an action and reaction which is expressing itself in the
form of an attitude of awareness  within the surrounding space of life. Hence it is an action
which structures its surroundings as  horizons of signs, while its awareness is structured by
the objects of its actions and reactions. The objects thus are noticed and found by means of
human being’s learning to use and structure its train of actions and reactions, its motor
actions so to speak, which are originated by the contact of the surroundings and human
body.(1) Hence the objects are noticed and found to be “there” relative to one another’s
space of action, which is the distance implied by the appearances within the horizon of the
human being. They are therefore signs in origin, as they are found and interpreted to be
there by means of train of actions and reactions of the human being.  The surroundings thus
first appear to the human being, as a horizon of signs, originating  through  a contact of
human action and its field of living.  Connected with this fact, we cannot meaningfully and
intelligibly speak of the use of signs, words as such, in isolation from the context of human
situations; from the surroundings, whereby a human being acts or reacts under the effects,
requirements, or calls of the conditions of the situation, surroundings of the living being as
such.  In other words, the use of words, meaningful application of signs and the surroundings
of human beings which we describe as “environment”, “situation”, or “world”, depending on
the context, are internally (logically) dependent on each other.
In the normal use of language which is mostly developed to meet the pragmatic
instrumental requirements, the human being seems  to remain indifferent to that aspect of
its  surroundings, unless it strikes its attention from the standpoint of its pragmatic instrumental
concerns. This indicates that the field of attention of the animal being is apt to be conditioned
and bounded with the field of its animal and instrumental concerns. On the other hand, that
aspect of the surroundings which eschews attention  is part of the conditions of the meaningful
use and application of signs. It is about seeing the use of words, such as saying something
meaningful, as being combined with what happens before or after the saying of words.
What we need to see clearly is that  the human being acts or reacts by saying, by using
signs as tools to deal with the surroundings, where the language situation forms the context,
the system structure, in which the application of words fulfils a function, hence expressing a
significance by their use in speech and language. Words are  such tools and techniques
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developed by the human beings to deal with the surrounding world, along with many others
tools of interpretation. But without having been noticed in their internal connexions with their
surroundings, they are apt to be described on the level of analytical representations of
language, as if they are signs standing for thoughts or perceptions, of a thinking entity
called “mind”. In fact, from such analytical standpoint, the analysis of a meaningful sign is
likely to take many pseudo forms, such as the analysis of it  into the introspective awareness
of a person who associates it with other representations of which he is introspectively
aware.(2) The introspective awareness here asserts itself as if it’s a truism. One thinks of
one’s images of thoughts, intentions, the images one associates with the appearances of
the surrounding things, as if it’s a primary recognition,(3) or understanding, before one’s
use of signs in language. It’s as if  such a person’s language, the use of signs, is an outward,
public tool and technique of  carrying and sharing these private perceptions of thinking (or
“contents of the mind” as sometimes referred)  among human beings.
It is not necessary that we should explicitly  believe these suppositions. It is good
enough that we hold on to our commonsense beliefs about the relation of thinking and
language without really questioning them deeply.
The point here is to see the contrast and what is wrongly supposed when we think,
as if it’s a commonsense truth, that saying something meaningful depends upon thinking
something meaningful before expressing it in words. Or, when we think: “ to mean something
with its name depends upon thinking and imagining its representing image before applying
the name to what it names.” (As if the representing image is a substitute image standing
for (4) the original perception.) “Shouldn’t I know what I mean, before I mean it with the use
of words!” expresses and strengthens our inclination in favour of such suppositions, without
necessarily or explicitly holding or asserting them.  In other words, one is inclined to hold
these beliefs, without explicitly asserting them. Indeed  sometimes one is inclined to reject
them in explicit form, while maintaining them implicitly (i.e. without a deeper awareness
about the implications of doing so) in the form of commonsense expressions, convictions
and  beliefs  about the relation of thinking and language use. For example,  no one seems
to believe that one can think without the activity of one’s body, that thinking is possible
without one’s body as Descartes thought. In this sense, common sense is against
Cartesianism. But on the other hand, no one is able to see, by means of this common sense
belief in the connexion of body and mind, the internal connexion between the activities of
human body and the operation with signs in language. This level of awareness requires a
deeper questioning, a mediation that considers not the next move as against this or that  in
the stream of the moves of the game, but the rules that make the moves and the game
possible. Therefore, anti-cartesianism,  on the basis of commonsense beliefs, hides
inconsistencies, which hide such cartesian suppositions as Ayer’s ‘primary recognition’
held and asserted on the basis of logic and its self-evident, or self-required premises. This
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inconsistency,  although natural, indicates a confusion in our thoughts which requires clarity.
Hence, the point is to see what is wrongly supposed and missed from attention when we
describe the use of words as separate actions and performances from  thinking and
meaning, which we may be inclined to hypothesize as different processes, and which we
may speculate its identity as hidden in the brain processes, or as spiritual in substance
interacting with body in external relation, in the manner Descartes supposed.
We may i.e., think and say that “a” is a sign of the alphabet designated to represent
a certain sound, forgetting meanwhile that this analysis  presupposes that we learnt them by
learning to perform inscribing and reading them and not vice versa.
In the normal use of language, we make as a matter of fact  distinctions between words
and things;  between thinking and what is thought or represented by means of the application
of signs. That is to say,  our habitual learning the  use of signs, misleads us  to assume an
understanding about how we express meaning.  Our automatic making  of  distinctions between
thinking and the use of  signs is in a way an expression of such habitual thinking and
understanding.  The use or application of signs takes many forms, from simple saying or
reading a word, to naming something;  from recognizing a thing as something, to remembering
the name of a thing; making calculations with numbers;  thinking with geometrical forms;
representing logical properties and logical relations by means of models, etc. In all these
cases, we habitually make a distinction between things and the signs by means of which we
represent our understanding or meaning  about these things. Thus, we are habitually
presupposing a division between language and world; between  thinking, meaning,  perceiving
process and the doings of the human body acting with the use of tools.
LANGUAGE AND WORLD FROM THE STANDPOINT OF CARTESIANISM
Such  at any rate, have been almost  traditionally maintained presuppositions of
western philosophy about the relation of language and world, words and objects, language
and thinking. For example, Cartesian epistemology founded true beliefs, knowledge as
such, on the clear and distinct perceptions of thinking substance (res cogitans) and regarded
the use of language only as a means of conveying these perceptions - thoughts of the thinking
subject. As Wittgenstein  deeply questioned  and clarified the matter how thinking and
language are internally connected with each other,  it seems now more clearly that, in the
light of  his clarifications, the relations between them  have been  taken  in the epistemological
theories as if it’s an external relation. Which means treating and  representing the activity
of language use on  one hand, and thinking, meaning, perceiving on the other, as substantially
separate processes; as if, saying or acting with the use of words is not logically, but causally
connected with thinking and meaning.  These are  the presuppositions characterizing what
we call the Cartesian standpoint.
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Descartes in fact expressed this external relation between thinking and human
situations  by extending his method of doubt so far as to obliterate the conceptual distinction
between dream and awake life.  He pointed out that the use of words as instruments of
bodily activity  may be illusion as in a dream, that while one thinks one is sitting, or speaking,
one may not be doing so,  generalizing his point under his method of doubt to the extent that
the contrast or difference between correct and incorrect application of words is obliterated.
That is to say, to the extent that a form of expression, such as “I am now sitting” (where one
can correctly say, or teach the use of the word “sitting” to a child) would not have a correct
application under his generalized method of doubt - for it suspends all cases of correct
application under the method of doubt. This kind of application of logic forgets that the
differences and contrasts between true and false, correct and incorrect, doubtful and certain
show themselves in the application of words, in the different consequences and functions
that follow from their application.
Such forgetfulness, which is cutting the internal relation between operating with signs
and thinking, is implicitly or explicitly contained in the suppositions that  separate thinking
and perceiving from the human  acting and reacting in its own life surroundings. Whereby
doing and playing of the human being with the things of the surrounding world takes very
many different  cultural forms.
Descartes’ methodical doubt seeking certainty is an example par excellence of such
a reasoning that contains the forgetfulness which is dividing the internal relations between
thinking and the use of signs, and which is connected to the facts of language that express
these internal relations in the surroundings whereby the signs of language are learnt, or
applied.  Descartes’ doubt,  methodical as it may be, is a doubt that destroys its own
possibility, as it is a doubt of such thinking that is forgetful of  the conditions of the application
of words. Because, we cannot doubt so far, without doubting the meaning of words, for the
application of the word and the rule governing its correct application are internally related in
the context of language where the application signifies its sense.
If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meaning of your words either.
If you tried to doubt everything you would not go as far as doubting anything.
The  game of doubting itself presupposes certainty. (5)
Wittgenstein rightly points out to the logical priority of the conditions  where signs
cannot be taken in separation from their significances, from the consequences that follow
upon operating or acting with them, and where true application differs from false in sense -
in the difference it makes in the life of the players. And people learn what they mean by
learning what consequences and differences follow in the language game.
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“What sometimes happens might always happen.” — What kind of proposition is that? It is like
the following: If “F(a) makes sense “(x). F(x)” makes sense.
“If it is possible for someone to make a false move in some game,  then it might be  possible for
everybody to make nothing but false moves in every game.”—Thus we are  under a temptation to
misunderstand the logic of our expression here, to give an incorrect  account of the use of our
words.
Orders are sometimes not obeyed. But what would it be like if no orders were ever  obeyed?  The
concept ‘order’ would have lost its purpose.(1)
A game allows for borderline cases—a rule for exceptions. But the exception and the rule  could
not change place without destroying the game.(6)
THE RELEVANCE OF PHILOSOPHICAL CLARITY TO EVERYDAY LIFE
AND CULTURE
   Why has this model of the relation between thinking and language seemed to be
so convincing to western philosophical tradition, as we can now characterize its main-
stream as Cartesianism, whose unquestioned deep rooted  presuppositions, so deep as
to dominate a whole tradition despite the different theories involved in it? Thanks to
Wittgenstein, they are exposed now with  their hidden logical impossibilities in contrast
with the logical functioning of the facts of language. This question can be instructive, if we
inquire into our own suppositions, and question  what we think about the relation of think-
ing to language, rather than blaming the division and the conceptual confusions involved
in it on the epistemological theories of  philosophers. For we may be prone to the very
same motives and inclinations that  misled them to separate thinking and perceiving about
reality as different processes from the use of signs; to posit substantial differences be-
tween thinking — being, (in the manner of cartesianism) or brain processes (in the man-
ner of materialism) and the use of signs; and hence to theorize explanations between
them, such as by means of hypothesizing an external relation, a causal hypothesis as
such between thinking, the use of signs, and reality.
  In fact, it seems to me nowadays, despite the level of clarity reached  owing to the
efforts of Wittgenstein and others in the philosophy of language from the phenomenological
standpoint,  people trained in the scientific and technological culture, scientists, specialists
of  social, economic, or physical sciences are more prone than philosophers to misunder-
stand the nature of reality pictured and represented by language, in sciences and in every-
day use. Such misunderstandings and forgetfulness of the human situation, the cultural con-
sequences of which was once pointed out ably by José Ortega y Gasset,(2)  may be the
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real cause behind the actions of so many people that have led to the miserable develop-
ments in the money and power seeking values of culture now underway and strengthening
in the name of  globalizm.
NOTES:
*  W.W. Norton,  N.Y. 1932. ÝKÜ (Ýstanbul Kültür Üniv.) & Ý.T.Ü. (Ýst. Technical Univ.)
1. Here the contact is part of the life of the whole nature, it is action of the nature, Natura  Naturans, in
contrast to  analytical differentiation of body and its environment and the description of
their interrelation by such concepts as “contact”, “action” etc. which presuppose the life
of the body within nature. It is an ancient philosophical insight, and one which is elabo-
rated by Spinoza though, still in need to be reminded against the forgetfulness of it due
to the dominance of analytical thinking habits.  It’s an insight shared by the philosophies
of existence and language of Heidegger and Wittgenstein, and expressed and articu-
lated in an original way by the philosophical work of Merleau-Ponty.  However, the insight
in question  still needs clarification and emphasis, as its forgetfulness doesn’t simply
mean a forgetfulness of a point, but it means a  different stance about life and nature on
the whole; it means a divided view of world of life in general; divided as a result of the
presentation of the world by means of the analytical representations of scientific theo-
ries, without taking a deeper notice of the  play-ground of the application of these repre-
sentations as signs in the life of the language users.
  2.  Such analysis is involved in the epistemological theories of empiricist philosophers as well as in the
theories of Russell and Ayer in such a manner that, its presuppositions are so deep that
such theorists are not even aware that their analysis are presupposing them. On the
contrary, it seems to these theorists, that i.e. the analysis of the physical object into
sense-data and its perceptual awareness is a logical requirement of presuppositionless
thinking. As if they are more directly and clearly perceived by thinking, involving no hidden
mediation and presupposition, whereas a theory starting from the actions and reactions of
a human body in a physical field of living seemed to them presupposed too much, and
therefore dogmatic. Here, not different theories are in conflict, the real issue is about the
description of thinking, and the conditions and facts which make logical analyses and the
analytical descriptions of facts possible in the language (of thinking). In other words, the
real issue for the human being  is to get self-understanding about the facts of thinking along
with the facts of language, about how thinking and language operates.  This is what
Wittgenstein ably shows, with such  contrasts to the facts of language in terms of human
beings operating with signs as tools of language in human life, to display the logical contra-
dictions of supposing a thinking subject, mind, a primary perceptual awareness, indepen-
dently of the application, or use of signs in language.
  3.  I.e. A.J. Ayer, in his book, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Pelican Books, 1986, argues that a primary
recognition is the precondition for human beings to operate with signs, hence to use
them in language. For he thinks that it is necessary for someone to remember and
recognize correctly the signs for their identification as letters, signposts, timetables,
etc. He argues against Wittgenstein’s point that private recognition or remembering is a
supposition similar to an idle wheel which rotates no other wheel with it in the language.
Ayer says: “The crucial fact which it seems to me that Wittgenstein  is persistently
overlooks is that anyone’s significant use of language must depend sooner or later on his
performing what I call an act of primary recognition.” (My emphasis, p.76)  Ayer’s suppo-
sition of primary recognition differs from the ordinary fact of recognition which Wittgenstein
considers in that the latter is taken and indicated as an expression which is surrounded
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with other people’s expressions of recognition, or remembering in the use of signs.
Which, therefore, can be compared and matched to be found similar, correct, or incor-
rect by the shared memory reaction as the basis of learning the rules of the language-
game.  It is apparent from Ayer’s consequent  remarks  that his disagreement is mainly
due to his insistence on reading  such facts of expression as remembering, recognition
etc. as analyzed and divided in the Cartesian manner of thinking, as analyzed into one’s
private introspective awareness or remembering which he asserts by the description
“primary recognition”, and public use of signs. But does he really distinguish the facts of
recognition, remembering etc. here, or assert a fictive mental occurrence instead, which
is not even a meaningful hypothesis, but a supposition in contradiction with  the facts of
language and their actual functioning! Wittgenstein’s private language argument clarifies
the contradiction in contrast with the functioning of the facts language. Ayer’s  introduc-
tion of  “primary recognition” is therefore instructive, as it shows  how  our analytical
thinking habits  with its analytical form of expressions and tools of analysis exercise as
a misleading grip in the correct recognition of the facts of language as they are, which
need to be distinguished and described  accordingly.  I have  discussed the issue raised
by Ayer in more detail in my essay: “Anlam Doðruluk Baðlamý ve Oyunun Kurallarý”, Felsefe
Tartýþmalarý, 9. Kitap. The essay is also published in the edition by Betül Çotuksöken,
Cumhuriyet Döneminde Türkiye’de Öðretim ve Araþtýrma Olarak Felsefe, Türkiye Felsefe
Kurumu Y. Ankara 2001.
4.  The typical term coined by Russell which expresses his presuppositions about the relation of a
naming sign to what it names, rather than the understanding about the facts of language
that express the internal relations of signs to what they signify.
5. If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meaning of  your words either.
If you tried to doubt everything you would not go as far as doubting anything.
The  game of doubting itself presupposes certainty. See Wittgenstein,  On Certainty,
ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright (Blackwell, 1969) p. 114, 115.
6. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and R.Rhees (Blackwell, 1968)
p. 345.
Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, ed. G.H. von Wright and Heikki Nyman,
Vol. II, (Blackwell, 1980) p. 145.
José Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses, (“La Rebellion de las Masas”,
1930
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SUMMARY IN GEORGIAN
ena da samyaro.
adamianuri aspeqti, romelsac moklebulia
mecnieruli realoba
erkut sezgini
stambolis kulturis universiteti
reziume da komentari
warmodgenili naSromis mizania aCvenos sicocxlisa da enis fenomenis
upiratesoba samyaros mecnieruli Semecnebis mimarT. arseboba, sicocxlis gancda
win uswrebs Semecnebas da ena, rogorc cocxali fenomeni, adamianis yofierebis
gamovlenas Seadgens. samyaroSi adamianis yofna-aryofnis, misi gadarCenisa da
cxovrebaSi orientaciis amocana saxes ucvlis mecnierul WeSmaritebas da aRviZebs
interess im sazrisebisa da niSansvetebis mimarT, romelTa TamaSic qmnis Cvens
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SUBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE1
TIM CRANE
University College London
It is obvious that a man who can see knows things which a blind man
cannot know; but a blind man can know the whole of physics. Thus the
knowledge which other men have and he has not is not a part of physics.
Bertrand Russell2
1. INTRODUCTION
Our knowledge depends on context in various ways. Some contextualists about knowl-
edge, for example, believe that knowledge claims should be assessed relative to certain
kinds of dialectical contexts3 . Here I am concerned with another kind of contextual depen-
dence: the way in which the knowledge we have is only accessible or available from within
certain contexts. These contexts are the contexts of a subject’s own experience and posi-
tion in the world; for this reason, I call the kind of knowledge which is dependent on context
in this way, subjective knowledge. I shall argue here that part of the abiding interest of Frank
Jackson’s famous ‘knowledge argument’ lies in its defence of the idea that there is such
knowledge4 . Much has been written about Jackson’s argument; my hesitation in adding
another discussion to the pile has been overcome by my sense . that this proper lesson of
the argument has yet to be grasped...
The knowledge argument is officially designed to show, from apparently uncontroversial
premises and simple reasoning, that the physicalist conception of the world is false. D.H.
Mellor rightly points out that if sound, the argument would show more than that: it would show
that some facts are subjective, and thus that a view which says that all facts are objective
would be false5 . Therefore, the view that objective science can state all the facts is false
too, if the knowledge argument succeeds. Mellor, along with many others, thinks he has to
show that the knowledge argument is unsound, since he thinks he can’t accept its conclu-
sion. He therefore adopts the ability hypothesis of Lewis and Nemirow, which is intended to
show that the knowledge argument is fallacious, resting on an equivocation on ‘knowledge’6 .
I shall argue here, against Lewis, Nemirow and Mellor, that the ability hypothesis is
mistaken and that all the other physicalist attempts to reject the argument (either as invalid
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or as unsound) are equally mistaken. The knowledge argument is a sound argument for the
conclusion that there are subjective facts: facts about the subjective character of experi-
ence. However, unlike some defenders of the argument7 , I do not think that this conclusion
threatens any plausible version of physicalism. Physicalists should accept that there are
subjective facts and they should deny, therefore, that all facts are objective, in the sense I
shall explain. Neither physical science, nor any other objective science, can state all the
facts; but this should not be the basis for a critique of physicalism.
2. THE KNOWLEDGE ARGUMENT
Jackson’s famous argument does not move from a claim about the existence of expe-
rience to the denial of physicalism; it moves from a claim about how we know about experi-
ence to the denial of physicalism; hence its name8 . The argument starts with a thought-
experiment about Mary, who has spent all her life in a black-and-white room, has never
seen any colors other than black and white. Now imagine that Mary has made an intensive
study of the science of color in all its aspects—physics, physiology, psychology and so on.
In fact, let’s suppose that she knows all the physical facts about color. Now suppose that
one day Mary leaves her black-and-white room, and the first thing she sees is a red tomato.
It is natural to say that she now knows something which she did not know in the black-and-
white room: what it is like to see red. Yet this thing she now knows is not a physical fact,
since by hypothesis she knew all the physical facts in the black-and-white room. So if a new
piece of knowledge is a new fact, then Mary learns a new fact when she leaves the black-
and-white room. If physicalism is (as seems plausible enough) the view that all facts are
physical facts, then it appears that physicalism is false.
The knowledge argument does not beg the question against physicalism. This is clear
if we represent its premises and conclusions as follows:
(1) In the room, Mary knows all the physical facts about color.
(2) Having left the room, Mary learns something new about color.
(3) Therefore: not all facts are physical facts. That, in essence, is the argument—
though some extra assumptions are needed to demonstrate its validity properly. But it is
clear that neither premise (1) nor premise (2) obviously beg any questions against physi-
calism. A physicalist could hardly object that the idea of someone learning all the physical
facts begs the question against physicalism and (2) seems an irresistible and simple thing
to say about the story as described above. Maybe, when these premises are scrutinized,
they will come to show some deep incoherence - but the argument as stated does not
obviously beg the question.
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Physicalists have tried to resist the conclusion by impugning either the validity of the
argument, or the truth of the premises. I think they are wrong. I think that the argument is
valid, and that physicalists should accept its premises. So they should accept its conclu-
sion. Yet I shall argue too that they should not worry about this conclusion; so this conclusion
cannot be that physicalism, properly understood, is false.
In §3, I will put to one side the idea that the knowledge argument either depends on, or
entails the existence of qualia — in me sense in which the existence of qualia is a matter of
dispute. In §4, I will assess the objection that the argument is invalid, and in §5, I will assess
the objections to the premises. In §6 I will bring out what I think the argument really shows:
that there are subjective facts. In §7 I shall examine the consequences of this conclusion for
physicalism.
3. THE KNOWLEDGE ARGUMENT AND QUALIA
It is sometimes said that (a) the knowledge argument assumes the existence of qualia,
considered as ‘intrinsic, non-representational, introspectible’ qualities of experiences (mental
states or events); or that (b) the knowledge argument establishes that there are such qualia.
Neither of these claims seems to me correct. In fact, it seems to me that the question of
qualia is irrelevant to the knowledge argument, in the. sense that to accept the argument,
one need neither assume the existence of qualia nor need one accept that the argument
shows there are qualia — even if the argument is wholly successful. Assumptions (a) and
(b) are false. (Of course, sometimes ‘qualia’ is taken simply as a term for conscious mental
state; in this sense, the argument does assume qualia. But this is not the sense of ‘qualia’ in
which there is a debate over the existence of qualia9 .)
The simplest way to see that (a) is false is to observe that if one were an intentionalist
about phenomenal consciousness and therefore one were to deny qualia, one would not
have any easy route out of the knowledge argument10 . Intentionalists about phenomenal
consciousness do not think that their intentionalism as such provides them with a solution to
the knowledge argument; they still think they need to refute the argument (if they want to
defend physicalism, as understood by the argument).
But nor should we accept (b): that the knowledge argument establishes that there are
qualia in the above sense. It would only establish that there are qualia if (i) the only way to
interpret the new knowledge Mary has is knowledge about experiences, and (ii) the only
way to interpret this knowledge about experience is in terms of knowledge of qualia. But
neither of these moves are obligatory. Taking them in reverse order: (ii) an intentionalist can
say that the knowledge Mary gains is knowledge about the nature of some of her intentional
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states. Having seen red for the first time, Mary now knows what it is like to be in an inten-
tional state of a certain special kind (seeing red). On intentionalist views, this state does not
involve qualia and nothing in the story so described requires one to say that it does. (i) A
more unusual, but still coherent, response is that Mary learns something about the world
when she sees red for the first time. She learns about some properties of red things, namely,
those properties which can only be known by looking at red things. One apparently coher-
ent response to the knowledge argument, then, is to say that Mary learns something about
colors, about physical properties in the world. I am not trying to argue that one or other of
these views is correct; I just want to point out that one could accept the conclusion of the
knowledge argument without accepting that there are qualia.
What is true is that if one had some independent reason for believing in qualia -say, for
example, one were persuaded by Ned Block’s ‘inverted earth’ argument - then one might
wish to use an appeal to qualia in trying to understand what the lesson of the knowledge
argument is: Mary learns facts about qualia (what it is like to have experiences involving them).
Now I don’t think this is the right thing to say, but all I need to emphasize at the moment is that
whether or not it is true, this view does not follow from the argument as I present it.
I conclude that the knowledge argument is independent of the question of qualia.
4. CHALLENGING THE ARGUMENT’S VALIDITY: THE ‘ABILITY HYPOTHESIS’
Those who challenge the argument’s validity normally claim that it involves an equivo-
cation on ‘know’11 . In the first premise, ‘know’ is used to express prepositional knowledge,
but (they say) in the second premise it is used to express knowledge-how or ability knowl-
edge. We should agree that Mary learns something new, but what she learns when she first
sees red is how to recognize red, to imagine red and remember experiences of red things12 .
Having seen something red, she can now recognize the color of fire engines, she can con-
sider whether she wants to paint her bedroom red and she can remember this decisive
encounter with a tomato. These are cognitive abilities, not pieces of prepositional knowl-
edge and it is a widely-held view that there is no reduction of ability knowledge to preposi-
tional knowledge. So Mary can learn something new—in the sense of gaining an ability—
but it is not a new piece of prepositional knowledge. Knowing what it is like to see red is
know-how. So the knowledge argument is invalid because it involves a fallacy of equivoca-
tion: ‘know’ means something different in the two premises. Since it is only in the case of
prepositional knowledge that the objects of knowledge are facts—if I know how to ride a
bicycle, how to ride a bicycle is not a fact—it is concluded that Mary does not come to know
any new facts and physicalism is saved.
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This response, known as ‘the ability hypothesis’, presupposes two things: (i) that knowl-
edge-how is ability knowledge and it is completely different from, and irreducible to, prepo-
sitional knowledge; and (ii) that regardless of the abilities she acquires, Mary does not
come to know any new propositions whatsoever. The first claim (i) is a general theoretical
claim about the relation between know-how, abilities and propositional knowledge. This
claim is actually more dubious than is normally assumed; but space does not permit me to
examine it here13 . I shall concentrate rather on the second claim, (ii).
The defenders of the ability hypothesis say that Mary learns no new prepositional
knowledge at all. But this claim is really very implausible. For there is a very natural way for
Mary to express her knowledge of what it is like to see red: ‘Aha! Red looks like this!’. (Let’s
suppose, for simplicity, that Mary knows that tomatoes are red, and she knows that she is
seeing a tomato; these are innocuous assumptions.) Now ‘Red looks like this’ is an indica-
tive sentence; in a given context, it surely expresses a proposition; and in the context de-
scribed, the proposition is true. (It could have been false. Suppose Mary were shown a joke
tomato, painted blue; the proposition expressed by ‘Red looks like this’ would be false; red
doesn’t look like that.) And it is a proposition that Mary did not know before. This all as-
sumes that a sentence containing a demonstrative can be used to express a proposition;
but this assumption is innocuous and should be accepted by all participants in the debate
(we shall see its full relevance later). So even if Mary did acquire lots of know-how, and
even if know-how is essentially different from propositional knowledge, then there is still
something that she learns which she couldn’t have known before. And that is enough for the
argument to succeed.
Further support for the view that there is a proposition which is learned is provided by
Brian Loar’s observation that someone can reason using the sentence ‘Red looks like this’:
they could embed it in a conditional, for example, ‘If red looks like this, then either it looks
like this to dogs or it doesn’t’. On the face of it, this is a conditional of the form ‘If P then Q’;
the substituends for P and Q are bearers of truth-values and therefore possible objects of
prepositional knowledge14 . The ability hypothesis has to explain this away if it is to support
its conclusion that nothing prepositional is learned. I doubt whether this can be done. For all
these reasons, I reject the ability hypothesis.
An alternative way to question the validity of the argument is to say that the knowledge
gained is knowledge by acquaintance15 . Mary is acquainted with some feature of redness
(what it looks like) or with some feature other experience (qualia, as it may be). Acquain-
tance knowledge is not reducible to propositional knowledge; but these features (of red-
ness, or of experiences) may nonetheless be physical. To this objection, my response is
essentially the same as my response to the ability hypothesis: unless the objector can show
that Mary does not learn any prepositional knowledge too, then the fact that she does gain
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acquaintance knowledge is irrelevant to the argument’s conclusion and we have a perfectly
clear example of the kind of proposition Mary learns: the proposition expressed by the
sentence ‘red looks like this’.
Mellor thinks that the Ability Hypothesis refutes the knowledge argument; he also says
it explains why Nagel is wrong about the limits of objective knowledge:
These are not the only otherwise mysterious facts which the know-how theory
explains. It also explains science’s mysterious inability, which so impresses
Nagel, to tell us what a bat’s sonar experiences are like. But on the know-how
theory this is no mystery, nor a limitation on the factual scope of objective
science. For the only knowledge any science ever gives us is knowledge of
facts. And even if many abilities depend on knowing facts, there is always
more to having those abilities than knowing those facts16 .
But if the ability hypothesis is false, then it cannot explain why Nagel is wrong about
the ‘factual scope of objective science’. Indeed, it seems rather that there are facts about
the bat’s experience (assuming it has experiences) which are beyond the scope of objec-
tive science: the facts which would be truly expressed (per impossible by saying ‘Experi-
encing the world from a sonar point of view is like this’. Or to take a more everyday example,
the fact that I can express when I say ‘red looks like this’ is a fact that a blind person cannot
know. Yet, as Russell points out, a blind person can know the whole of physics. And there is
nothing relevant to this debate which stops the blind person learning the whole of objective
science. True enough, the sighted person has abilities which the blind has not, and Mellor is
right that no amount of science can give you these abilities. But this is irrelevant. The impor-
tant point is not that there are these abilities which someone who knows what it is like has;
the important point is that someone who knows what it is like knows that certain things are
the case. This is the propositional knowledge which the sighted have and the blind lack, in
addition to whatever abilities they may also have.
5. CHALLENGING THE PREMISES
I therefore reject these attempts to dispute the validity of the argument; the argument
is valid. But what about the premises? Few physicaltsts wish to challenge the first premise,
that in the story as told, Mary knows all the physical facts about color vision17 . For suppose
a physicalist did deny this. Then they would have to accept that there are some physical
facts which in principle cannot be known without having certain experiences. Physics, the
science which states the physical facts, is in principle incompletable until certain very spe-
cific experiences are had. Now it may be true that having knowledge in general requires
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having experiences of some kind. Yet how can physicalism, which bases its epistemologi-
cal outlook on physical science, require that science demands us to have certain specific
experiences? The suggestion has little plausibility.
So most responses to the argument have challenged the second premise instead,
and claimed that Mary does not learn any new fact. In a recent survey, Guven Guzeldere
describes this character of this dominant response as follows:
The pivotal issue here is whether the having of an experience constitutes a spe-
cial class of irreducible ‘first-person facts’ or whether what is lacking in Mary has to do
with her experiential ‘mode of access’ to facts that she is already acquainted with18 .
The idea seems to be that Mary already knows all the facts in question, she simply
gains a new ‘mode of access’ (whatever that is) to a fact she already knew. If this response
were right, then certainly the argument would be undermined. But it seems to me that, de-
spite its popularity, the response cannot be correct.
The central idea is that Mary apprehends or encounters in a new way something she
already knew. The phrase ‘mode of access’ is often used to describe what this encounter-
ing in a new way is. But what are ‘modes of access’? One way to understand them is in
terms of new Fregean mode of presentation of the objects and properties already known
under other modes of presentation. On this interpretation, the puzzle about the argument is
of a piece with other puzzles about intentionality and many authors have explicitly drawn this
comparison. Vladimir might know that Hesperus shines in the evening but not know that
Phosphorus shines in the evening. We do not conclude from this that Hesperus is not Phos-
phorus since as is well known ‘X knows that p’ is not an extensional context. On this view,
the fact that Hesperus shines in the evening is the same fact as the fact that Phosphorus
shines in the evening—after all, they are the same star, the same shining, the same evening!
So although Mary knows that red looks like this, this is not a new fact that she has learned
but, analogously, a new mode of presentation of a fact she knew before.
But which fact is this? We need to identify something which can be referred to in more
than one way, the relevant fact concerning which can be learned about in the black and
white room. One way of putting it might be like this. When she leaves the black and white
room, Mary judges that seeing red is like this. The physicalist says that seeing red is being
in brain state B, so let’s suppose Mary knew this in the black and white room. Mary can
therefore infer that being in brain state B is like this. We therefore have two terms, ‘seeing
red’, ‘being in brain state B’ which pick out the same thing and a predicate ‘like this’ which
can only be used when one is having the experience. But nonetheless, the experience is the
brain state for all that.
So far so good. But remember that the distinction between different modes of presenta-
tion of the same thing is supposed to show that the second premise of the argument is false:
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Mary does not learn anything new. But it cannot show this. For if this construal of Mary’s case
and the case of Hesperus and Phosphorus are really parallel, then this entails that someone
who comes to believe that Phosphorus shines in the evening because of their belief that
Hesperus is Phosphorus does not learn anything new, but only comes to appreciate a pre-
viously known fact under a new mode of presentation. And this cannot be right: the original
point of the distinction between sense and reference was to do justice to the fact that the
discovery that Hesperus is Phosphorus can be a significant advance in someone’s knowl-
edge. It was a discovery about the heavens that Hesperus is Phosphorus, it was a new
piece of knowledge that the ancients gained. So similarly the knowledge that Phosphorus
shines in the evening is a new piece of knowledge. If facts are what you learn when you gain
knowledge, then the normal approach to the distinction between sense and reference en-
tails that what the Ancient astronomers learned when the learned that Hesperus is Phos-
phorus is a new fact.
Of course, there is something which is the same before and after this particular dis-
covery: how things are in the world, the reference of the terms, the entities. No-one disputes
this about the Hesperus /Phosphorus case. So one could say: ‘in a sense the facts are the
same, in a sense they are different’. But the relevant question is whether anything is learned
when someone acquires the belief that Hesperus is Phosphorus, whether there is any new
knowledge at all. And if there is a sense in which the fact learned is a new fact (even if there
is a sense in which things are the same too) then there is new knowledge. This surely
cannot be denied. Note that if you do deny this, you have to deny at the very least that there
is new knowledge in the following sense: the knowledge that the two modes of presentation
are modes of presentation of the same thing19 . But this makes it impossible to even state
what it is that the ancients learned.
Since they introduced the parallel, it would be fruitless for physicalists to try and draw
some principled difference between the Mary case and the case of Hesperus and Phos-
phorus. So either physicalism says that nothing new is learned in either case—which is a
hopeless thing to say—or it says that something is learned in both cases. This is the .only
plausible thing to say. But then Mary does learn something new, the argument’s premises
are true, and we already decided it was valid. So is physicalism refuted?
6. PHYSICAL FACTS AND SUBJECTIVE FACTS
This depends, of course, on what physicalism is. What is refuted is the doctrine that all
facts are physical facts - given a certain understanding of ‘physical’ and ‘fact’. The argu-
ment assumes a certain understanding of what ‘physical facts’ are.
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What are facts? Philosophers have disagreed over the nature of facts and over whether
there are such things. Some say that facts are true propositions, others that they corre-
spond one-one with true propositions, and others say that since they are what make true
propositions true (they are ‘truth-makers’) they need not correspond one-to-one with true
propositions20 . What conception of fact does the knowledge argument assume? It is obvi-
ous, I think, that the knowledge argument has to assume that facts are objects of preposi-
tional knowledge—where a state of prepositional knowledge is one described in claims of
the form ‘X knows that P’ where X is a knower and ‘p’ is replaced by a sentence. So for
something to be a new fact is at least for it to be a new piece of knowledge, an advance in
someone’s knowledge, some piece of knowledge that they did not have before.
Does this mean that the knowledge argument covertly begs the question against physi-
calism by assuming a conception of fact which physicalism would reject? No. Whether or not
physicalism decides to call objects of prepositional knowledge ‘facts’, physicalism should
certainly accept that there are objects of prepositional knowledge, and that knowledge state
are individuated partly by their objects. Everyone accepts that there are such objects of propo-
sitional knowledge, whether or not they also accept that there are facts in some other sense.
So I think it is a mistake to say that we need to establish which theory of facts is correct before
settling whether the knowledge argument works. This would be to claim that the argument had
to have as a hidden premise that one particular theory of facts is the right one. But this is not
so; everyone has to accept that there are objects of prepositional knowledge.
The knowledge argument’s conception of fact does not beg any questions. What it
says is that a distinct piece of propositional knowledge is knowledge of a distinct fact. This
is surely a very natural and uncontroversial idea. We can learn skills or pieces of informa-
tion; when we learn pieces of information what we learn are facts. But it is sometimes said
that there are two notions of pieces of information (or fact): a coarse-grained notion and a
fine-grained notion21 . According to the fine-grained notion, facts are individuated at the
level of sense; for the coarse-grained notion, facts are individuated at the level of reference.
Note that this point is sometimes put in service of the mistaken idea (dismissed above) that
Mary learns nothing new, but only gains a new ‘mode of access’ to what she knew already.
If one uses the distinction between coarse and fine-grained facts to support this mistaken
idea, then one is forced to say that only the coarse-grained notion is relevant to the indi-
viduation of knowledge. But this is clearly false, and not something a physicalist should
appeal to, for all the reasons given in the previous section.
In The Facts of Causation (1995), Mellor makes a distinction between facts and what
he calls facta. Facts are the ‘shadows’ of truths – ‘if it is true that P it is a fact that P. Facta
are the truth-makers for truths; it is an empirical question which facts there are, just as it is
an empirical question which properties there are. So we should not infer difference of facta
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from difference of facts; facta and facts do not stand in one-one correspondence. For present
purposes this distinction corresponds to the distinction between fine-grained and coarse-
grained facts. I think we should agree with Mellor that both notions of fact (or the notions of
fact and factum) have their place. This is consistent with saying what I said above, namely
that the objects of knowledge are normally individuated in a fine-grained way. Maybe some-
times we individuate the objects of knowledge in a coarse-grained way. That’s perfectly
acceptable too. But so long as we do also individuate objects of knowledge in a fine-grained
way, then we should accept the conclusion that Mary learns a new fact.
Having said what the argument means by ‘fact’ we can now turn to ‘physical’. What we
are asked to imagine is that the knowledge which one acquires about colors inside Jackson’s
black-and-white room is stated in the language of physics. But it would not help Mary if she
learned things in the room which were in the language of psychology and physiology. Not
would it help her if she learned a fully developed dualist psychology (if there were such a
thing) talking about states of consciousness while explicitly acknowledging their utterly non-
physical nature. None of these theories would help tell her what it is like to see red. The
point is not that the land of knowledge she gains in the black-and-white room is physical
knowledge; rather, the point is that it is the sort of knowledge that can be stated in some
form or another: it’s ‘book-learning’. As David Iewis puts it, the ‘intuitive starting point wasn’t
just that physics lessons couldn’t help the inexperienced to know what it is like. It was that
lessons couldn’t help’22 .
So although physicalism—understood as the view that all facts are physical facts—is
one of the targets of the argument, it is really an instance of a more general target: the view
that all knowledge of the world is the kind that can be imparted in lessons, without presup-
posing any particular kind of experience. Thus any view which was committed to this view of
knowledge would come within the knowledge argument’s range. Likewise with Cartesian
dualism—one could not know what it is like to see red, the argument implies, even if one
learned the complete Cartesian theory of the mind.
Paul Churchland has argued that this feature of the argument shows that it proves too
much23 . He dunks that Jackson’s argument involves a ‘logical pathology’: it ‘makes any
scientific account of our sensory experience entirely impossible, no matter what the ontol-
ogy employed’. But this is plainly a non-sequitur: all that follows from the knowledge argu-
ment is that if one knew the full scientific account of our sensory experience, it would not
follow that one knew what it was like to have the experience. This entails nothing about
whether such a full scientific account of the workings of our senses can be given. Now
Churchland himself identifies this as the main issue at one point:
If it works at all, Jackson’s argument works against physicalism not because
of some defect that is unique to physicalism; it works because no amount of
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discursive knowledge on any topic, will constitute the nondiscursive knowl-
edge that Mary lacks24 .
But he takes this to be connected to the claim that any scientific account of experience
must be impossible. This, I think, is a mistake, for the reason just given. (Note that since I think
Mary gains prepositional knowledge, I would not identify ‘discursive’ with ‘propositional’.)
It is true that what Mellor (in the quotation above) calls ‘the factual scope of objective
science’ is shown to be restricted by the knowledge argument. For no scientific account of
vision will tell the blind what it is like to see, and I have argued that what the blind lack here
is (in addition to ability-knowledge and acquaintance knowledge) prepositional knowledge.
These pieces of propositional knowledge — these kinds of fact — are what objective sci-
ence cannot express. But no-one should expect it to; this should not be seen as a mysteri-
ous ‘restriction’ on the powers of science.
I conclude that there is no fallacy in the knowledge argument; but perhaps now we
are beginning to see that its conclusion is stated rather misleadingly, i.e. as an objection to
physicalism. For even if physicatism is the view that all facts are physical facts, the knowl-
edge argument is an objection to more than this (so far, Churchland is right). It is really an
objection to the view that all facts are, so to speak, ‘book-learning’ facts: facts the learning
of which do not require you to have a certain kind of experience or occupy a certain
position in the world. (As Jackson says, ‘you do not need color television to learn physics or
functionalist psychology’25 .) ‘Objective’ would be a good name for these facts. And ‘subjec-
tive’ would therefore be a good name for those facts the learning of which requires that one
has certain kinds of experience, or occupies a certain position in the world, etc. This why
I say that the knowledge argument is an argument for the view that there are subjective
facts. It is an argument which shows that in order to gain new knowledge of a certain sort -
to learn new facts - you have to have experiences of a certain sort.
That there are subjective facts in this sense should not really come as a surprise. For
another example of a fact whose apprehension depends on the subject’s specific location
in space and time, consider the case of indexical knowledge. Consider, for example, Vladimir
lost in the forest; he consults his compass and a map and remarks with relief ‘I am here!’
pointing to a place on the map. When Vladimir exclaims ‘I am here!’ pointing at the map,
this is something he learned. He now knows where he is, and he didn’t before. In a classic
paper, John Perry describes himself following a trail of sugar around a supermarket, intend-
ing to tell the shopper from whom it came that he was making a mess. When Perry realized
that he was making a mess he learned something, that he expresses by saying ‘It’s me! I
am making a mess26 . And this piece of knowledge is distinct from the knowledge he would
express by saying ‘The shopper with the leaking sugar bag is making a mess’. Both ex-
amples of new pieces of knowledge require one to have a certain position in the world:
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Vladimir and Perry cannot learn what they learn without occupying certain positions, or
being the person that they are. In particular, they cannot learn these pieces of knowledge,
these facts, from books. How could they? (Some writers have noted here the analogy with
the knowledge argument. I will discuss this further below)27 . What Mary, Vladimir and Perry
have all learned are subjective facts.
Someone might try to neutralize this conclusion at this point by appealing to the
distinction between facts as truths and facts as truth-makers. Perhaps such a theorist may
admit that there are subjective facts in the sense of subjective truths, or in the sense of
objects of knowledge (so long as objects of knowledge are individuated by sense rather
than solely by reference). That is, even if this theorist were persuaded by my argument that
Mary does learn a new fact, and that her situation is relevantly like the indexical case, they
may nonetheless say that this is just another way of saying that there are subjective truths.
What really matters is the denial of subjective truth-makers (or in Mellor’s terminology, facta).
And this, as the indexical analogy shows, is untouched by the knowledge argument.
But what would a subjective truth-maker be? A subjective fact, as I defined it above,
is a fact the learning of which requires that the learner has a certain kind of experience or
occupies a certain position in the world. Truth-makers, by contrast, are not learned: they are
what make true the truths that are learned. So maybe we could say this: a subjective truth-
maker is the truth-maker for a subjective truth or fact. Or: a subjective truth-maker is what
has to exist in order for a subjective fact to be learned. (This is rough, but nothing here
depends on its being more precise.) So what needs to be the case for Mary to learn that red
looks like this? An obvious part of the answer is: a visual experience of red. Mary’s visual
experience of red needs to exist if she is to learn that red looks like this. Now if a subjective
truth-maker is an experience, then no-one should deny the existence of subjective truth-
makers; for the issue is not about the existence of experiences. Experiences are subjec-
tive in the sense that they depend on the existence of experiencing subjects; but no-one in
this debate denies the existence of experiencing subjects (e.g. Mary) either. So what could
someone be denying if he were to deny that there are subjective truth-maker?
The objective/subjective distinction I drew above was between different kinds of knowl-
edge. Admittedly, it is hard to see how it clearly applies to kinds of entity. The physicalist should
certainly say that one of the entities which constitute the truth-maker for Mary’s knowledge that
red looks like this is: Mary’s experience of the tomato. And this experience might be called a
subjective entity in the sense that it is an entity which is dependent on a subject of experience.
The experience could be called a subjective truth-maker, then. So it seems that everyone must
accept that there are subjective facts (truths) and that (in so far as the idea makes sense) there
are subjective truth-makers too, since there are experiences. The truth/truth-maker distinction
does not help the physicalist escape the conclusion of the knowledge argument.
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I have argued that the physicalist should accept that there are subjective facts. The
question now is how this can be made compatible with more plausible versions of physical-
ism; that is, versions which do not say that all facts are physical or objective.
7. PHYSICALISM REVISITED AND RE-DESCRIBED
The knowledge argument takes physicalism to be the view that all facts are physical.
Given what it means by ‘fact’, this means that all propositional knowledge is physical. And
given what is meant by ‘physical’, this means that all knowledge is the kind of knowledge
which can be learned inside a scenario like the black and white room—that is, without having
to have any particular kind of experience. So the target of the argument is that all facts are
‘objective facts’ and this is the view that the knowledge argument refutes. Conclusively.
But: why should physicalists have to say that all knowledge is physical in this sense?
Indeed, why should physicalism be a thesis about knowledge at all? Physicalism is a view
about what there is and only derivatively about how we know it. The strongest and clearest
motivation for physicalism, I have argued, comes from its claim to explain mental causa-
tion28 . In order to do this, physicalism need not be committed to the view that all knowledge
must be expressible without the expresser having to have any particular experiences. It just
needs to be committed to the idea that physics is causally closed, not even to the view that
physics is explanatorily adequate29 . Therefore, physicalism does not need to say that phys-
ics must state all the facts. (The idea that it must may derive from the image of the book of
the world, with all the truths written down in the one true story of reality. But the image is
misleading; if what I say here is right, there could never be such a book. For the book cannot
express the proposition that Vladimir expresses when he says ‘I am here!’ and that Mary
expresses when she says ‘red looks like this!’.)
It is at this point - rather than in the mistaken attempt to dispute the argument’s second
premise - that the physicalist should appeal to the parallel with indexicality. The idea that
Vladimir and Perry gain new knowledge — knowledge of new facts — is compatible with
every object and property involved in these stories being physical, in the sense of the sub-
ject matter of physical science. And it is compatible with every object and property being
objective, in the following sense: the subject matter of objective science. The fact that
these pieces of knowledge are only available from certain perspectives does not entail that
there are some further non-physical/non-objective objects and properties involved in the
these situations. What is subjective are the facts.
Now many have made the connection between indexicality and the knowledge argu-
ment. But it is important to emphasize that to appreciate it, we do not need to enter the
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debate about what is the correct theory of facts or resolve the question of how to individuate
propositions30 . And we do not have to make the implausible move that Mary learns nothing
that is really new. All we need is to recognize that there is knowledge which can only be had
from certain points of view: knowledge of subjective facts. This knowledge will not be physi-
cal knowledge in the knowledge argument’s sense. But this should not worry the physicalist.
Surprising as it may seem, a physicalist can (and should) sensibly deny that all knowledge
is (in the relevant sense) physical knowledge31 . And they should therefore deny that all facts
are physical facts. This is because not all knowledge is (in the relevant sense) objective
knowledge - that is, knowledge of objective facts. Therefore not all facts are objective facts.
A number of writers have drawn attention to the fact that the argument moves from
epistemological premises to a metaphysical conclusion32 . Mellor says that the existence of
subjective facts has ‘been falsely inferred from certain kinds of knowledge33 . In so consider-
ing the matter, these philosophers have tried to find something wrong with the argument.
But as I have tried to show, there is nothing wrong with the argument, there is no false
inference. Indeed, demonstrating exactly what the argument achieves should in itself tell us
why we should not be worried by it. So long as physicalists do not hold that all knowledge is
physical or objective, that all facts are physical or objective, or that physics must be ‘ex-
planatorily adequate’ — or that objective science can state all the facts - then the knowl-
edge argument poses no objection to the physicalist. It tells us, rather, something important
about our knowledge, something even physicalists must accept.
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SUMMARY IN GEORGIAN
subieqturi codna
tim kreini
londonis universitetis filosofiis instituti
reziume da komentari
subieqturi codnis gamovlenis mizniT, avtori ganixilavs subieqturi
faqtis arsebobis SesaZleblobas logikuri eqsperimentis safuZvelze. es eqs-
perimenti SemdegSi mdgomareobs: warmovidginoT, rom qalbatoni meri cxovrebas
atarebs gareT gausvlelad, Tavis oroTaxian binaSi. erTi oTaxi mTlianad Savia,
meore TeTri, anu es qali, Tavisi karCaketili cxovrebis gamo, mxolod Savsa da
TeTr fers aRiqvams; magram adamians aqvs goneba, aqvs warmosaxvisa da ganzogadoebis
unari da aRqmis am mwiri monacemebis safuZvelzec, saTanado analizis gziT, mas
SeuZlia aagos sruli codna ferTa nairsaxeobis Sesaxeb.
axla warmovidginoT, rom meri gamodis gareT, baRSi da xedavs wiTel
vards. Tuki aRqmis es ucxo fenomeni, wiTeli feri, axali SinaarsiT gaamdidrebs
mis codnas, maSin mis mier dadgenili ferTa Teoria ar yofila sruli codna da
irRveva logikuri amocanis sawyisi piroba, magram, meore mxriv, Tuki axali
araferi xdeba, gamodis, rom wiTeli feric mis warsul gamocdilebas ekuTvnis da
maSasadame, Tavisi karCaketili cxovrebis manZilze, qali yvelafers ar aRiqvamda
mxolod Savad an TeTrad, rac isev ewinaaRmdegeba sawyis daSvebas.
aq, rogorc irkveva, Tavs iCens winaaRmdegoba Teoriidan ganWvretil da
logikurad dadgenil cdis Sinaarssa da cocxal aRqmaSi, am Sinaarsis faqtobriv
realizacias Soris. avtori fiqrobs, rom saqme gvaqvs erTi da igive faqtTan,
romelic sxvadasxva viTarebaSi, sxvadasxva konteqstSi, gasxvavebuli saxiT arsebobs;
rogorc subieqturi, an rogorc obieqturi faqti. paradoqsi moixsneba, Tuki
davuSvebT, rom raime faqti SeiZleba gansxvavdebodes Tavisi Tavisgan imis mixedviT,
Tu ra viTarebaSi arsebobs igi – rogorc aRqmiseuli, ganumeorebeli movlena, Tu
rogorc logikurad ganmeorebadi cdis monacemi. am gansxvavebazea agebuli sxvaoba
subieqtur da obieqtur codnas Soris.
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avtori vrclad ganixilavs Tavis TanamoazreTa da oponentTa Sexedu-
lebebs aRniSnuli problemis garSemo. Tuki gonebas ZaluZs logikurad aagos
obieqturi codna fizikur movlenaTa Sesaxeb, maSin es codna ar saWiroebs
praqtikul gamocdilebas da es ukanaskneli axali, subieqturi codnis wyarod
SeiZleba iqces. codna subieqturia ara imis gamo, rom igi subieqtis praqtikul
qmedebas emyareba, aramed imitom, rom mas saqme aqvs subieqtur faqtebTan, anu
aRqmiseul, individualur da ganumeorebel movlenebTan, romlebic ar eqvemdebarebian
periodizaciis princips, rac obieqturi codnis safuZvels Seadgens.
avtori gamoTqvams varauds, rom misi Tvalsazrisis winaaRmdeg SeiZleba
wamoiWras Semdegi argumenti; obieqturi da subieqturi faqtebis nacvlad iqneb
sjobdes vilaparakoT faqtebze, romlebic asaxaven WeSmaritebas da faqtebze,
romlebic qmnian WeSmaritebas. cnebaTa aseTi Canacvleba saqmis viTarebas ar
cvlis, fiqrobs avtori, radgan WeSmaritebis amsaxveli faqti, igive obieqturi
faqtia, xolo ramdenadac qmnadobis procesi subieqts gulisxmobs, WeSmaritebis
Semqmneli faqti aris swored subieqturi faqti. es faqti viT Semoqmedebis
subieqti, aris erTjeradi, ganumeorebeli; igi qmnis WeSmaritebas, anu daadgens
cocxal mimarTebas cnobierebasa da samyaros Soris.
aqedan gamomdinare, subieqturi codna, adamianis praqtikuli gamocdilebis
codnaa da ar ewinaaRmdegeba fizikalizmis princips, romlis mixedviT yovelive,
rac arsebobs aris fizikuri Ffaqti da Seadgens fizikuri (obieqturi) codnis
safuZvels. subieqturoba aRniSnuli codnisa da Sesabamisi faqtebis interpretaciis
gzaa, roca es faqtebi ganixileba codnis Camoyalibebisa da WeSmaritebis qmnadobis
cocxal da ganumeorebel dinamikaSi.
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 Abstract
Since the 1990s, contemporary Chinese aesthetics has gradually fallen into depres-
sions and became silence after the two heated domestic debates in the 1950s and 1980s.
Nowadays it is high time for Chinese scholars to make reflections on these setbacks and
frustrations. Firstly we need to clarify what are the real problems that contemporary Chi-
nese aesthetics encounters. To be short, that is, the arrival of globalization has caused a
series of profound turns from aesthetics to arts. With the further expansion and penetration
of globalization, theoretical aesthetic subjects and relevant problems are more salient, in-
cluding the shift of contemporary aesthetic research paradigm, the basic method that we
borrow western theories to interpret Chinese art works and aesthetic phenomena, the con-
stant advancing interdisciplinary research, etc. The author’s main aim in this paper will be
to explore some workable methods, which are significant to the development of the present
Chinese aesthetics in this new century.
Key words: dewesternization, resinicization, globalization, Chinese aesthetics, is-
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INTRODUCTION
 
Since the 1990s contemporary Chinese aesthetics has gradually fallen into depres-
sions and became silence after the two heated domestic debate in the 1950s and 1980s.
Nowadays it is high time for our scholars to make reflections on these setbacks and frustra-
tions. Firstly we need to clarify what are the real problems that contemporary Chinese aes-
thetics is faced with.
In the1950s, the main task for Chinese scholars was to reconstruct the fundamental
theories of Chinese aesthetics in new ideological discourse according to Marxism; in
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the1980s we mainly turned to acquaint with and digest contemporary western aesthetics to
promote the level of Chinese aesthetic research. But nowadays what are the fundamental
problems for Chinese aestheticians? It is known to all of us that globalization has brought a
series of profound changes in aesthetics and arts. With the further expansion and penetra-
tion of globalization, the theoretical aesthetic subjects and the relevant problems are more
salient. My main aim in this paper will be to explore some workable methods, which are
significant to the development of the present Chinese aesthetics in this new century.
 
UNIVERSALISM OR PARTICULARISM:
THE SHIFT OF CONTEMPORARY AESTHETIC PARADIGM
 
Globalization derived from western countries and expanded to all over the world.
Under these circumstances, due to China’s weak position in cultural exchange as a devel-
oping country, Chinese scholars are anxiously concerned with the changing trends and
struggle to respond to this changed and changing world, enduring huge pressures.
One important reason for their concern is that globalization is not only an economic phe-
nomenon but also a cultural phenomenon. It is eliminating the cultural isolations and divisions,
and thereafter, human history is flowing to merge into one single world history. Owing to the
internal link of the one-world’s economy and lifestyle, closer than ever before, the experience of
daily life and aesthetic fashion, to a great degree, have been transformed into standardized
models around the world. Some scholars emphasize that globalization should embody the di-
versity of aesthetic styles while others maintain that globalization tend to assimilate people’s
lifestyle and aesthetic tastes, which leads to the homogenization of the global culture. (1)
Globalization brings more international cultural communication and exchange, which
arouses the public thirst for enjoying foreign cultural products, especially the ones which
represent the mainstream western culture. An UNESCO survey showed that cultural com-
munication and exchange has become interactive: China is becoming the third largest ex-
porter of cultural goods, following the UK and US, and Asia’s cultural product exports are
growing to surpass North America(2). However there is no denying that due to western
culture’s dominant position, the process of globalization under the way can be considered
to be the expansion of western knowledge, value system and artistic tastes to all over the
world, spreading a series of western systematic universal value criteria. Therefore, global-
ization can be regarded as westernization and westernization is identified as universaliza-
tion. By means of hybridization or assimilation, when they are introduced, the powerful for-
eign cultural products will easily squeeze out the weak local culture, resulting in the reduc-
tion of cultural diversity and the ruin of the existing local culture. Consequently, global culture
is tending to be westernized. Another version of globalization is interpreted as American-
ization because of its special prominent authorities in the western world.
101
All these drew a strong response from the Chinese academia. Some Chinese schol-
ars struggle to fight against the penetration of globalization, and this gives rise to intense
controversy on universalism or particularism in China. Consequently, ever since the 1990s,
the struggle against essentialism, western cultural hegemony, and the awareness to stress
on cultural heterogeneity of cultures and arts between east and west, have become a surg-
ing trend in China.
Another factor to stimulate such response comes from the shift of western para-
digm, which has been widely spread in China and has made great impacts on Chinese
scholars. The essential of the paradigm shift is from objectivity of knowledge to pursuing
power of knowledge. Gramsci put forward a theory of “cultural hegemony”, to differentiate
from traditional political hegemony. In his view, the supremacy of the bourgeoisie is based
on two equally important aspects: economic domination and intellectual and moral author-
ity. While Michel Foucault declared that he only concentrates on the study of relationship
between power and knowledge rather than the content of truth. For Foucault, power and its
domination are his theoretical themes. Edward Said maintained that Orientalism is a sort
of political discourse, one tactic for dominating, restructuring, and exercising authority over
the Orient. There is no objective and fair knowledge system in terms of Orientalism done by
the purposive western scholars.
These ideas have greatly influenced China’s academic circle after the 1990s to re-
flect on the Sino-Western cultural relationship, which has been defined as relationship of
oppression and authority. The diffusion of Western culture in China is considered to be a
process of cultural colonization. Correspondingly, Chinese scholars began to shift their re-
search focus from searching for truth, a classical paradigm, to centering on political cor-
rectness and ideological struggle for power. And the conflict between Sino-western aes-
thetics is considered to be irreconcilably antagonistic.
For so long and so far, western aesthetics have always been in a guiding position.
One famous Chinese scholar, Professor Ji Xianlin said that Chinese aestheticians have
been the puppet of western aesthetics. Another scholar, Professor Cao Shunqing said modern
Chinese aesthetics has lost its voice. They maintained that the only way to change the
current status is to divert from western aesthetics, to clean up the deep-rooted occidental-
centrism, and reconstruct a new Chinese aesthetic framework(3).
This tendency among many Chinese scholars in fact is a denial of modern Chinese
aesthetics, and will mislead the future development of Chinese aesthetics. To be precise,
they ignored the common grounds, the interlink between Chinese and western aesthetics.
According to their viewpoints, the right way of modern Chinese aesthetics is
dewesternization, that is, to reconstruct the local discourse based on China’s own tradition
against western hegemony. In the chains of their logic, aesthetic theories stay isolated and
unique in each country, and don’t share any common grounds therefore, cannot be inte-
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grated. If so, Objectivity and universality of aesthetic knowledge are denied. Then, how
should we understand the logical development of modern Chinese aesthetics and properly
explain our aesthetic phenomena?
 
INTERPRETING CHINESE AESTHETICS WITH WESTERN THEORY:
THE BASIC METHOD OF MODERN CHINESE AESTHETICS
 
Modern Chinese aesthetic theories are mainly based on western speculative aes-
thetics, typically, classical German aesthetics. The major research work is to explain Chi-
nese aesthetic materials and art works in terms of western theories: interpreting Chinese
aesthetics with western theories. This is a unique and original method adopted by Chinese
scholars to deal with Sino-western comparative aesthetics, which is the foundation for us to
establish modern Chinese aesthetic system. It can be regarded as Chinese scholars’ con-
tribution to the study of inter-cultural aesthetics.
From the very beginning, modern Chinese aesthetic history is a Sino-western com-
parative aesthetic history. Introducing western theories to explain Chinese aesthetic mate-
rials and art works becomes the basic method for aesthetic study, or we may say, the basic
method of Sino-western comparative aesthetics. This was determined by the disciplinary
characteristics even since aesthetics as an independent discipline was introduced and
later transplanted into China. In this sense, modern Chinese aesthetics is and, I suppose,
will be quite different from the aesthetic studies in each western country in the surroundings
of homogeneous culture, in that it spans over the vast lands and involves a diversity of
cultural connotations between Chinese and western countries, and goes in fierce conflict
and mutual interactive blending. As a brand new domain in the Chinese history, Chinese
aestheticians once stepped into this domain, it is possible for them to explore and further
develop their own research method specific to their own national culture.
After World War, the third world countries rapidly stepped onto the international stage,
and eastern countries had witnessed the gradual rising of their economic and political sta-
tus. Under these circumstances, the studies of comparative aesthetics have been gradually
developing. But traditional occidental-centrism still continues. In fact today it is still playing a
central role in the global politics, economy and culture. However, the huge gap between
Chinese and western cultural traditions and language symbols has made most western
scholars to set back from going into the realities of eastern culture, so few of them are able
to directly get involved in eastern academic research, especially Chinese culture. On the
contrary, groups of Chinese scholars studied aesthetics in western countries, so they broad-
ened their horizon and had vast international perspectives and accumulated rich experi-
ence in comparative inter-culture aesthetic research, and in this, came into being the unique
feature of modern Chinese aesthetics, fundamentally, comparative aesthetics.
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Therefore, there are several natural stages revealing the logical course of the de-
velopment of modern Chinese aesthetic system. Firstly, Chinese scholars introduced
western aesthetics and applied them to verify Chinese aesthetic materials and art works.
This is the beginning of western aesthetics towards its sanitization and Chinese aesthet-
ics to be westernized. Secondly, with more communications carried out, Chinese schol-
ars tried to find out the common grounds between aesthetics, which is the interaction in
more profound dimensions of the sanitization of western aesthetics and the westerniza-
tion of Chinese aesthetics seeking to build up a common aesthetic theory across Sino-
western aesthetics. In other words, we interpret Chinese aesthetic materials and art works
on the basis of the concepts, the frameworks and expression mechanism of western
aesthetics and finally establish modern Chinese aesthetics, blending the western theo-
retical aesthetic essence and the features specific to Chinese aesthetics. This is a pro-
cess of searching universality between aesthetics in the course of interactive influence of
both western aesthetics towards sanitization and Chinese aesthetics to be westernized.
Today it is still our major workable method.
Can we say this method carves modern Chinese aesthetics into the puppet of west-
ern aesthetics? Essentially, Occidental-centrism is not identical with universalism. The former
argues the superiority of western culture to other non-western ones, but the latter advocates
the universal application of aesthetic knowledge and value system. The two can’t be con-
fused and taken to be the same one. Truth has nothing to do with hegemony that is related
to Occidental-centrism. Although nowadays “cultural diversity” is often mentioned; some
Chinese scholars maintain “to go back to ancient China” and “Chinese Characteristics”.
However, this reveals the long tradition of Sino-centrism and the particularism of unique
Chinese culture regardless of the universal target and standard in theoretical researches
as a discipline(4). As a matter of fact, the aesthetics, no matter Chinese or western or any
other cultures, nationalities, each enjoys its particularities and shares universal common
grounds, and may both encounter conflict and be integrated.
For the sake of establishing a discipline, we shouldn’t over-emphasize the particulari-
ties of Chinese aesthetics regardless of the criteria of aesthetics and the universality in theo-
ries. And this is destined to be infeasible. In fact modern Chinese aesthetics, from the very
beginning of its birth, was not a simple copy of western aesthetics. It had a strong sense of
political utility: saving China from misery. The strong distinctive political utility is specific to
China in modern Chinese aesthetics, and is different from classical western aesthetics. Ber-
nard Bosanquet declared in the beginning of his book A history of Aesthetic, “Aesthetic theory
is a branch of philosophy, and exists for the sake of knowledge and not as a guide to prac-
tice”, “Art, we are told, is useless; in a kindred sense aesthetic may well submit to be useless
also”(5). Professor Zhou Laixiang thinks that western speculative theories of aesthetics stress
on the logic and integrity of the reason but do not take utility as its final goal. On the contrary,
Chinese aesthetics cares more about its utilization instead of logic.(6)
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Due to the pragmatic needs in Chinese context and the influence of traditional Chi-
nese aesthetics, modern Chinese aesthetics apparently inherits the characteristics of an-
cient Chinese aesthetics which stresses the political utility; therefore it does not lose its
own theoretical guide. Then, how should we think of the differences between China and
western aesthetics? According to Bernard Bosanquet, ancient Chinese “aesthetic con-
sciousness which had not, to my knowledge, reached the point of being clarified into specu-
lative theory”(7), It means that the differences between aesthetics suggest that they are on
different historical stages. When Chinese aesthetics developed into certain historical stage
it inevitably would form its own speculative theory. The development of modern Chinese
aesthetics proves that what Bernard Bosanquet stated is quite right. And this is the same in
explaining the various differences between aesthetics. Professor Zhou Laixiang said, there
exists a double reverse development trace between Chinese and western aesthetics. “While
Chinese aesthetics goes from experience to theory and western aesthetics from theory to
experience”(8). Therefore, he claimed, “The purpose of comparative aesthetics is to seek
for the commons, immutabilities, and universalities among all kinds of countries.”(9)
This actually is the basic direction of modern Chinese aesthetics. Chinese scholars
have created a method to explain China’s aesthetic phenomena with western theories while
they successfully applied the methods similar to “influent study” and “parallel study” in interna-
tional comparative literature research. The method set up a reliable bridge between aesthet-
ics for their communications and connections, mutual flow and proof, and finally for the estab-
lishment of the general aesthetic theory surpassing the regional differences between eastern
and western countries. It has brought with its own experience and tradition specific to Chi-
nese aesthetic ideas to be merged into international aesthetic domain, to make international
aesthetics step out of regional constraints of the homogeneous western culture and to a great
extent break through the Occidental-centrism. This is the important contribution the Chinese
aestheticians made to the international aesthetics in the research paradigm.
 
INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY: REDEVELOPMENT OF THE RESEARCH METHOD
OF CONTEMPORARY AESTHETICS
 Aesthetics, as a discipline, came from the west. According to western academic
tradition, aesthetics is a branch of philosophy, and philosophy is the confluence of differ-
ent knowledge system and origin of various disciplines, and is characteristic of inter-
discipline. As a branch of philosophy, aesthetics has the nature of inter-discipline. In his-
tory ever since the ancient Greece, the aestheticians are proficient in several branches of
learning, especially in subjects between human sciences and natural sciences, which
has become a tradition in western aesthetic studies. So nowadays in the global age, it’s
urgent to apply an inter-disciplinary method in the aesthetic studies between aesthetic
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speculation and mass media, and between the non-utility of aesthetic activities and the
commercialization of literature and arts.
In the past, aesthetic theories were mainly based on literature-centrism, while nowa-
days one feature of the contemporary global culture is that the focus has turned into visual
image in almost all the fields, such as culture, media and arts etc. Images have now perme-
ated through our everyday life. In fact, in the past 50 years, there has been a gradual shift
from the verbal and textual culture and arts towards visual culture and arts is now at a more
and more fast speed, which has become a great challenge to traditional aesthetics studies.
The visual turn took place mainly in two aspects: the shift in the whole social culture and arts
and the shift in visual arts itself with movies and televisions at a leading position. All these
changes resulted in a decanonization process in the field of present Chinese literature.
Classical literary works are becoming farther away from the people, including the university
students. Instead, American movies, MTV, Flash, cartoons etc. are becoming an indispens-
able part in most people’s cultural life. TV, rather than books are their favorites.
Chinese movies relied mainly on storytelling, but now they pay more attention to
action itself while plot, theme, and dialog, etc. are less valued. Hollywood movies dominate
China’s movie market; gangster films, western films, science fiction films, swordsmen film
etc. are quite popular. Many blockbusters such as Hero and House of Flying Daggers,
directed by China’s internationally famed first-class director, Zhang Yimou, have also shown
the fascination of Chinese Kongfu through delicately designed scenes, which have reaped
millions of dollars, like Hollywood blockbusters.£¨10£© Professor Zhou Xian thinks that
movie is now undergoing a dramatic shift from narration to spectacle in the era of visual
culture. Hollywood movies and Chinese directors of “the fifth generation” are evidences of
this shift. The emergence of spectacle movies indicates changes from discourse to im-
ages, from time to space, and from reason to pleasure in the contemporary
culture.£¨11£©How to respond to the challenge of visual turn in the cross-interaction be-
tween the various disciplines and to breathe into traditional art philosophy fresh airs, we are
still in want of deep and thorough reflection over aesthetic research.
Another impact of globalization on the interdisciplinary aesthetic research is the
deterioration of global environment and the challenge of ecologism responding to the de-
terioration of the global environment. The environmental crisis in recent decades has pushed
the science of ecology into the center of public attention and given rise to a new philosophi-
cal paradigm. Ecological thought has influenced almost every discipline including aesthet-
ics. Thereafter, environmental aesthetics as a sub-field of philosophical aesthetics has got
developed in the last thirty-five years. Professor Aronld Berleant wrote: “Recently years
have seen the gradual unfolding of new field of study, environmental aesthetics, out of the
convergence on a similar body of issues by scholars and researchers from different fields.
This work appeared first at interdisciplinary conferences in aesthetics, environmental de-
sign, philosophy, and the human sciences. Soon, articles and books began to appear that
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addressed similar questions from the standpoint of various disciplines—philosophy, cul-
tural anthropology, architecture, planning, landscape architecture, cultural geography, envi-
ronmental design, psychology. Artists, too, contributed to this trend, not only environmental
artists but composers, playwriters, photographers, and film directors—practitioners who
originated perceptual, experiences of environment that provoked new questions. This field
of environment aesthetics, moreover, is international in scope, as people from different
countries, traditions, and cultures discover in it a common interest.”12
The nature in traditional literature has greatly changed in aesthetic patterns. In the
past, artists such as poets and painters often depicted the nature as the Land of Peace
Blossoms away from the turmoil of the world like the Garden of Eden, a paradise where
people live an idyllic life. But in the contemporary literary works, our natural environments
have been described as an object with thousands of boils and hundreds of holes, which
needs to be protected and saved urgently. Walden; or, Life in the Woods is a record of
Henry David Thoreau’s two years’ experience of living at Walden Pond. The writer’s chief
emphasis is to demonstrate that we human beings can absolutely live a more simplified
and happier life. In her Silent Spring, Rachel Carson questioned the right of industrial facto-
ries to pollute without considering the harmful effects on the environment. Her work started
the environmental protection movement in the United States. Global warming disaster movie
“The Day after Tomorrow”, the American movie took a look at what the world would look like
if the greenhouse effect and global warming continued at such levels, which would result in
worldwide catastrophe and disasters, including a variety of hurricanes, tornadoes, tidal
waves, floods and the beginning of the next Ice Age.
Such development of eco-literature gets well expressed in theories called eco-criti-
cism. Eco-criticism has a clear distinction from other critical approaches. For example, liter-
ary theory, in general, examines the relations between writers, texts, and the world. In most
literary theories, “the world” is a synonym of human society - the social sphere. But eco-criti-
cism expands the notion of “the world” into the entire eco-sphere, which suggests reading
literature from ecological perspective and concerning environmental crisis. Due to the seri-
ous environmental problems caused by the rapid industrialization and urbanization of con-
temporary China, this eco-criticism has great influence in China when it was introduced from
the West. Since the mid 1990s, eco-criticism has become the focus in Chinese literary theory
and criticism. Ecologism and environmental aesthetics began to exert great influences. The
term “ecoaesthetics”, not generally used by western scholars, is mainly used by some Chi-
nese scholars, concentrating on the study of the relationship between aesthetics and the physical
environment, which has become a very important field in Chinese aesthetics at present.
Environmental aesthetics extends beyond the narrow confines of the traditional phi-
losophy of art, opens to various areas and disciplines, from outer space to the museum,
from architecture to landscape, from city to wilderness. This trend of contemporary aesthet-
ics and its neighbor disciplines determine interdisciplinary methods, including the methods
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of natural sciences and human sciences in aesthetics research. We often overstate differ-
ences between Chinese and western culture. In fact despite the differences of territory re-
gions, cultures, religions, arts, common grounds, such as people’s fundamental values,
morals, lifestyles, aesthetic tastes do entail similarities. If in ancient time because of the
isolation of geographic conditions and the limits of vehicles, the differences between Chi-
nese and western culture are obvious, today in the integrative global age, with the develop-
ment of vehicles and convenience of information exchange, interaction between Chinese
and western culture has been obviously increasing fast, and the tendency to be similar has
become one distinctive feature of this modern society. This inevitable tendency is under-
estimated when we are constructing contemporary Chinese aesthetics. What’s more, the
negative effects of narrow nationalism are also underestimated in the present Chinese
aesthetics and art theories.
Conclusion
In this global age when confronted with western dominant aesthetic discourse, the
most urgent task for us is not putting forward original Chinese theory to differentiate from
the western theories, but to keep a foothold on China’s local context, trying to comprehen-
sively illustrate the common issues for aesthetic cultures of both China and other countries
and to find the common laws across east-western aesthetics. How to reconstruct contem-
porary Chinese aesthetics system in the conflict between globalization and localization, in
the challenge of visual turn all over the world and environmental aesthetics? Maybe we may
avoid the imaginary trap of antagonistic Sino-western dualism this kind of rigid antagonism
may just be a kind of imaginary existence, and work out a practical feasible general method
including local context, contemporary horizon, common topic, Sino-western interaction, in-
terdisciplinary integration, so as to make a comprehensive and consistent interpretation of
Chinese and Western aesthetics. Based on this, Chinese aesthetics will flow into the cur-
rent of international aesthetics, and finally construct some general theories transcending
the limitations and narrows of nationalities and common aesthetic theory applicable to the
whole world including western aesthetics. This is the irreversible trend for the development
of Chinese aesthetics.
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SUMMARY IN GEORGIAN
Cinuri esTetikis meTodebi da Sedegebi
globalur epoqaSi
hun dai
Congqvingis esTetikuri asociaciis prezidenti.
samxreT dasavleTis universiteti, Congqvingi, CineTi.
reziume
gasuli saukunis 80-ian wlebamde Cinel mecnierTa esTetikuri koncefciebi
marqsizmis ideologiuri wnexis qveS iyo moqceuli. avtori fiqrobs, rom amJamad
msgavsi, arasasurveli zegavlenis axali saSiSroeba iSva; globalizacia ar niSnavs
mxolod ekonomikur integracias, globalizacia kulturis sferoebsac Seexeba
da CineTSi, es procesi dasavluri da amerikanistuli kulturis zemoqmedebiT
xorcieldeba.
avtori Tvlis, rom evropuli esencializmi, romelic saboloo jamSi arsisa
da arsebobis dualizmamde midis, Cinur esTetikaSi SeiZleba davZlioT samyaros
erTianobaSi ganWvretis poziciidan, rac aRmosavluri azrovnebis da kerZod
Cinuri filosofiis uZveles tradicias Seadgens.
PHILOSOPHY, CULTURE AND RELIGION

CULTURE – PHILOSOPHIES – PHILOSOPHICAL
SYSTEMS
(PHILOSOPHY EMERGING FROM CULTURE:
A VIETNAMESE PERSPECTIVE)
PROF. POST-DR. LUONG DINH HAI
Institute of philosophy of Vietnam
Abstract
Culture is the source of fostering the systems of philosophy, the philosophical thoughts,
and is the condition and material, the origin and condition for development of philosophy. A
nation may have no own system of philosophy, but it cannot exist without its own culture.
Culture is the necessary conditions, requisites for existence of each nation in both aspects
of the material and spiritual life. According to that meaning, culture is also the requisites for
the existence and development of the systems of philosophy.
Different from the systems of scholarly philosophy in which the thinkers, scientists
completely define and create the philosophies, the universals are commonly nameless,
appear and exist in the different forms such as: folk-verse, folk-speech, in the daily life, in
architecture, etc... One cannot determine exactly the time of generating one certain univer-
sal, one specific philosophy. But one can determine the author and the moment of origin of
one specific system of philosophy. Such philosophies, abundant and diverse universals
have existed for a long time in the life of each national community, however they can exist
only side by side, reflect the specific aspects, processes of the social life, but they cannot
incorporate into a system of philosophy having an internal structure, a system of arguments.
Their generalization level cannot be high and closely systematical like the systems of schol-
arly philosophy.
The life reality of the nations shows the national cultures cannot be short of philoso-
phies, universals because they are the orientations for their activities, communication and
communication. The more and more a culture develops, the bigger and bigger quantity and
depth of philosophies get. The farther and farther go towards the modernity, the bigger and
bigger quantity, depth and polyhedral diversity of the entire philosophies become. The more
and more go backward to the ancient past, the smaller and smaller quantity, depth and poly-
hedral diversity of the entire philosophies become. The most important is that when the sys-
tem of philosophies increases in both quantity and depth, the other factors in the national
culture also develop in both width and depth according to the development orientation of
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system of philosophies, since how far philosophies develop and expand, they will pave the
way, create the direction, form the patterns for actions, communication and activities in order
to create a new cultural value, a new cultural environment, new cultural products.
Another aspect in the relationship between culture and philosophy that relates to the
philosophies in the national culture, is the role of the philosophies for the systems of schol-
arly philosophy. Only a few nations have the systems of scholarly philosophy. The systems
of philosophy are normally at the high argumentative level in comparison with the philoso-
phies in the national culture. The systems of philosophy are also important components of
the national culture. The doctrine of the scholarly philosophy is the high-leveled crystalliza-
tion at the high argumentative level presenting the world outlook and the outlook on life of
the nation in that era which was refracted through the concrete philosophers’ prism. The
philosophies in the national culture are the direct materials for forming the structure for all
factors of the systems of scholarly philosophy. Meanwhile, the philosophies can take part
more or less by their contents of knowledge, way of thinking, and deduction... into the sys-
tems of philosophy in the form of archetype. On the other hand, many philosophies indirectly
take part in the doctrines of the scholarly philosophy through influencing the philosopher’s
thought, consciousness during the study process, through the life experience, through adopt-
ing the experiences of other people, in order to take part into the system of the scholarly
philosophy since such system appeared, formed, developed and was expressed to be-
come the systematical argumentation.
The national culture is the living environment of the systems of scholarly philosophy,
is the place supplying food, drinking water, oxygen and sunlight to those systems of schol-
arly philosophy. Like the fruit trees being planted in the national culture gardens, the fatter,
the richer with appropriate temperature, humidity, light they are, the more they develop with
the more fruit. The systems of scholarly philosophy are the products firstly of the national
culture that were piled up, distilled and sublimed through talent of the awareness, medita-
tion, skill and spirit combined with the other virtues of the philosophers who have created
the systems of scholarly philosophy that were also sprouted, fostered in the national culture.
There is no national culture that developed to a certain degree, which cannot have the sys-
tems of scholarly philosophy.
Culture is the spiritual foundation of the society, at the same time it is the spiritual
foundation of philosophy. Culture in the broad sense of the word is the foundation of the
existence of the humankind, at the same time is the decisive foundation for the birth, exist-
ence, development and perdition of the systems of philosophy. Culture despite the broad
sense or the narrow meaning of the word is a regular motivating force of the social develop-
ment in general in which there is the development of philosophy. A nation without a devel-
oped culture cannot have abundant, diverse philosophies; moreover, it cannot have any
systems of philosophy. A nation may be enslaved for thousands years, but unless it has not
lost, eliminated its own culture, it can exist as an independent nation. Nations can borrow
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systems of philosophy, but cannot borrow the philosophies, moreover cannot borrow cul-
ture in general. That is the relative independence of philosophy with culture and the role of
culture for philosophy.
According to the Latin origin, culture means cultivating, bringing up, educating, de-
veloping, respecting. At present, in Vietnam, in spite of the different nuances such origi-
nal meanings are still present in a certain degree in the notion of culture in its broad sense
of the word. Culture is a system of programs, modes of upper biological living activities of
the human (including actions, activities and communication). That system has been formed
and developed throughout the historical process and helps in maintaining and improving
the social life in all its aspects. Such programs, modes of activities have been incorporated
by knowledge, standards, habits, ideas, ways of action, thoughts, doctrines, trust, target,
objectives, value orientations... Such things are diverse and abundant and have been accu-
mulated for a long time, formed the social experiences – one incorporated factor of culture.
Culture is the socially genetic thing from one generation to another.
In the historical process, the notion of culture also changes and develops. In the
initial period, culture meant cultivating land, then it meant processes and results of invention
and creation from the natural materials. In the following period, culture even implied the
meaning of the human bringing up (tending) and educating process. The ancient Roman
philosopher, Cicero was the first person to use such a new meaning of the culture notion.
Since the later half of the 18th century, the notion of culture has been used broadly in philosophy
and the other social studies. Culture is considered as the most important aspect of the
social life, related closely to the modes of the human living activities, thanks to that can
distinguish the animal being from the human life. Next, the branches of the different opinions
on culture started to appear. Culture is considered as developing process of reasoning and
the living ways having reason of the human, contrary to the wild and barbarous nature in the
pre-historical period. Culture is the human spiritual life that is maintained and developed in
the historical process, is the evolution of moral consciousness, ethics, religion, philosophy,
law and political sense that impulses the progress of the humankind.
On the other hand, they also consider culture as particular features of a society.
Culture is a system of values and ideas defining the mode of organizing society in the
different historical periods. Such systems are different and relatively independent, which
include the whole of the material cultural assets, the racial customs, the forms of language
and the other symbol systems(1).
In history, initially one commonly identified culture with all the things would be created
by the people. Then, they considered culture only the human activeness in action, activities
and communication, with an aim of creating a new world – the artificial world different from
the natural one. Culture is like the mode of performing and adjusting the human activities, is
a special aspect of the social life. It has created and imparted from one generation to another
the programs upper-biological in deed, activities and communication of the people.
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Therefore, culture is not identified with the society, it is only a special aspect of the social
life, presented in all different social states and there is no social phenomenon that is not
affected and influenced by culture or does not bear the cultural imprint.
Culture is like an information code system, that encodes the human social
experiences. Those experiences are in relation with the forms of actions, activities,
communication, and therefore, with the whole social structure and state created by a human,
they are presented like the upper-biological programs in regards to action, activity and
communication. If in the biological systems, there are even the special information structures
in order to manage and adjust such biological systems (ADN, ARN) called gene, then in the
social systems such genetic code is culture. The forms of action, activity, communication
are adjusted by “the cultural codes” with an aim of producing and developing factors, social
sub-systems and their relations, typical for each specific mode of organizing society (that
means featuring for the second natural world), communities and social institutions,
personalities that are typical for such society. That is similar to the biological genetic codes
conducting the metabolism in order to form the cells and organs of a biological body (2).
Regarding the human beings, beside the biological one, there is also another genetic
code system. That is the social genetic code, having function of transmitting from one to
another, from generation to generation the whole block of the social experiences. In order to
be transmitted, preserved, such experience block must be present in the form of different
signs such as: sound, script (writing system), language, voice, gestures, images... Such
system of signs is very diverse, abundant so that it can record the block of the social
experiences that are regularly renovated, modified, enriched and developed. Such system
of signs is one of the incorporated factors of culture.
In the second natural world, the products created by the human are also the signs in
the form of the different formulas and meanings. The material cultural objects play a dual
role in the human life: on the one hand, they directly serve practical, specific objective and
daily needs of the people such as: eating, dressing, accommodating, travelling... On the
other hand, they are the means of preserving, transferring programs, meanings, contents,
modes of adjusting activity, action, communication. Only in the second aspect, the second
natural world bears the cultural meaning and content.
Development of culture creates meanings, contents, modes of adjusting activities of
the people, creates new genetic code systems, in order to preserve and impart such
meanings, contents and modes of adjusting. The society development connects closely
with the formation of new modes of activity, therefore makes appear new programs, new
modes along with new cultural genetic codes. In the development process, the disintegration,
combination, exclusion, supplement among the new and old, modern and traditional systems,
modes also take place.
Separating the fields of spiritual activities leads to generating new contents,
meanings, modes of adjusting as the indirect and derivative structures in relation with the
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concrete forms of the practice. According to the historical movement, the independent fields
of the spiritual culture gradually appeared such as: religion, art, ethics, science, political
sense and jurisdiction, ....They interact with each other and take part in adjusting activities,
actions and communication in the daily human life.
In a certain development period of the society, the social genetic codes were formed,
either directly or indirectly, adjusted the human activities, gradually created their orders,
classes/ranks. They can be classified into 3 classes: 1- The past cultural remnants; 2- The
contemporary culture (the programs, contents, modes of adjusting activities creating a
defined form of the existing culture); 3 – The factors belonging to the future culture (the new
moral disciplines, ideas, thoughts about the future society...). Three levels, classes, three
those kinds of culture can be concretized, deformed and transformed in order to adjust
actions, activities and communication of the people and can be unified to incorporate into a
perfect whole system (3).
The cultural factors in the perfect whole system connote and connect closely with
each other to create the universals, the philosophies bearing the nature of the world outlook,
in which the social accumulated experiences are hoarded up. However, they are not the
philosophical categories, but are the realistic reflections that are shown to become the
cultural universals, the regulations, standards, philosophies. The universals bearing the world
outlook nature and the philosophies can operate and develop even outside of the
philosophical reflection. They were inherently available in the cultures where the forms of
the philosophical knowledge haven’t been developed.
The universals of culture can be divided into two big blocks having close interrelation.
The first block acknowledges the most fundamental, common features of the objects, including
the human activities. They are the basic structure of the human consciousness and bear the
general nature: space, time, movement, relation, quality, cause and effect, ... The second
block of the cultural universals is the special categories, defining people as the subjects of
activity, communication, relation, such as people, society, consciousness, good and evil, faith,
trust, hope.... The block of such universals acknowledges experiences, takes individuals into
the social relations and communication. The universals of culture can be divided into two big
blocks having close interrelation. The first block acknowledges the most fundamental, common
features of the objects, including the human activities. They are the basic structure of the
human consciousness and bear the general nature: space, time, movement, relation, quality,
cause and effect, the second block of the cultural universals is the special categories, defining
people as the subjects of activity, communication, relation, such as people, society,
consciousness, good and evil, faith, trust, hope.... The block of such universals acknowledges
experiences, takes individuals into the social relations and communication.
The cultural universals, the philosophies appear, develop and operate like a perfectly
whole system, each factor interrelated and interacting either directly or indirectly. In the system
of the cultural universals there have been expression of the most common conceptions in
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regards to the basic factors and the aspects of the human living activities: human position,
social relations, spiritual life and values of the human life. Those conceptions contain inside
of the contents, programs, modes of general activities of the society and they are concretized
by more concrete conceptions, typical for a form of defined social organization.
In the universals bearing the world outlook nature of culture may have the living
alternatives and the private activities, which are typical for the different cultural styles and
rooted in the human consciousness. At the same time, they are also closely related to the
contents, modes, action programs of both the past and the future, presenting the features of
the communication mode and human activities, of preserving, transmitting the social
experiences and value standing. They bear the national and racial specific characteristics
in each culture, and define the particular traits of the different cultures.
The universals of culture perform simultaneously at least three functions in the human
activities: 1- Classifying and arranging the social experiences that have been being available
in the way of “packing” notion in order to transmit to impart to different generations, individuals,
eras; 2- The universals of culture is the basic structure of the human consciousness in a
specific historical era. ; 3- The universals have interrelations to create an overall picture
about the world, to form a thing called the world outlook of the era, which presents the
general conception of the human and the world, and the value steps. Therefore, such picture
will determine not only the human thinking but also the human emotion (4).
The meaning of the cultural universals will be perceived by individuals and they will
determine the level of conception about the world, action and behaviour of the individuals.
The meaning of the cultural universals is in the group level and the individuals will be adjusted
appropriately with their specific circumstances.
Many philosophical doctrines in history have realized the fundamental position of the
cultural universals existed in the era which generated those philosophical doctrines. The
meaning of the cultural universals is located in all fields: in common language, in the
phenomena of the moral sense, in philosophy, in religion, arts, technique, law, etc...
The society reformation always demands changing the values and the deep meaning
of the life which are acknowledged in the universals of culture. The society transformation
regularly goes closely with a revolution in the brain, with criticizing the orientations of the
world view which are dominating that country and in that point of time, along with the proposal
on new values. There will be no big change in the society if there is no change in culture.
Being the subject of culture, but the human is always the creation of culture. It has personality
thanks to adoption of the social experiences transmitted in culture through educating,
fostering, socializing and “social genetics”
The activities of the biological program (eating, drinking, self-defence instincts, sexual
desire, etc...) in the human have experienced in the socialization process, education, and
performed in the form of the defined culture. There may be many manifestations of the
biological programs which are forbidden because of culture. Culture “taboos” many
117
ambitions, wishes, desires presenting freedom of the animal instincts through educating,
training the human since the childhood, culture also includes social – unconsciousness,
which is transmitted among generations, among one another (5).
All changes in culture are due to the creative activeness of individual. The human is
the creation of culture, but is the subject creating it. Although in the different cultures, abilities
and conditions for creation are different. Obviously, creation in the traditional societies is
inferior to the creation in the technological societies. If in the traditional society tradition is
superior, in the creative technological society, renovation is superior. As well variability and
genetics are all important for creature, tradition and creation are also equally important for
society and culture. Culture not only creates, transforms the life, but also preserves the
stable foundations of the social life.
In the traditional society, the cultures exchange relations with each other, borrow the
fruits of each other, however they rarely touch their fundamental deep layer. In the technological
society, the interaction among the cultures is stronger. The modernization processes connect
closely with borrowing, adopting new technologies, science, education system that have
changed the basic value of the traditional culture. At present, with the rapid development
speed of technology, the cultural transformations are getting bigger and bigger, the position,
role and interrelations between the scholarly culture and the mass culture also change strongly.
Dialogue between the cultures is very important. The diversity and interaction among the
cultures are the conditions for their development.
Nevertheless, though the impact of technology is so strong, each nation has its own
culture. In the national culture there are the postulates, principles, behaviours which are
expressed in its own way. Oriental, Vietnamese and European people all use a food tray
when eating, however the food tray of the Oriental people is different from the one of
Europeans’: European people eat on individual ration, Oriental people together use a food
tray and together enjoy dishes, Vietnamese people use chopsticks when eating, Europeans
use spoons, forks, ...
Each nation has its own culture, but not that every nation has its own scholarly, aca-
demic philosophical system. Whatever nation has its own philosophical ideology and es-
pecially also has the system of the universals, the diverse and abundant philosophies. The
systems of scholarly, academic philosophy have been summed up from the development of
science, practice and social history, in other words, the development of the national culture,
in which there are also the systems of the scholarly philosophy that were built previously.
Culture is the source of fostering the systems of philosophy, the philosophical thoughts,
and is the condition and material, the origin and condition for development of philosophy. A
nation may have no own system of philosophy, but it cannot exist without its own culture.
Culture is the necessary conditions, requisites for existence of each nation in both aspects
of the material and spiritual life. According to that meaning, culture is also the requisites for
the existence and development of the systems of philosophy.
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From reality of the development history of the nations in the world and in the South-
East Asian Region, we can see in each national culture ever connotes the universals, the
philosophies about the human, life, society and the world in general. However, that is not the
system of philosophy. Such universals, philosophies can be disjointed, scattered, cannot
be connected closely with each other, although those are the universals, the deep philoso-
phies. They express meditation, summing up the human experiences, knowledge about the
aspects, facts, single phenomena in the life. They can be expressed by folk verses, folk-
speeches, literature, arts, architecture, and behavior in the life. For Vietnamese people :
“Oh gourd, love the pumpkin
Though of different species, you share the same trellis”
For a long time that folk-speech is the behavior in the relationship among people
with people. However, that is not philosophy, also not the system of philosophy.
Different from the systems of scholarly philosophy in which the thinkers, scientists com-
pletely define and create the philosophies, the universals are commonly nameless, appear
and exist in the different forms such as: folk-verse, folk-speech, in the daily life, in architecture,
etc... One cannot determine exactly the time of generating one certain universal, one specific
philosophy. But one can determine the author and the moment of origin of one specific system
of philosophy. Such philosophies, abundant and diverse universals have existed for a long
time in the life of each national community, however they can exist only side by side, reflect the
specific aspects, processes of the social life, but they cannot incorporate into a system of
philosophy having an internal structure, a system of reasons. Their generalization level cannot
be high and closely systematical like the systems of scholarly philosophy.
Those philosophies, universals are located in the national culture, they do not separate,
then closely connect with culture in both the broad sense of the word and the literal meaning, in both
the material and spiritual culture. They mix into the national culture and they are tiny sand seeds in
the sandbank of the national culture, is a basic incorporated factor having decisive meaning for the
depth of the national culture. From a certain angle, can say, such philosophies, universals are the
layer of compact, condensed sediment of the national culture. It is not the entire culture, but it is the
core factor that creates quality of culture, makes culture more abundant and more profound. It is
like meat seeds that are grinded smoothly in a soup pot or in a gruel pot we eat everyday.
On the other hand, the national culture is an endless source of milk fostering and
developing philosophies and universals. The bigger and bigger size, intensity and working
ability of a nation are and the more and more culture develops that make their philosophies,
universals more and more abundant, profound, comprehensive and manifest the human life
more fully. Development of the national culture supplies materials for the appearance, exist-
ence and development of the philosophies, universals. In the contrary direction, the philoso-
phies, universals have effect of orienting and pushing up the human activities and commu-
nication, their actions according to the cultural, creative orientation for expanding and de-
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veloping culture. The philosophies are models, orientations for the following development
of culture. That means it is the direct base for the following development of culture.
Therefore, being an incorporated part of culture, but it is the core and important part.
Moreover, the philosophies in each national culture are commonly familiar, directly related
to the human daily life, they are transmitted through education of school, education of family,
accumulation through experiences, learning from friends... The philosophies, universals are
only at the experience level or experiences, but are not located at the argument level. Hence,
they are easy to understand, to apply, appropriate to mind inner feeling, character, and
personality of community, so they are easy to go deep into the human, easy to perceive and
to orient the human activities, communication more lightly, gently than the argument philoso-
phies in the systems of philosophy.
The everyday reality of the nations shows the national cultures cannot be short of
philosophies, universals because they are orientations for their activities, communication
and communication. The more a culture develops, the bigger the quantity and the depth of
philosophies get. The farther and farther go towards the modernity, the bigger and bigger
quantity, depth and polyhedral diversity of the entire philosophies become. The more and
more go backward the ancient past, the smaller and smaller quantity, depth and polyhedral
diversity of the entire philosophies become. The most important is that when the system of
philosophies increases in both quantity and depth, the other factors in the national culture
also develop in both width and depth according to the development orientation of system of
philosophies, since how far philosophies develop and expand, they will pave the way, cre-
ate the direction, form the patterns for actions, communication and activities in order to
create new cultural value, new cultural environment, new cultural products.
Another aspect in the relationship between culture and philosophy that relates to the
philosophies in the national culture, is the role of the philosophies for the systems of schol-
arly philosophy. Only a few nations have the systems of scholarly philosophy. The systems
of philosophy are normally at the high argumentative level in comparison with the philoso-
phies in the national culture. The systems of philosophy are also an important component of
the national culture. The doctrine of the scholarly philosophy is the high-leveled crystalliza-
tion at the high argumentative level presenting the world outlook and the outlook on life of
the nation in that era which was refracted through the concrete philosophers’ prism. The
philosophies in the national culture are the direct materials for forming the structure for all
factors of the systems of scholarly philosophy. Meanwhile, the philosophies can take part
more or less by their contents of knowledge, way of thinking, and deduction... into the sys-
tems of philosophy in the form of archetype. On the other hand, many philosophies indirectly
take part in the doctrines of the scholarly philosophy through influencing the philosopher’s
thought, consciousness during the study process, through the life experience, through adopt-
ing the experiences of the other people, in order to take part into the system of the scholarly
philosophy since such a system appeared, formed, developed and was expressed to be-
come the systematical argumentation.
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The system of the scholarly philosophy by itself is a basic and important incorpo-
rated factor of the national culture, if that national culture has the systems of the scholarly
philosophy. It is difficult to say that a high-developed culture can have the systems of the
scholarly philosophy, but clearly that in the development history of the nations in the world,
from the ancient age up to now, the systems of scholarly philosophy were born in the wide,
deep, brilliant-developed cultures such as in: Greece, Ancient Rome, India, China, Ger-
many, France, England, ....The national culture is the living environment of the systems of
scholarly philosophy, is the place supplying food, drinking water, oxygen and sunlight to
those systems of scholarly philosophy. Like the fruit trees being planted in the national cul-
ture gardens, the fatter, the richer with appropriate temperature, humidity, light they are, the
more they develop with the more fruit. The systems of scholarly philosophy are the products
firstly of the national culture that were piled up, distilled and sublimed through talent of the
awareness, meditation, skill and spirit combined with the other virtues of the philosophers
who have created the systems of scholarly philosophy that were also sprouted, fostered in
the national culture. One can say there is no national culture that developed to a certain
degree and cannot have the systems of scholarly philosophy.
In the national culture, the philosophies are the direct nutrition source of the systems of
philosophy, since they were distilled, sorted out carefully, existed in the form of the general knowl-
edge, the orientations for the human actions, activities and communication. A culture that has
not developed to such degree of having the philosophies, cannot have the systems of scholarly
philosophy. The other factors of the culture can either directly or indirectly affect the formation
and development of philosophic thinking, of the formation, development history of philosophic
thoughts, of the systems of scholarly philosophy. However, the impact through the philosophies
is the most basic and important one. Similarly, the national culture is the source of maternal milk
of the scholarly literary works, then the national culture is also the endless source of maternal
milk fostering the philosophic argumentum, the systems of scholarly philosophy.
In reality, there is no separation between the national culture and the entire philoso-
phies of nation existing in such culture. Similarly, the systems of scholarly philosophy are
like that, but they are different from the systems of philosophies, the systems of scholarly
philosophy belong to another layer; step in generalization degree and logical argument and
systemization. The single philosophies are commonly not based on logical argument, their
generalization degree is low therefore systemization is not as high as in the systems of
scholarly philosophy. The systems of scholarly philosophy are the results of summing up,
generalizing the development results of science, social life, historical experiences and indi-
vidual experiences, i.e.: they are generalization, summarization of the development steps
of culture; therefore, their generalization is higher than the philosophies and culture in gen-
eral. The philosophies commonly reflect single scattered, incoherent experiences, facts,
actions, not presenting the general laws or the deep essence of phenomenon, process.
Therefore, they cannot bear the systemization, argumentum. But they are the important
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materials for the systems of scholarly philosophy, and are the inevitable intermediary among
the other factors, parts, layers, steps of culture with the systems of philosophy of that nation.
Both special forms in the entire national culture inter-modify to form the general world out-
look, outlook on life of that nation, they have effect to orient in general so that the human can
act, communicate and operate in the daily life.
With the historical development of culture and national life in general, the philoso-
phies as well as the philosophy have the ceaseless transformation. There are the philoso-
phies that can lose effectiveness and fall into oblivion, there are new philosophies that arise,
reflect new phenomena, things, process, as well there are the systems of philosophy that
will gradually fall into oblivion. New systems of philosophy that can better meet the require-
ments of social life and individuals, will arise and develop. The men of the primitive age or
of the slave age had the philosophies that for the time being the modern men do not have.
On the contrary, the modern men have the philosophies that the ancient people could not
have. Likely, the primitive men could not say “Precious like gold, the type of philosophy the
modern men usually use. The similar situation is also available in the systems of scholarly
philosophy. The new systems of philosophy of the following era that will ever inherit the
philosophies, thoughts, arguments, achievements of the previous eras, arrange them so
that they can be suitable for the new systems of philosophy, adopt new philosophies and the
other new factors of the culture.
Philosophy occurs within the nation, pushes up the national culture to develop up to
a new step, impulses the movement of the national culture, modifies, makes good the cer-
tain shortcomings of the national culture. Philosophy either presents the reflection of the
national culture or is a basic side, a key area of the national culture. Philosophy is the
national culture in the highest argument level, is the generalization of the cultural achieve-
ments in different fields from science to reality, from the knowledge to the living experi-
ences, from the historical past to the present and future. Therefore, philosophy is affecting
orientation of the world outlook for the following development of the national culture, to con-
duct actions, activities and communication of the human in creating new culture, in adopting
and enjoying the cultural achievements in general.
If philosophy wants to be at the top of argument, it must sum up and generalize the
development of all cultural fields. That requires the philosophies to have broad cultural views,
broad and deep knowledge about the different fields of the national cultural life. The more
philosophy stands at the top of argument, the more profound its size and degree of gener-
alization, summarization become, the higher level it stand at in comparison with the phi-
losophies and so, the more it has effect of orienting greatly for many different fields of cul-
ture. Such orienting effect can be through the direct way by adopting philosophical argu-
ment knowledge, possibly by the indirect way through adopting the philosophies that are
located in the systems of philosophy themselves or were transformed, amended, made
accurate in the process of appearance and existence. Each man who lives, operates and
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communicates, is always conducted by some philosophical arguments and defined phi-
losophies.
In the consciousness and life of each man, though being self-conscious or not self-
conscious, they are always influenced by the philosophies and philosophy. The entire cul-
ture, but the core is that the philosophies and philosophy create paradigm, corridor, pipe of
actions, activities and communication of the human. In relation with culture, all philosophies
and philosophy creates a paradigm system, corridor, pipe for creating, adopting and enjoy-
ing the human culture. On the other hand, the cultural life in the development process also
makes contribution in revealing the limitations, shortcomings, mistakes of the philosophies
and the systems of philosophy, thenceforth, perfects, and amends or eliminates them out of
the human sense and life.
Nevertheless, in the existence and development process of the philosophies and
the systems of philosophy when forming paradigm, corridor, pipe for culture, they can bind,
inhibit the cultural development, and especially inhibit thinking and ability of creating the
human culture. The philosophies, systems of philosophy that are backward, obsolete or
have mistakes, normally begin to have reverse effect by presenting their conflicts with the
philosophies, systems of philosophy and culture in general, even among them with culture
can begin a conflict period. In the conflict process, culture gradually presents demand on
renovating, replacing the old philosophies and philosophy with the new philosophies and
philosophy. At the same time, culture will gradually create, replenish and agglomerate ma-
terials for generating new philosophies or new systems of philosophy. The conflict between
philosophy and culture will gradually create the cultural premises for resolving such conflicts
and then the means that help resolve the conflicts. Culture will progress step by step, re-
solve gradually single, small problems coming toward resolving bigger problems, creating
new cultural materials, meeting new requirement of the development, gradually modifying
into the natural cultural treasure new knowledge, new philosophies, and new cultural values.
On such agglomeration basis, culture will speed up philosophy to make new sudden
breaches, create the systems of philosophy that are newer, more suitable for the develop-
ment. Culture takes part in sorting out, screening, eliminating, preserving, bringing into play
and imparting the values of old philosophy into new philosophy.
Culture is the spiritual foundation of the society, at the same time it is the spiritual
foundation of philosophy. Culture in the broad sense of the word is the foundation of the
existence of the humankind, at the same time is the decisive foundation for the birth, exist-
ence, development and perdition of the systems of philosophy. Culture despite the broad
sense or the narrow meaning of the word is a regular motivating force of the social develop-
ment in general in which there is the development of philosophy. A nation without a devel-
oped culture cannot have abundant, diverse philosophies; neither can it have any systems
of philosophy. A nation may be enslaved for thousands years, but unless it has not lost,
eliminated its own culture, it can exist as an independent nation. Nations can borrow sys-
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tems of philosophy, but cannot borrow the philosophies, moreover cannot borrow culture in
general. That is the relative independence of philosophy with culture and the role of culture
for philosophy.
Not being completely identifiable however can imagine that philosophy is the bril-
liant halo of the cultural fire globe. The bigger and bigger, the more and more luminous such
globe gets, the more and more brilliant, pervasive the halo becomes, the more beautiful its
color becomes. Culture, philosophies and the systems of philosophy is three different lay-
ers, steps of culture itself in the broad sense of the word, but that is three in one – a culture
in the broad meaning..
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SUMMARY IN GEORGIAN
kultura da filosofia –
filosofiuri sistemebi
(kulturidan aRmocenebuli filosofia –
vietnamuri perspeqtiva)
 KUFFFFFFFFFFFF FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
luong din hai
profesori, vietnamis filosofiis institutis vice-direqtori.
reziume
warmodgenil naSromSi sakmaod vrclad aris gaSuqebuli genetikuri mi-
marTeba kulturasa da filosofias Soris, rogorc zogadi TvalsazrisiT, aseve
kerZod, vietnamis sulier tradiciaTa SenarCunebisa da ganaxlebis perspeqtivaSi.
avtori gansakuTrebiT xazs usvams gansxvavebas kulturidan aRmocenebul
filosofiasa da saswavlo-filosofiur sistemebs Soris. filosofia, rogorc
kulturis fenomeni ikvebeba eris uZvelesi, miTosur azrovnebaSi fesvebgamjdari
tradiciebiT, rac adamianTa fsiqoemociur arqetips Seadgens. saswavlo-filosofiuri
sistema ki SeiZleba nasesxebi iyos zogadsakacobrio kulturis saganZuridan,
globalizaciis epoqis moTxovnaTa gaTvaliswinebiT. avtoris azriT, saWiroa
damyardes harmonia filosofiis am or saxeobaTa Soris.
avtori gvisabuTebs, rom erma SeiZleba iarsebos saswavlo-filosofiur
sistemaTa gareSec, magram kulturis ararsebobis SemTxvevaSi, igi Sewyvets arsebobas.
eri SeiZleba damonebul iqnas, magram sakuTari kulturis TviTmyofadoba mas
gadaarCens. eri SeiZleba ganTavisufldes, magram Tuki is moklebulia kulturul
memkvidreobas, didi xnis sicocxle ar uweria mas.
aqedan gamomdinare, avtori daaskvnis, rom kulturas sasicocxlo mniSvneloba
aqvs adamianTa erovnuli erTobisaTvis. kultura aris filosofiis wyaro imdenad,
ramdenadac TviT filosofiuri azrovneba, rogorc kulturis fenomeni, eris
TviTmyofadobis, misi yofna-aryofnis, misi gadarCenis aucilebel sulier qmedebas
Seadgens.
125
THE CONCEPT OF SPIRITUAL COGNITION
NIZHNIKOV SERGEY
People’s Friendship University of Russia, Moscow
Yet ancient philosophers (Plato and Aristotle) and later Kant defined the certain hier-
archy of human cognition and abilities. It can be expressed in the following way:
- Sensory cognition is the basic one, all our cognition begins with it. Aristotle
in the beginning of his main masterpiece work “Metaphysics” wrote: “All the people by
their nature tend to acquire knowledge. And its proof is perception impulse…” (980a);
- Rational cognition is functioning with the help of mind. It has ability to establish
and disclose objective (cause-effect) relations between phenomena, laws of nature. Intel-
lect is cognition through concepts and categories, it is not tentative but discursive;
- Cognition based on the intellect ideas. Intellect ideas serve for understanding
while reason categories serve for assertion about perceptions. By an idea Kant means
essential reason conception to which senses can’t supply adequate subject. Cognition
founded on intellect specifies world apprehension principles. In Criticism pure mind he
notes that any our cognition is caused thanks to senses, then moves to reason and
finishes into intellect as the highest cognition capacity;
- Faith as “improvable knowledge” directed to cognition of incomprehensible
and transcendental.
Only the last two highest levels are considered as spiritual cognition.
Meanwhile we must make difference between faith and superstitions. Faith is based
on speculative thought and doesn’t contain naturalistic character while superstitions are
specific “vain belief”, faith in nonsense. Superstitions are always naturalistic; they give lit-
eral interpretation to all that is interpreted in spiritually-symbolic way by faith. Faith gives a
scope to the human freedom and consolidates it but superstitions always mean complete
human dependence on some forces or idols. The superstitions, same as mystics construct
other worlds in the image and likeliness of the sensual world; per se they just double and
triple the present world. The faith says about other world as of a spiritual speculative world
but not as of a world situated in some other space and time. The faith speaks about eter-
nity. Hell and Paradise — are spiritual ideas so within these abstract concepts it is useless
to look for wonderful gardens or for devils with pans. We can find these symbols in religious
legends but they are not to be interpreted as naturalistic ones. There are always a lot of
superstitions but there is only one faith though its interpretations can vary. The superstitions
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are unscientific, but the faith is super-scientific, it includes science but is not limited by it.
According to philosophy a human being can create his life on the basis of his sense and
according to developed religion on the basis of faith in absolute virtue that is above and
more powerful than stars or terrestrial augurs.
Let us correlate the discussed human cognitive abilities with the main kinds of human’s
intellectual development of the world:
Then we can suggest another classification of the forms of cognition basing on kinds
of spiritual human activity and restraining from hierarchical approach. In this connection it is
possible to select some more forms of cognition: existential, moral and aesthetical.
We can also differentiate the following concepts:
1) rational, typical of science;
2) extra rational out of rational, typical of philosophy, religion, art and morals, that are
not limited by the boundaries of rational cognition and get beyond it but do not deny
the scientific knowledge within the science competence;
3) Irrational, typical of mystics, all kinds of superstitions pseudoscientific gnostics etc. Irra-
tional is not compatible with rational and does not form a part of extra rational. It has
ability to create all kinds of cross breed forms that may claim for spirituality (sects, extra-
sensory and parapsychology magic and some modern «spiritual» trends and cure
methods etc.), or claim for being scientific, though in fact remaining pseudoscientific,
since are using incompatible methods ( astrology and many others);
4) Super-rational, the cognition of which is ultimate goal of philosophy, religion and art
the name of which is excessively used by irrational. Super-rational can be character-
ized as spiritual, for the latter relates to the first one. Mystics and superstitions are not
super-rational but are just primitive “rational” and empirical. They claim for the status
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of super national knowledge while remaining within the limits of rational and design
structures of «other worlds», contradicting by that to empiricism and rationalism in the
proper sense of the word. Without any authorization irrational is using both rational
and super rational, being in fact pseudo rational and pseudo super rational.
Any true cognition regardless its form it has or the methods it use has a creative
character. Creativity finds its reflection in cognition of unknown in the very movement of
cognizing thought. The specific creative character is an inherent quality of intuition and of
imagination. The development of creative imagination plays the role of a ram for break
through the traditional theories and getting beyond their limits. The cognition creativity can
exist in environment of freedom, objectivity and criticism.
Now it is much spoken about the lack of spirituality in a society and in a person, but
what is the spiritual as it is? You may hear the most various answers to this question it:
someone sees the spiritual only in sphere of religion or mysticism, someone associate it
with the whole area of culture or identifies it as morals. Especially frequently nowadays the
spiritual is connected to any mystical visions or ideas, extrasensory or Para psychological
abilities. The ordinary consciousness maintains concept of spiritual in the individual inter-
ests. But what does its essence consists of?
First of all it is self-cognition. In the most intimate spiritual making where the person
is extremely sincere to himself, he is capable to touch depths of his own life, to meet him-
self, sometimes for the first time is valid to find out and realize him. Thus the spiritual self-
knowledge is carried out, for such self-recognition is simultaneously also spiritual transfor-
mation of the person. The spiritual knowledge begins there where a person in the unfathomed
sincerity concerns depths of his own same as of general being.
Spiritual as a process represents itself in disclosing of essence of a person that is
nothing else that the self-cognition. In the act of self-knowledge a person is given to itself,
but in a paradoxical way, so, that he is a special essence that is in the dark concerning its
own nature. Therefore the first precept appealed to a person from God, became a com-
mandment “know thyself”. In a history it arises for the first time as an inscription on Apollonian
temple in Delphi, then it is repeated by Tales, and it becomes meaning of the life for Socrates,
getting in Plato’s theory about knowledge as reminiscence a complete kind. The same
requirement is proclaimed in religion though in the form specific to it, it becomes also the
basic theme of art, especially in Aeschylus’s tragedies in Ancient Greece, in Indian
Bhagavad-Gita and even in Epos about Gilgamesh in ancient Mesopotamia.
The spiritual phenomenon realizes in a person, and this process can be named self-
knowledge. Hegel characterized the given process in the following way: “Know thyself “ —
this absolute precept neither in itself, nor there where it was stated historically, has no value
only the self-cognition directed to certain abilities, character, propensities and weakness
of an individual, but value of knowledge of that originally in the person, originally in itself and
for itself, knowledge of the essence as spirit. So in philosophy of spirit the so-called human-
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knowledge is of small value, aspiring to investigate in other people their features, their
passions and weakness — these as they are called, the bends of human heart - knowl-
edge, on the one hand, having the sense in case it can appraise the knowledge of general
- a person as such and by that the essence – spirit and on the other hand — engaged in
casual, insignificant, not original kinds of existence of spiritual, but not penetrating up to
substantial — up to the spirit itself”(1)
In true philosophy as spiritual making, within the framework of it and by it the self-
knowledge was accomplished. Even the first naturalistic philosophers studied universe to
learn themselves. Heraclites still earlier than Socrates, in fact, also was engaged only in
self-knowledge, sitting on steps of a temple, playing dice with children and reflecting about
eternity. He, “…as if having made something majestic and important, speaks: “I searched
for myself” — and from Delphian sayings by the most divine considered “Know thyself”, -
that, as Socrates has served as a starting point of rising of this question and his research...”.
So wrote Plutarch about Heraclites (2).
Socrates passes to more direct self-knowledge, he is not interested any more in round-
about ways to himself: “I have refused research of objective reality”, he spoke(3). Following
Socrates it is possible to say that the spiritual knowledge is “art which helps us to care of
ourselves”, i.e. it is directed not that belongs to us, but on improvement of ourselves (4). As
per Socrates the spiritual knowledge is directed on search of essence of human ego that later
Plato has defined as idea, eidos of a person (5). The identification of idea with the essence of
spiritual has resulted then in its understanding as metaphysic-super sensual, to avoid it in the
given work, the spiritual knowledge is defined as disclosing of essence of a person.
Deep conformity can be found in east philosophy. In Ancient Indian philosophy the
spiritual purpose began to be determined by a concept moksha, i.e. “deliverance” in trans-
lation from a Sanskrit, and Mokshadharma - as a way, the law of delivering and one of
Mahabharata’s books simultaneously. Mokshadharma, as well as Upanishads, comprises
the basic conceptual system and principles, i.e. archetype of Ancient Indian Culture. In In-
dian philosophy the spiritual knowledge and essence of a person are defined through tran-
scendental-immanent understanding of Brahman-Atman. Same is said, for example, in Taoist
book “Guan In-Tzu “: “to search for wisdom outside of itself – the top of nonsense”, and the
ancient Confucian philosopher Meng-tzu, said that “the doctrine has only one purpose –
search for the lost human nature”(6).
The fundamental metaphysical categories of philosophy and basic religious symbols
can be considered as conceptions of essence of a person. Then also the category of being
is a symbol of essence of a person, because to it he is called to transcend from his exist-
ence, finding himself, thus, in a gleam of being (Heidegger). A person is an eternal way to
himself, and for this purpose it is necessary for him to learn all universe as in breadth heav-
ens, and in depth of his own psyche, the logos of which is infinite in its self-increasing
(Heraclites). And for this purpose he needs transcendent and immanent, being and empiri-
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cal world, and such concepts as atom (Democritus), idea (Plato), “the unmoved-mover“
(Aristotle), the supreme unity (Neo-Platonist The One, Vedanta, Vl. Solovyev) etc. They
are, among other things, symbols of essence of the person, points of a foothold for thought
and self-creation. In spiritual knowledge a person finds a way to his essence.
A person can be a slave not only of empirical circumstances, but also of ideas which
are imposed on him by culture or ideology. Therefore research of forms of spiritual, results
the analysis of the concept in clearing of consciousness from illusions. The philosophical
analysis of spiritual is a way to freedom, process of self-purification and self-deliverance. In
this sense philosophy, for example, is an esoteric science, accessible to everybody, but not
by all is comprehended.
The experience of spiritual self-cognition that is creating essence of a person creates
also a culture. It is the form-building core, we shall recollect confessions of St. Augustine,
Rousseau and Lev Tolstoy they are not only the reflection of revolution in culture, but in many
respects have served also as its catalyst. In a history of culture of mankind spiritual experi-
ence of knowledge is disclosing as Revelation, - a Tree with three branches: religion, phi-
losophy and art. They are united right by the phenomenon of spiritual that, however, is mate-
rialized in these three spheres in specific way, basing on various intrinsic forces of the
person, his abilities and potentialities.
Strictly speaking, the phenomenon of spiritual is not the property of culture in the sense
that it is itself arises on the basis of spiritual acts. From nothingness strings of being are
weaved, from spiritual is created cultural, its cloth is weaved. In culture the movement of
spiritual is objectified. In spiritual creativity the person finds freedom and dignity. Spiritual
acts derivate senses and real values, social and juridical rules, morals. The basic moral
precepts have been born as revelation within the depth of self-cognition experience, re-
gardless what basis it would be ground on. So, for example, a precept “Don’t kill!”, is al-
ready known for thousands years, but wars proceed on the Earth, and the state laws of
many countries include a death sentence in its Codes.
The aforesaid understanding of spiritual does not coincide with anthropology of L.
Feuerbach. The latter reduced all understanding of spiritual to love, and mostly sensual,
than spiritual. In pathos of bringing down on the ground transcendental he has missed the
essence of a person disclose itself through the process of transcend without which the birth
of spiritual is impossible. The love as the strongest and the deepest experience, irrespec-
tive of object at which it is directed, already comprises in itself an element of transcen-
dence, self-rebellion and spreading beyond its limits. For this reason Descartes said: “the
concept of God is previous than me” (7). Through the given statement the philosopher,
probably, wanted to tell, that a person is born spiritually from the supreme idea, original
pattern, transcendence, instead of a monkey. “The pure concept, - explains Descartes in
the other place, - there is a God “(8). Only basing on such utmost concepts, the person is
capable to accomplish spiritual cognition, which creates his essence. By means of them a
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person pulls himself by his hair out of an animal life, same as Munchausen – out of a bog. In
this sense a person has his origin from God, or from human being, depending on what
conceptual system we shall select. As to the traditional anthropology Heidegger marked,
that it “is such interpretation of the person which basically already knows, what he is such
and consequently it is never capable to be asked a question what creature he is”(9).
However, despite everything that has been told, the spiritual knowledge as constructing
essence of a person, or developing it, it should be studied, under the name of the object, anthro-
pology, i.e. by science about a person, in this case, if it is possible to express it as, - spiritual
anthropology. The latter should not evaluate a person as something that is constant once and
forever, and not as static concept. Even when a person thinks about himself and defines himself
through a pronoun I, - I is no more than a symbol of infinite depth, and I is only its name. The
essence of a person is not something static; the creative person each day is capable to recog-
nize himself as something other. The essence of a person is developed during the spiritual self-
cognition conducting a person in his infinite way to the Person, to perfection and to an ideal that
is to open the spiritual archetype of humankind to the full volume. This process by itself is the
supreme kind of spiritual creativity and creation where a person creates not something alien to
itself, or something auxiliary for his existence, but his very essence.
The spiritual phenomenon can also be defined through concept of transformation.
Spiritual is carried out then when a certain essence is transformed to the Person. Further
this process can acquire its own symbolic and terms depending on what material it is ac-
complished: religious, philosophical or other creative materials. But in its essence the spiri-
tual act is only spiritual, and then it is objected in certain areas and disciplines. When ask-
ing a question about spiritual, we inevitably find ourselves in the bosom of thousand-year
cultural traditions. For spiritual knowledge a person requires some levers which would en-
able him to release him from himself. Here we with inevitability enter three mentioned spheres,
each of them has the language in which and by means of which are gained the spiritual
knowledge, results of which are fixed in the same language, on which it is carried out. There
are developed certain methods of spiritual knowledge appropriate to specifics of spheres
of its realization: philosophizing on the basis of thinking, religious belief on the basis of
ability of the person to the supreme feelings. According to young K. Marks, “the originality of
each intrinsic force”(10) of a person creates “the original way of its objectification”. The
disclosing of united process of spiritual knowledge disintegrates and shows results in dif-
ferent areas, and through these channels allows a person to create himself. The phenom-
enon of spiritual cannot be torn off from its manifestations same as being from living, but it
is also impossible to reduce it to them. Spiritual shows itself only in an image, only then it
can be seen for a person, but any image disguise spiritual as such. “Jesus has told: Images
are appeared to the person, and the light that in them, is latent. In an image of light of the
father it (light) will open, and his image is shadowed due to the light”(11). Identifying images
of spiritual with it as it is, the person limits and, thus, deforms his own essence, runs into
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narrow dogmatism and fanaticism. However, living in the world of alienation, in the world of
spiritual he also is compelled to move by way of trials and errors. Spiritual knowledge as
revelation that splits into three basic spheres, nevertheless, makes a unity. The philosophy,
religion and art as specific ways of display of spiritual not only enter in contradictions with
each other, but also communicate, interact with each other in whole culture of mankind.
So, some intrinsic characteristics of the spiritual phenomenon are already determined,
spheres of its actions and objectivities are allocated. At definition of the concept of spiritual
it is impossible to stop at any of the pre-established points of view, for example, extremely
religious or atheistic; it would deform the concept of spiritual as this would be only one
sided consideration of it. In the modern world we notice every possible, sometimes oppo-
site types of world-views. The task is, that their carriers could find common language, and,
moreover, the general spiritual basis for dialogue.
Originally spiritual existed for a person as a mystery in such a manner that he was
losing himself in it, ran into some kind of ecstasy, the changed condition of consciousness,
nevertheless accomplishing thus some transcendence of his routine existence. But all this
occurred mostly due to eliminating of conscious life, than due to increasing of sensible-
ness. However a person needed such way of transcendence, because even now, having
come to a deadlock he can choose for remedy alcohol, drugs or various mystical illusions.
Qualitatively new understanding of spiritual and a method of its achievement has appeared
with occurrence of philosophy and monotheistic religions. The spiritual attitude to life began
to appear where a person started to comprehend the life metaphysically from his position in
the world. Basing on such judgment the representation of idea was born; idea about the
ideal relation to life, i.e. spiritual appeared. The idea as spiritual vision is expressed most
adequately, though not without some problems, in Plato’s philosophy. In religion the meta-
physical comprehension of life is fixed to its central symbol. Through such symbol or idea
for human consciousness arises the possibility of an entry in spiritual, realization by a per-
son of his spiritual life. Christ, Buddha, Plato have managed to penetrate into spiritual es-
sence of position of a person in the world and to express it in symbols and concepts. Their
positions contain speculative truth which is demonstrated on a material of various cultures
and by various methods. And as the spiritual knowledge concerns not abilities of a person,
not what he has, but what he is on essence, the spiritual truth is he himself on the highest
level of sensibleness of his being when the essence of a person is completely developed,
resulting in appearance the spiritual archetype of humankind. For this reason Christ spoke
“I am an entrance”, and al-Hallaj, - “I am the Truth”.
Spiritual results from the position of a person in the world, which is characterized by
such concepts as freedom, will, consciousness, speculation etc. For the analysis of a spiri-
tual phenomenon research work of the mentioned philosophical categories is necessary.
From realization of the spiritual cognition, its consideration comes out such concepts as
existence and transcendence, that essentially characterize a phenomenon of spiritual and
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which we shall discuss in more details further. As aforesaid and generally was clarified the
concept of spiritual, its characteristics and area of realization then it is possible to get to
more profound and versatile research of a problem of spiritual. As the summary of this item
we shall generalize all told about a spiritual phenomenon.
Necessity of spiritual comes from position of a person in the world which is character-
ized by a duality and contradictions: a human person by nature is a biological creature,
and by essence - spiritual, but a person is a unity and integrity of everything, what he has
got. He enters sphere of spiritual or essentially human area when he starts posing existen-
tial questions asking about the significance of his own life. Spiritual is represented as truth
of human life which is born from comprehension of the life itself. Spiritual is the supreme
product of the life as it is which comes to the self-consciousness and conscious increase in
the person. Searching for meaning of the life results in necessity of self-knowledge, es-
sence of being. The spiritual cognition is vertical way whereas all other kinds of knowledge
are distributed in a horizontal plane. This vertical, or the intrinsic cognition of meaning of the
life is nothing else but self-cognition, as a result of which the essence of a person is devel-
oped and created, showing spiritual archetype of humankind.
The self-cognition as knowledge of the cognizing subject is speculation about his
essence, as a result of which it comes to the increasing appearance that, in its turn, is
characterized by humanizing of a person results to his humanization. Such knowledge is
the supreme kind of creativity, - self-mastering. In an ideal achieved spiritual perfection it is
possible to count in the one who has developed his essence, has humanized himself, and
has opened in himself the spiritual archetype of humankind.
The process of spiritual creativity in a history of culture splits into three basic streams
in which spiritual proves the most direct image: religion, philosophy and art. Spiritual as it
is, is the unity in its concept, but during historical periods it is carried out by various ways. It
is transformation of a person into a spiritual creature which is impossible without “points of
a support”, symbols of religion and metaphysical categories of philosophy, basing on which
the consciousness is capable to purify itself. Spiritual penetrates all human live activity and
without it in general there is no person, but in other spheres its activity is submitted only
indirectly. However to its self-consciousness spiritual can come, if it is inquired not about
something else, but about it itself, not about its spheres, even some direct objectified, but
about spiritual as initial revelation, as contemplation in which all intrinsic forces of a person
are resulted in the supreme harmony and perfection when his essence is completely real-
ized in existence, history and culture.
Conclusion
In the present work has been carried out an attempt of definition of spiritual cogni-
tion and to lay out its naked essence through an analysis of its manifestations in mankind’s
culture. The very analysis of eastern and western culture and philosophy ancient and
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temporary ones, resulted in substantial comprehension of uniformity of spiritual concep-
tions and its cognition that are inherent to a man and to the humankind in general. Con-
cept of spiritual cognition is divided in several branches of its realization but neverthe-
less among such contradicting and multi-sphere aspects as philosophy, religion and
culture, we tried to detect their inner unity that
represent the spiritual as it is. Spiritual Cognition represents the highest form of manifes-
tation of the reasonable life of a man, its essence.
The sense of spiritual phenomenon in simple and clear words is determined as
relation of a man to his own life, to his I and to his own world in which he exists. Spiritual
cognition is demonstrated in realization by a man of the purpose of his being, it express
relation of a man towards each moment of his life from the point of view of Eternity. Though
this relation is imported from outside but it is the essence of the life itself, immanent
essence of which is disclosed through appeal to transcendental.
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SUMMARY IN GEORGIAN
sulieri Semecnebis koncefcia
sergei niJnikovi
ruseTis xalxTa megobrobis universiteti
reziume
naSromi yuradRebas iqcevs sulieri Semecnebis definiciis mcdelobiT da
misi manifestaciiT zogadsakacobrio kulturaSi. dasavluri da aRmosavluri
filosofiis, antikuri da Tanamedrove azrovnebis SedarebiTi analizis gziT
dadgenilia sulieri Semecnebis Tandayolili idea da arsi, is, rac memkvidreobiT
mosdgams kerZod adamians da kacobriobas zogadad.
avtori erTmaneTisgan ganasxvavebs rwmenas da crurwmenas. rwmena inten-
ciaa maRal sferoTa mimarT, crurwmena ki naturalizmis farglebSi trialebs.
am mxriv avtori saintereso gradacias gvTavazobs:
filosofia gonis saSualebiT, azrovnebis formiT da ideaTa gamoyenebiT
iZleva yofierebis arsis spekulatiur Semecnebas.
religia gulis meoxebiT, rwmenis gziTa da simboloTa moxmarebiT miiyvans
adamians ganwmendamde da gadarCenamde.
ganixilavs ra adamianuri Semecnebis mravalferovnebas, avtori gamoyofs
azrovnebisa da Semoqmedebis sam ZiriTad Stos:
filosofia, religia da kultura.
rogorc erTi xis sami gansxvavebuli nayofi, isini swored sulierebasTan
ziarebis gziT enaTesavebian da erwymian erTmaneTs.
sulieri Semecneba iwyeba iq, sadac adamiani ganixilavs Tavis Tavs
maradisobasTan mimarTebaSi. swored es mimarTeba qmnis Cveni cxovrebis azrs da
gvisaxavs usasrulo mizans wuTisoflis warmavlobaSi.
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Abstract
The link between cross-cultural awareness and cognitive concept learning is based
on the assumption that any verbal sign or word is a result of the analogical nature of human
conceptualization. A cognitive concept designates a unified idea of dynamic educational
process, concerning itself with both cognitive and affective realms (the intelligences and
the emotions) of the human beings, pointing out that one does not exist without the other.
Actualizing multiple statements in one language unit and comprising diversified cul-
tural tinges, this verbal sign becomes the conceptual symbol of the whole text. In addition it
increases students’ awareness of cross-cultural issue. Therefore culture specific meanings
should be studied with an equally important emphasis on textual and cultural-historical de-
tail. For this very reason pedagogy is featured as the conceptualization of a new culture
when priority is given to the real global communication problems.
Key words: verbal signs, cross-cultural awareness, informative potential, word-con-
cepts, conceptual translation, lingo-cultural memory.
1) COGNITIVE CONCEPTS AND GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE
Learning and teaching English introduces us into a world of cognitive ideas and
exciting discoveries. Learning of foreign concepts makes relaxing atmosphere in class
from global perspective because dominant paradigm in teaching and learning is based on
cognitive intercultural awareness. So cognitive concepts expressed in verbal symbols fea-
ture a particular clear-cut universalistic propensity: deep, complex semantic relations be-
tween words involving not only the student but teacher as well in self-organizing and self-
cognizing process that proves so challenging.
The link between cross-cultural awareness and cognitive concept learning is based
on the assumption that any verbal sign or word is a result of the analogical nature of human
conceptualization. Since our own conceptual system in terms of which we think and act
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must be and is actually metaphorical, simple concepts or word-metaphors always reveal
something fresh and esoteric simulating imagination and energy. A cognitive concept des-
ignates a unified idea of dynamic educational process, concerning itself with both cognitive
and affective realms (the intelligences and the emotions) of the human beings, pointing out
that one does not exist without the other. Concepts are born to provide any cognitive activity
and are expressed by words, but they are never equal. The relations between the concept
and word are therefore very complicated. Cognition of the world is performed in quantum
computing and is expressed in different meanings simultaneously of one and the same
word-concept.
The definition of concept that is found in a Concise Dictionary of Cognitive Terms
[Kubriakova: 1996] is the following: it’s the unit of mental and psychical resources of our
consciousness and of that informative structure which reflects our knowledge and experi-
ence. Thus concept in Stepanov’s definition is a kind of clot of culture in man’s mode of
thought; it is through this concept that culture enters into lingua mentalist. In other words
through this concept any regular man who is not a “creator of cultural values”, himself enters
into this culture and in some cases even influences it [Stepanov: 1997]. So concept forming
is regarded as a lively process for generating new ideas and thoughts in literary texts.
Admittedly, cognitive conceptual approach to language learning is the approach that
basically gives the students responsibility to discover about themselves as well as the lan-
guage and outer surroundings in order to co-operate not only with their peers but teachers
too. Since the teacher is a guide for the students therefore he/she becomes a constant
learner of what the learners need.
My viewpoint had grown out of an attempt to grasp needs analysis of the 21st century
student who has an easy access to Internet website, where facts and figures are viable. But
he/she is looking forward to getting more sophisticated emotional aesthetic information
that the teacher is expected to share with. Alarmingly it has been noticed rapid boosting of
information volume at the expense of emotional and spiritual development of an individual.
Nowadays the problem of realignment of education system is virtually addressed to thor-
ough reshaping the paradigm of cultural didactics; ultimately the major question at this point
should be “how can we better prepare learners for the changing worlds of work and citizen-
ship?” instead of “how do I improve my teaching?”
Not surprisingly we use communicative exercises while presenting sets of class-
room activities arranged on a scale of increasing sophistication. The eclecticism and pot-
pourri of teaching methods and styles is based on the conviction that repetition and prac-
tice of key words or concepts in the beginning stages of a language course should give way
as soon as possible to a meaningful verbal interaction among the students.
Once learned, however, these concepts must be in natural situations in order to de-
velop as high a degree as possible of communicative skills in the target language. My
students are instructed to master effective teaching methods that provide the opportunity to
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learn and fine-tune cognitive –concepts that are linked to key-words that are necessary in
interpreting texts. The procedure of the seminal analysis of the text challenges students to
pick out learning techniques that are best suited to learning language that is relative to their
own cultural standpoint.
2) SEVERAL EXAMPLES
A good example for culture-specific differences can be traced in Georgian word “cross”,
which has negative connotation for other cultures while in Georgian it is positive; compare in
English such word-combinations as: double cross, on the cross, a cross to bear and to cross
over to the other side, etc. they all express negative meanings, but in Georgian such word
combinations as: jvari gweria (protected from evil eye), jvriswera (wedding in the church),
gparavdes lomisis jvari (may the power of Lomisi cross save you), Wamis win pirjvris gadasaxva
(crossing before meal-taking) they all express positive emotions.
Another example of comparative concept learning is illustrated in English word “derby”
in American and English cultures. Two different pronunciations: English [da:bi] and US [de:bi]
has several meanings: 1. Annual horse races run at Epsom, 2. Any of annual races, 3. Any
important sporting contest: a local derby; 4. Derby Hat (US bowler). Shifting in meanings
involves the whole history of two cultures. The original derby is an annual horse race at
Epsom Downs, England and the Kentucky Derby (Churchill Downs in Louisville, Kentucky).
However, it is nowhere near the town or country of Derby in north central England; it is a
racetrack in Surrey, southwest of London.
The “derby” derived its name not from its location, but from the title of its founder Ed-
ward Stanly, the twelfth Earl of Derby, who established the race in 1780. Derby then became
the term for a number of prominent horse races, usually restricted to three-year olds, and
today it has come to mean any race or contest open to all comers or to a special category of
contestants. In the US in 1880 the name “derby” was applied to a stiff felt hat with a dome-
shaped crown and a narrow brim. This might be connected again with races when spectators
from high and upper middle classes are expected to wear special hats. Many special occa-
sions in England are still highlighted with the wearing of unique and trendy hats. Moreover,
“Derby Parties” as in Kentucky became the gathering place for the rich and famous, espe-
cially those in well-placed positions in government to interact in an annual event.
Consequently, this cognitive concept is reflective of the age by showing an access to
content, featuring culture-specific connotations. It is so-called cultural dialogue between
different generations, different cultures and epochs.
Understanding the basic concepts of cultural comparison we have to develop appro-
priate learning materials for our multicultural audiences, which sometimes consist not only
of Orthodox Christians or Catholics, but also of Muslims and Jews. Cross-cultural mean-
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ings of words become a problem for translators, which is frequently solved in accordance
with the order and demands made by the society’s mindset or mode of thought, leading
sometimes to unclear, culturally inappropriate or even absurd outcomes.
A good example of culturally alienated meaning is another English’ word “gay”, which
has traditionally meant “happy” and “cheerful”, but within the last twenty years or so “gay” in
American English has come to designate homosexuals. Seemingly, it should have started
with American writer Gertrude Stein, who first used this word in one of her short stories in
this shifted meaning. She uses the word repeatedly in such a meaningful context over and
over again, that finally the reader infers an alienated meaning of the concept and infers the
implication of the meaning-shift in the concept of “gay-happiness” (which is a complete
alienation in the application of the original concept).
The advantage of teaching culture-specific differences may be also illustrated with
the following example from English and American cultures: if we take a phrase “homely girl”
its usage in Standard English features several synonyms in the dictionary entry: “home lov-
ing”, “cozy,” “home-centered” but the same phrase in General American means: ugly, not
popular, uninteresting. Thus the same wording in two cultures reveals different concepts: for
British culture “homely” with things means: “simple’, “plain”, “not important” like in: “homely
meal” as casual meal. While Americans perceive opposite meaning when used with people:
“homely girl= unattractive, not very datable unmarried woman (when dating became very
popular and gained acceptance, sitting home all the time meant a boring, uninteresting
person). The language change came about to describe different concepts in the two cul-
tures. The uninformed students’ lack of understanding this difference is a perfect example
of diversified cultural meaning i.e. a gap in their cognitive development. Hence this phrase
is not the part of their experience. Actually proper understanding of any text is more likely to
be a problem of cultural diversity than of linguistic differences. So what may be immoral in
one culture might be moral in another or what is not permissive in one culture can be ac-
cepted freedom and rational action in the context of another culture. Interestingly, this differ-
ence even entered the new dictionaries with a stylistic marker: “inf. esp. USA”. We offer an
entry from English Language and Culture Dictionary: “adj. 1. esp. BrE simple; not trying to
seem important or special; a homely meal of bread and cheese; 2. AmE (of people, faces,
etc) not good-looking, unattractive, almost ugly” [Longman: 1992].
3) READING (INTERPRETING) EQUALS TO LINGUISTIC THINKING
The process of identifying the basic word-concepts in literary texts is a challenging
task. It is to some extent a tension between anticipation and unexpected frustration. How-
ever this is an incessant seeking of random variants: nonstop comparison and analysis –
dropping less probabilistic alternatives and then constant synthesis of the obtained results
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until achieving the non-final decision to form a new cognitive concept – a new meaning.
This assumption is significant for linguistics as well as for psychology in the study of the
mind. This kind of approach to the study of stylistic effect produced by verbal sign is consid-
ered as the basic feature while molding word-concepts in modernistic literary texts.
Defining the term “concept” it should also be underlined how important it is to outline
conceptual system of the whole novel in order to understand the purport of the author. In order to
describe and illustrate the kinetics of springing up basic word-concepts connected with simulta-
neous realization of several meanings of a word, it is plausible to apply a method of technical
systems and present this complex process as a hierarchical dynamic multi-level system.
Any concrete polysemic word renders its own model of the objective reality. Obvi-
ously the inseparability of objective content and observing subject as a price of all well-
defined knowledge, must be definitely taken into account not only in linguistics. Moreover
the position of the observer in relation to the language observed and described is far more
significant. Nevertheless concepts render self-regulating and self-steering properties shift-
ing the text into a conceptual system. The word being in itself a model of the real world
becomes the center of the whole. Moreover every word-concept is the center and every
center is unique and is related with the top level of the semantic pyramid. To what extent it is
associated to that top point, defines its validity and accessibility in the literary text.
Literary texts tend to exploit the polysemic potential of language to create a unified
whole in which ambiguity produces an enriching meaning to the text’s final comprehension.
Most of the authors place such a word-concept in the titles, the constituents of which are
spread all over the whole text as a system. The reader cognizes the adequate aesthetic infor-
mation through storing up justified probabilities on different hierarchical strata. The procedure
of selection or interaction of random meanings forms the basis for creating new information.
American symbolist poet Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Fall of the House of Ushers” will
serve as an illustration. The title indicates a concrete fact and it is so simple and logical that
at first sight it doesn’t arouse any nebulous and vague associations; no brainstorming or
great mental effort is needed to decipher it. Nevertheless when looking closer, considering
Edgar Poe’s symbolic and tempestuous nature with all his ideals, we can come to the
conclusion that this simple title is not so simple and ordinary, but many-fold and indefinite.
Moreover this is a great simplicity that brings to light undecided associations. This simple
word is charged with a meaning to the utmost degree.
For Edgar A. Poe any attainment of the exciting knowledge is destruction or in other
words, the process of dying is revelation. Similarly throughout the story we see that the narra-
tor, like the house, is falling and exists between the perception of simple objects and the
neurotic perception of an aberrant world. Presumably the stylistically neutral and simple words
“fall” and “house” in the title reflect semantic complicacy generating infinite potential informa-
tion. Presumably indefiniteness means the power to transcend the concrete words. The au-
thor stretches the word to reveal its potential for ambiguity. Having availed with its true syn-
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onyms from the language system in various repetitions in addition with context-dependant
synonyms, the author offers simple word-concepts to generate quasi information about the
described reality. The reality is the unfolding word itself. The content based information is
developed in two directions; concrete and abstract: fall1 –and fall2, house1 and house2.
1.“FALL – drop, sink, rotting for years, 2. FALL – depression of soul, sin, coming to grief;
1.“HOUSE – mere house; 2. HOUSE – mansion of gloom, melancholy house”.
The indefinite ambiguity of the simple word is generating and extending the potential
information of these word-concepts, which is never-ending source for non-final associa-
tions. In this case we trace two types of predictability: linear and dimensional. The former
takes place on syntagmatic level while the latter is the result of wider and super linear analy-
sis embracing all the levels of text interpretation. This is doubly important for the beginning
of predictability and adaptation. It should be pointed out that simultaneous perception of the
word may be illustrated in multi-dimensional pyramid of meanings, based on sophisticated
analysis of semantic and logical relations of immediate and remote constituents of the text
elements in addition to componential analysis of the key words or word-concepts.
Here is an opening passage taken from the story that signalizes the starting point of
cognitive predictability:
During the whole of a dull, dark, and soundless day in the autumn of the year, when
the clouds hung oppressively low in the heavens, I had been passing alone, on horse-
back, through a singularly dreary tract of country, and at length found myself, as the shades
of the evening drew on, within view of the melancholy House of Usher . . . – upon the bleak
walls – upon the vacant eye-like windows – upon a few rank sedges – and upon a few white
trunks of decayed trees – with an utter depression of soul which I can compare to no
earthly sensation more properly than to the after-dream of the reveler upon opium – the
bitter lapse into every-day life – the hideous dropping off of the veil. There was an iciness,
a sinking, a sickening of the heart – an unredeemed dreariness of thought which no goad-
ing of the imagination could torture into aught of the sublime [Poe E.A.: 1983, 107].
The probabilistic information about destruction and death is inferred from the fol-
lowing word-combinations and phrases: 1. a dull, dark and soundless day; 2. clouds
hung oppressively low in the heaven; 3. the natural images of the desolate and terrible;
4. a sense of insufferable gloom pervaded my spirit; 5. an utter depression of soul. The
concept of death contrary to life is related with the house completely decayed, standing
on the brink of the dark lake where its reduplication is seen in the still waters. The Ushers
are visualized as victims of their environment. So the inverted world is probably opposed
to rational. Incompatibility of contrasting concepts (life and death, rational and irrational,
beauty and distortion) brings a new amalgamation of the simultaneous perception of new
meanings: 1. the mirror of their minds and the material world; 2. white trunks of decayed
trees and utter depression of soul, an iciness, a sinking; 3.unredeemed dreariness of
thought - aught of the sublime;
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The house with a zigzag fissure symbolizes Roderick Usher and his clan with all their
sins and vices. This melancholy cracked up house is described as utterly dilapidated in
every stone: with the bleak walls, the vacant eye-like windows, trunks of decayed trees, yet
possessed of spacious totality. It is not a mere house, but both the family and family man-
sion, which metaphorically mean spiritual depression of the mankind. This feeling is incom-
parable with any earthy perceptions. It is enormous “mansion of gloom”, which has been
“rotting for years”. The contrasts between something indefinitely big and enormous against
something indefinitely small are amalgamated into one concept offering a concrete sense,
which allows to cognize the unknown darkness physically. Thus the ambiguous and fuzzy
feeling is rendered more precisely with ordinary words, which turn out cognitive concepts –
expressing multiple statements.
The final confirmation of the poetic predictability and consequently the reader’s cul-
ture awareness to the text occurs in the closing paragraphs, when the indefinite semantic
power of the key words in the title cuts the edge to show up the potential for ambiguity. This
is the simultaneous perception of the death of the individual symbolizing collapse of the
world. [L. Jokhadze: 2005]
For another illustration of the relations between the verbal sign and the cultural con-
text we offer a snippet form Georgian hagiography about St Nino (who is responsible for
introducing Georgians to Christianity in IV century)
xolo nino darCa gangebiTa RvTisaiTa da warmoemarTa mTa(Ta) kerZo CrdiloisaTa
da movida mdinaresa zeda mtkuarsa da mohyva napirsa mdinarisasa da moiwia mcxeTad,
qalaqsa didsa mefeTa sajdomelsa.
da iyo sam wel egreT, ilocvida farulad RmrTisa mier adgilsa
mayuliTa Seburvilsa. da Seqmna nasxlevisa juari da aRmarTa igi mun da ilocvida
mis winaSe.
da meoTxesa welsa iwyo qadagebai da xarebai qristes RmrTisa sjulisai da
Tqua: ~rameTu vpove cdomasa Sina friadsa Crdiloisa queyanai.~ da meequsesa welsa
arwmuna nana dedofalsa, colsa mefisasa, sensa Sina missa. da meSuidesa welsa arwmuna
mirian mefes saswauliTa qristesmieriTa. da mswrafl aRaSena eklesia quemo samoTxesa
Sina, da sueti igi iyo ZelisaÁ patiosani, romeli TviT aRemarTa. [kreb. redaqtori i.
abulaZe: 1964]
We present our translation of the same excerpt:
“Nino made for the North along the river Mtkvari and approached a big royal city (then
capital) Mtsxeta. She stayed there for three years praying secretly on a place overgrown with
blackberry bushes and made a cross-like symbol out of cuttings of grape vines while praying
there outside of the city walls, which later became the place of worship. And during the fourth
year she started preaching the precepts of Jesus Christ she said: “I found pagan people
astray in the north of the country”. A year later she convinced and converted the wife of the king
– Queen Nana (while she was ill at ease). The very seventh year she succeeded miraculously
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in persuading King Mirian himself, who soon after built rapidly a church down below the pal-
ace, the column of which was of divine wood and it had risen by itself”.
When we look closer to the text, splitting it into smaller fragments and analyzing both
immediate and distant co-occurrence or distribution of the word “jvari” (cross) we focus on
this basic concept and to some extent on the total text. Allegorically, this combination of
materials (unwanted clippings of grape vines binding with her own hair) symbolizes that the
unwanted vines were likened to pagans - lifeless to Christendom. Noteworthy to say, that all
the temples and churches of Georgian Orthodox are structurally built in cross-like shape.
“Cross” is not a sign of death for Georgian culture (as we have already mentioned above)
but it has been changed into a symbol of restoration, renewal, and born again soul. The
concept of unwanted vine cuttings or waste came to be again useful and full of life. This life-
giving concept of the vine is still sacramental for Georgian culture.
4) CONCEPTUAL TRANSLATION AS CROSS-CULTURAL PHENOMENON
From the perspective of cognitive concepts one can easily notice that verbal signs
may possess various amount of informative potential which can be expanded pushing the
edges of verbal sign rendering and generating fresh associations for the whole literary text.
Noteworthy to mention that polysemic word concepts present a lot of difficulties not
only to readers but to translators, who are expected to know not only the source language
but also to possess a thorough knowledge of all cross-cultural connotations with a histori-
cal-societal context. Thus capturing the major concepts of the literary text implies tracing all
the semantic constituents of the word and their illustrations in the source text as well as in
translation. Otherwise the word-concept loses its whole-ness and omnipotence of compli-
cated text-building capacity. Consequently any translated text is evaluated according to
what extent the word-concepts and their semantic constituents are interwoven in the text to
make them like goads – firmly embedded nails – inspired by divine Spirit.
We assume that spotting the right word-concepts in a literary text equals to linguistic
thinking which is striving to achieve the truth. This ability is innate nature of any language, it
is rooted in the potential of the verbal sign from the beginning.
So professional translators, students of linguistics and scholars in philology face a
problem of translating polysemic words from one language to another. It is a complicated
job even for those who are expected to know not only the source language but also to
possess a thorough knowledge of all cross-cultural connotations with a historical-societal
context. Literary texts tend to exploit the polysemic potential of language to create a uni-
fied whole in which multiplicity, heterogeneity and simultaneous understanding of differ-
ent meanings of concept-words is the source of new ideas enriching the final unity of both
texts in either language.
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The theory of concept formation as it has emerged in modern investigations has
been sharply challenged in both theoretical and experimental work. Therefore a conceptual
word is the significant part or “brand” for the whole which can best uncover and reveal the
essence of the parts constituting the whole. The concept-word representing the whole is
chosen on the ground of semantic, logical and cultural considerations.
Another example of cross-cultural connotations in the word-concepts is found in a
age-old text, old Georgian manuscript dating to 979-983 A.D. , which was found on moun-
tain Sinai, in 1902 and was reprinted by Georgian scholar [P.Ingorokva: 1954]
Some difficulties for professional translators are faced in such words which are per-
ceived from the point of view of contemporary cultural memory. These words are “language”
(ena) and “testimony” (sawameblad). They are misinterpreted by many translators with false
concepts leading to absurdity. Georgian word “sawameblad” (testimony) is translated as
“torture” and “ena” (language) instead of “culture” by many experienced translators which is
to our mind due to the gap in cultural memory.
We present the opening sentence as the key concept of the whole manuscript in
Georgian and our translation in English:
~damarxul ars enai qarTuli dRemde meored moslvisa misisa sawameblad, raiTa
yovelsa enasa RmerTman amxilos amiT eniTa.”
“Buried has been Georgian language (Kartuli) up to now and unto the Second Ad-
vent of the Messiah as a testimony that all should be judged through this language”.
Not considering cross-cultural awareness these word-concepts may be translated
as “torture” instead of “testimony”, which leads to completely different information. We have
to consider that social and cultural environment when the text was created and how it was
then used by Georgian scholars. We have to enhance religious cultural context and investi-
gate these words in X century culture. So that to refresh cultural memory.
We consider the key word concepts “buried mystery in the language”, which shed
light to the interpretation of the whole historical text. The inverted order in English was used
for the sake of emphasis, as the words “buried and mystery” generating linguistic progno-
sis offers a reader free choice of interpretation. The concluding sentence suggests again
ineffable information pointing to the mysterious function of Georgian alphabet.
 “Language” as it is used in the original manuscript should not be understood in its
contemporary meaning. But we have to look at it from the viewpoint of totality of the text and
infer its traditional meaning which the word had in those times. It meant not only speaking
language but multitude of people living together, a tribe, a nation. We can confirm our point
of view by a quotation from Old Testament, Isaiah 66.18.
“. . . and I, because of their actions and their imaginations, am about to come and
gather all nations and tongues and they will come and see my glory.”
We offer the same passage from Georgian Old Testament
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~radgan me vuwyi maTi saqmeni da zraxvani, modis Jami yvela xalxisa da enaTa
Sekrebisa; movlen da ixilaven Cems didebas”.
Admittedly the author of the manuscript Ioane Zosime should use the word in its
polysemic meaning of “tongue” (language), as “nation” and its “culture”, Georgian ethnicity
and its historical mission as it was apprehended in the esoteric Christian circles of Geor-
gia. This point of view and such interpretation may also be found in Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s
book “Essays and Letters” [Gamsakhurdia, 1991].
The second word-concept which is also the key word-concept in the opening para-
graph must be “testimony”. The latter presents a dubious case in Georgian. It is not the
current meaning again from the contemporary Georgian language. Therefore by some trans-
lators it is misunderstood again. We have to appeal to the old meaning of the word, which is
“testifying” and for confirmation we address for help to Holy Scripture “Gospel of John” (32).
“Then John gave this testimony: “I saw the Spirit come down from heaven as a dove and
remain on him”, which in Georgian translation sounds like this:
~da imowma ioanem da Tqva: da vixile suli, mtrediviT gadmomavali
zeciT, da davanebuli masze”
In case we use “language” only in the present day meaning and “testify” in the meaning
of “torture” we face another misunderstanding. In those days when Gospel came into being
hagiographic and hymnographic texts were being created and interpreted according to the
old use of these words. So we can conclude that Ioane Zosime could not use Georgian culture
without Georgian language and his prophetic insight that this language and this nation should
survive till the Second Coming. The encouraging prophecy of the author is a kind of strength-
ening and cheering statement for his people that Georgian nation will survive for the Second
Advent of the Lord. The word “nation” is a later development in the language and hence its
polysemy is clear at present. Nevertheless we need to look at hagiographic texts not from the
angle of past but through the prism of present. This is our awareness to perceive past and
present simultaneously and hence achieve the functionally adequate equivalents while inter-
preting and translating both in the source and recipient languages.
In the above presented analysis the meaning goes to the fixed stereotype of modern
society disregarding the social-cultural borders of the mentioned word-concepts.
Additionally we offer samples of translated texts where a word-concept sometimes
partially conveys the original concept not retaining the effect of the multiple meanings which
is conceptual information that is ethic and historical reverberations in the original. To make
this point clear we address to the best specimen in Georgian literature “The Man in Panther’s
Skin” by Shota Rustaveli (XII c. Georgian writer), which is translated or interpreted by vari-
ous translators in different ways. Naturally, our criticism should not be taken as ungrateful
remarks to the translators. Marjory Wordrope’s translation is a virtually literal paraphrase,
while that of Venera Urushadze’s is more poetic although not attuning to the author’s word-
concept, especially the epigrammatic line that figuratively conveys the compact thematic
information; moreover it shows the author’s concept his - viewpoint about general biblical
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wisdom of didactic principles that make the essential pattern of man’s upbringing and the
purpose of his earthly existence. Unfortunately, part of the information is missing in both
translations.
This is the original stanza in Georgian:
“radgan Tavia sicrue yovlisa ubedobisa,
me ar gavwiro moyvare, Zma umtkicesi Zmobisa?!
ara viqm, codna ras margebs filosofosTa brZnobisa!
miT viswavlebiT, mogveces SerTva zesT mwyobrTa wyobisa.”
[avTandilis anderZidan, strofi 781]
Here is Marjory Wordrope’s literal translation:
1. “Since lying is the source of all misfortunes, why should I abandon my friend, a brother
by a stronger tie than born brotherhood? I will not do it! What avails me the knowledge of the
philosophizing of philosophers! Therefore are we taught that we may be united with the
choir of the heavenly hosts” [M. Wardrope: 2003].
An attempt of poetic version of the same stanza is performed by Venera Urushadze:
2. “Since the sin of deception is the source of our sorrows and troubles,
What shall avail me the lessons instilled by the wise in all ages,
Philosophy’s golden treasure, making us one with the angels,
If I abandon the friend who is dearer to me than a brother?”
[The Testament of Avthandil, 771] [V. Urushadze: 2003]
We venture to offer our own rendering of the same stanza, which sounds like:
“Since lying and deception is the source of all our suffering
Why should I throw up my friend dearer to me than a brother?
I will not do it! What profit has a man from the knowledge of the sages in all ages?
We are only taught to be favored to join the supernal order of orders”.
Presumably more adequate equivalent of the epigrammatic concept has been traced:
SerTva zesT mwyobrTa wyobisa - join the supernal order of orders. Moreover there is a
simultaneous realization of the following meanings: 1. mystical joining the Lord posthumously
(hierogamy), 2. the road to super cognition, 3. personification of super nature which proph-
esies man’s Godly nature, 4. to share super principles, 5. to join in living liturgy partaking
Jesus’ Eucharist, 6. to join the cosmic order through organized behavior and righteous way
of earthly life. What’s more the latter becomes the core semantic element and moves to the
top easily in our multi-dimensional cognitive pyramid. In this case all the meanings above
enumerated are entangled in a node. Does this epigram in the final line have more than two
or three of above-mentioned meanings? It does. It is so because of our knowledge of the
world. Thus we experience likewise feelings and emotions with the author and plus our
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creative aspirations in addition. So we are involved in communication with the author, deal-
ing with co-creation, co-participation and co-perception. This is divine energy of the word-
concept which strengthens the reader to the utmost and eliminates even the fear of death
(another new connotative meaning). Thus the caring author implies a good reader and the
latter is given a unique chance of comforting, through cognizing reality to monitor his behav-
ior in this disordered earthly life.
The self-organizing power of cognitive concept is the essential principle in concept-
learning process because every verbal sign is located horizontally on the syntagmatic axis
and it is in constant relationship or cognation (analogy) with its corresponding highest point
on the paradigmatic axis – vertically; hence this could be controlled on the pyramidal self-
organized chart, the vertex of which designates the cognitive concepts. So, not only lan-
guage characteristics but pragmatic and cultural factors are involved and closely interacted.
Consequently, the principles of self-reflective concepts give rise to singularity and exclusiv-
ity, hence to freedom of an individual in cultural context.
Nevertheless it is extremely challenging to spot such a basic concept that may ac-
quire the all-embracing energy in the translated text that may convey a hidden multiplicity. It
should reveal compact information of Rustavelian thoughts in one unit, which combines and
modulates the concept into poetry. It should be rhythmically precise in sound-symbolism,
stylistically adequate (rhetoric devices of pun, alliteration, allusion etc.) and methodically
appropriate, taking socio-semiotic and cross-cultural features into account. The exact equiva-
lent is hard to seek even in the same language on the level of paraphrase as part of the
information is definitely being lost. So a perfect translation relies on the goal, that expresses
needs for what and to whom the translation is oriented.
5) CONCEPT-WORDS IN RELIGIOUS TEXTS (HYMNOGRAPHY)
From the standpoint of biblical usage and contemporary views of valid exegesis
polysemic word-concept repentance became the basic concept for our translation of David
the Builder’s poetic testament “The Canon of Repentance”. This word became the hallmark
in the process of translating and it organized the English text of Georgian hymnography.
The right spotting of the basic word-concept, which is the functional equivalent further pro-
vides the right rendering of meaningfully adequate compositional structure of the original.
This should be a self-regulating system of co-perception, co-occurrence and co-creation,
which will be proved hereby with depth analysis of the semantic structures of the core ele-
ments. [Jokhadze.L. : 2005 ]
Considering the fact that there is another version of the translation of the same origi-
nal (published about at the same time simultaneously under the title of “Songs of Remorse”
by Dodona Kiziria) we decided to specify the difference between the words remorse and
repentance and prove our arguments for the preference of the latter.
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No one can question language competence of the professional translator for whom
English is almost second native tongue. But the confusion of words remorse and repen-
tance should be caused due to alienation from the native culture which implies to stay too
long away from the Georgian roots, when one feels so ungrounded and unstable because
this also means lacking of the grace and of divine energy of the Georgian word.
Firstly digging into some contemporary reference books and theological data ob-
tained by experts on the subject in question I found out that repentance has already a stylis-
tic marker Eccles in dictionaries. We offer a dictionary entry:
repentance – ( n) (Eccles) 1. being penitent. 2. repenting; feeling of sorrow,
etc. for wrong doing, compunction, contrition, and penitence – with a willing to atone;
remorse – (n) deep regret for having done smt. wrong eg. He showed ~ for
his crimes;
1. deep, torturing sense of guilt felt over a wrong that one has done, self –
reproach;
2. pity, compassion: now only in without remorse – pitilessly repent.
Noteworthy that this difference is confirmed more convincingly by such a great Ameri-
can scholar as E. Nida, who is considered professional translator of the Scripture. Since
these closely related words cause problems to translators we offer Nida’s elaborate ex-
periment performed on the basis of componential method of analysis.
repentance remorse conversion
1. bad behavior 1.bad behavior 1. bad behavior
2. sorrow 2. sorrow 2. —————————
3. change of behavior 3. —————— 3. change of behavior
These three terms share the common components of psychological experience and
behavioral event. They also include a number of supplementary components, which are im-
portant, but not contrastive. For example, repentance is often associated with penance in the
thinking of many persons. It is also primarily “religious” in connotation. Remorse shares with
repentance a component of sorrow for what one has done, but repentance indicates some
change in the direction of proper behavior, while remorse has a dead end of sorrow, often of
a highly egocentric morbid nature. But in the case of components of repentance, remorse,
and conversion, there is a system of temporal priority, for as in repentance, there is first the
bad behavior, then the sorrow for this, and finally the change of behavior. In other cases one
encounters to change in the heart, which not only concentrates primary attention upon the
change of behavior. Whatever expression is employed, it is essential that the principal com-
ponent, the change of behavior, is not overlooked, for this not only occurs in the final position
of temporal priority, but it certainly is the principal component for repentance. [Nida: 1982]
To evaluate the adequacy of the translation with the source text and the proper
understanding of the author’s purport we offer review-message on our translation first
obtained from the outstanding translator of bible texts Eugene A. Nida: “I was pleased to
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receive the excellent booklet of David the Builder of Georgia, “The Canon of Repen-
tance”. The English translation is excellent. And I, definitely pleased to have this fine
piece of liturgical material” [Jokhadze.L. : 2005 ]
Thus the functional adequacy of the word-concept is indubitable and the creation of
the Georgian seminal work was virtually for this very reason (change of behavior, mind, to
turn from sin, to put on a new heart emphasizing the psychological factors). We address to
the context in the source language and analyze it both on the level of thematic organization
as well as on the level of stylistic devices, which contribute greatly to the effectiveness of
any communication, since figurative language here points out to the interaction of several
meanings. The focus should be firstly on the smallest division – the word, then the troparion
and to some extent on the entire text. Consequently any troparion should be translated with
careful consideration of the whole structure.
The Canon of Repentance belongs to the genre of philosophical lyrical poetry and
reflects contemporary view on man and universe, sin, eschatology, repentance and other
constituents of Christian Weltanschauung. Every phrase is virtually connected with the Old
and New Testament, and with this or that theological or philosophical issues. Traditionally
this genre of hagiographic texts is based on the biblical knowledge and is meant for reviv-
ing immortal values to replenish the sinful nature of man. It can not say anything new to a
reader well-informed in theology. Significantly, it is verbal sign and its metaphoricity that
carries a latent figurative shift and organizes a new stylistic system to generate aesthetic-
cognitive information for the creative reader. I tend to think that such words are canon and
repentance that occur in the title to organize the text and help render the author’s message.
Presumably, a node of multiple meanings is deep-rooted in these polysemic words
and their constituents are spread all over the whole text. Firstly, the compositional structure
coincides with the Matin Prayers or morning Canon, which usually consists of 9 songs
(prayers), but the second canon is missing to be read only in fasting times, especially dur-
ing Lent (L.J.). The same order is observed in the Canon of Repentance. So it proves to be
more of a canon than a mere song. Hereinafter only the first and the ninth parts of the Canon
of Repentance are represented for consideration with proper titles to every canon like Praise
be to the Lord Most High and so on. Presumably, it relies on Byzantine model of structuring
hymnography, where every canon is thematically defined.
ugalobdiTsa
1. romlisaca winaSe
qed-dadrekil ars yoveli
muxli yoveli modrekebis da enai
yoveli
Sensa xmobs aRsarebasa,
meca, sityuao,
aRmsarebelsa momxeden!
Praise be to the Lord Most High
Thou before whom every neck is bowed
and bent is every knee
and every tongue confesses
Thou, O, word
hearken to me, a penitent
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The lexical variants and semantic components of repentance are spread all over the whole
text expressing its different figurative tinges. In the first Prayer of the Canon the following words
penitent-repent are used that belong to the same semantic domain. In Prayer III-iniquity of dwell-
ers: Cain’s murderous mind, perverseness of Seth’s sons, the transgression of giants, Egyp-
tians’ inhumanity, ill-habits of Canaanites, in Prayer IV-V-VI – redemption of sins and atoning for
them; in Prayer VII – new rebirth of the word, in Prayer VIII–asking for mercy and conversion of the
penitents, in Prayer IX – restoration through repentance. So words within the same semantic
domain are simply piled up one on the other. These nouns do not refer to different potentialities or
degrees of evil. They simply emphasize the enormous wrong doing of the sinner. Furthermore the
first Prayer is associated with the last Prayer of the canon and describes the earnest address to
the Almighty, the Holy Trinity and the Mother of God. This is a stylistic frame to the poem, stressing
the unity of the whole. It expresses the fundamental melody of repentance with its recurrent seman-
tic elements ensuring the thematic information of the text as a united whole.
From this point of view the stylistic (pragmatic) quality seems to be the most deter-
mining factor in the acceptability of religious texts in translation, it is essential to pay due
attention to those features which carry so much informative potential. The major stylistic
device is parallel constructions that activates multiple latent statements prolonging the pro-
cess of cognition a great deal, e.g. the binary opposition of my crown and kingship and a
slave to his conqueror carries the latent message which is revealed in the final troparion:
Therefore came the Virgin. Noteworthy how the metaphoric icon is preserved in the trans-
lation of the phrase: like an up-flowing torrent of evil, describing God’s omnipotent power
to make a river go upward. It implies a person off the track, not observing God’s precepts.
Moreover the question is how to translate the ambiguous, metaphoric feelings of the poet
into a precise and many-sided concept. Again it is the blessed word that comes to aid with
its fossilized, age-old internal meanings, responsible for the gamut of different functions
and associations. Likewise I attempted to preserve the original spirit and translated an-
other metaphorical word-combination in the same way,: invest the word with flesh in a tab-
ernacle material (ganazrqe xorciTa da karviTa miwisaiTa). The polysemic word tabernacle
renders several meanings simultaneously and carries the major informative power in this
case: l. a temporary shelter as a tent; 2. dwelling place; 3. the human body considered as
the dwelling place of the soul; 4. the portable sanctuary carried by the Jews in their wander-
ing from Egypt to Palestine, later the Jewish Temple; 5. shrine, niche, etc. with a canopy; 6.
a place of worship esp. with a large seating capacity; 7. (Eccles) a cabinet like enclosure
for consecrated Hosts, usually in the center of the altar at the back.
Presumably they are all to be taken into account in this case. The first, the third and the
seventh prayers are stylistically relevant for the troparion. The rightly selected meanings re-
veal the essence of the whole Prayer. It should be again underlined that all the nine Prayers of
the Canon are entitled separately, which is entirely neglected in all other translations. This
seems rather arguable, as it is known that all the canons are based on the Byzantine model of
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composing. Any deviation from the fixed order would mean blasphemy, as the Christian sym-
bols in literary texts are conventionally based on scholarly consensus never to be altered.
The Canon attains its ultimate point of completion in the final part. In the troparion of
the first Prayer, dedicated to the Virgin Mother, the repentant strives for removing the heavy-
laden burden of despair that he offers in atonement for his sins. The Holy Mother - defender
of sinners - is the pledge for it. This troparion together with the final one in Prayer IX (when
the Virgin gives birth to the new unity - the divine flesh, through her intercession the Logos,
Christ as the verbal sign - invisible God became visible) achieve the super stylistic effect.
This is the emotional information inferred through the aesthetic-cognitive function of
the word that renders order in the whole text in both languages, where every verbal sign or
word combination is in close connection with the Old and New Testaments.
We offer the review message of D. Gilbert, an American theologian, which is added
to our translation published in separate addition: “It was with great pleasure and interest that
I read Lali Jokhadze’s translation of “The Canon of Repentance” by King David the Builder.
Without being able to comment from the original, I felt that she had captured not only a
poetic style, but the heart of a man in search of peace with God. The king’s sorrow is clearly
born out of a conscience stricken by the revealed truth of God’s holiness, sovereignty, mercy,
and righteous judgment. In this beautiful verse, one feels to the depths of the king’s soul as
he confesses his guilt before the God who sees all. His comfort comes to him through
drawing near to Mary, the Mother of God, because it was her Son who took away the sin of
the World and who invites us today, “Come unto Me, all who are weary and heavy laden,
and I will give you rest”. Were Mrs. Jokhadze’s translation of this beautiful example of Geor-
gian literature to be published, I believe that many of the English-speaking words would
appreciate the opportunity to get acquainted with an important part of Georgian history and
faith.” (Rev. David Gilbert, BEE International Biblical Theology Faculty).
On the whole the informative potential of the cognitive word “repentance” features
the universal text-building efficacy, which creates the linguistic basis to perceive the whole
text as one integral verbal sign. It generates a new conceptual system where different mean-
ings of the same word co-exist (speak) and cooperate in the conceptual space to get the
adidebdiTsa
4. martio, srulo, sam-mzeo,
erT-ciskrovnebao,
ganminaTle mxedvelobiTi sulisai,
raiTa
gixilo naTeli
naTliTa uflisaiTa,
suliTa RmrTisaiTa Ze
gamogvibrwyinvo maSin
dausrulebelTa saukuneTa!
Glory to Him
O Thou Simple and Perfect,
Three in one undivided,
in three suns united,
clear the sight of my spirit
that I might see light
in the light of the Lord
and then the Son of endless ages
shall shine forth ever and ever!
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author’s message across. The functional adequacy of the translated word-concepts opens
up the compatible access for the translator to choose thematically ample lexical variants.
So a new conceptual self-regulating system is being generated from the very beginning.
Having perceived the magic power of the multiple IP of the divine word the translator easily
spots the dynamic equivalents in the recipient language. The creative indefinite potential of
the Georgian word apparently should be sought in the bosom of Christendom, since the
divine word itself is the common holder of cosmic love and energy.
Sometimes it is difficult to determine which communicative function is predominant but
when it is seen that this is the wisdom that comes from the religious language of the Scripture or
hagiographic texts it becomes clear that the informative-instructive function is prevailing. In this
case a word-concept definitely acquires exclusive informative power, since the author is preoccu-
pied to feature not his own talent and virtues but to convey God’s word. This is the case where the
individual manner of writing is concealed and the age-old figure of speech is highlighted in the
source text. Then the informative potential of the word-concept generates universal self-regulating
principle that forms basis to render order and decipher religious texts not only in the original but
also in translation. Such word-concepts have exclusive energy to make order out of chaos.
Stemming from this we make an attempt to cognize what kind of constituent is the literary
text of the world’s conceptual system and what word-concept describes most efficiently the
cognitive distribution of the real life. In this respect figurative language is the most prolific area to
investigate. So polysemic words, cognitive metaphors or other word-concepts are considered
to be fundamental means for generating information and systematizing any literary text. Due to
this we are able to cognize the unknown abstract world through the known and concrete. Cogni-
tive concepts (cognitive metaphors) assist us to cognize the world both visible and invisible,
organizing the surrounding chaos into the order of orders. As we are continuously involved in
making probabilistic choices a certain impact born from a goal-oriented selection of meanings,
creates a multi-fold system in which polyphonic perception of the real world is realized. The
process of realization of several meanings creates emotive information when none of the mean-
ings are lost. On the contrary, each of them has its equal right, its value and its unique feature to
exist. This dynamic co-existence of mutually excluding meanings is sometimes so intrinsically
interwoven, that it makes an ambiguous infinitude being more appealing and challenging.
Undoubtedly, such transparent words and their informative potential depend on the
context and situation, which is presented as a lingo-cultural entity associated with the laws of
general linguistics. We have analyzed various examples from literary texts when word-con-
cepts convey polyphonic effect pushing edges of the semantic field when used as metaphors,
allusions, similes etc. then they acquires various communicative functions at the level of text
interpretation. We distinguish integral influence of emotive-expressive, didactic-informative,
aesthetic-cognitive or concept-forming or concept-defining functions. The multiple statements
as such are not a statistic sum of dictionary meanings but a synchronous act of instant realiza-
tion of several contextual meanings, developing its semantic net. In addition we have to stress
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that the effect of the multiple meanings, caused by a stochastic choice creates a multi-dimen-
sional system of associations and connotations, the interaction of which identifies some uni-
versal values of this linguistic phenomenon: predictability and adaptation. Although these uni-
versal properties are not revealed at once and the reader cannot prima facie perceive them
so easily, yet they play a significant role in getting the author’s message across i.e. identifying
the informative potential of the word-concept in the text.
Summarizing, cognitive concept learning we assume that it is best described as an
access to global knowledge and to cultural awareness, which in turn meets the double chal-
lenge of change in behavior head on. Students find themselves compelled to go through a
stricter and more enticing course of training in self-cognation and self-realization to infer
appropriate message and to live up to the standard of intellectual worth. So teaching cul-
ture-specific differences introduces learners to the new way of cognizing reality, pushing
forward a new culture.
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SUMMARY IN GEORGIAN
verbaluri niSnebi da kros-kulturuli
cnobiereba
lali joxaZe
ilia WavWavaZis saxelobis Tbilisis saxelmwifo universiteti,
ucxo enebis fakulteti, saqarTvelo
r e z i u m e
ZiriTadi sityva-konceptebi: verbaluri niSani, kroskulturuli codna,
kognitiuri koncepti, konceptualuri Targmani, lingvo-kulturuli mexsiereba
(azrovneba).
konceptualuri swavlebisas kroskulturuli (interkulturuli) cod-
na emyareba verbaluri niSnis funqcionirebas, anu enobrivi erTeulis sametyve-
lo realizacias mxatvrul teqstSi. enaTmecniereba, romelic Seiswavlis enis
erTeulebis formaTa funqcionirebas, wina planze warmoaCens am erTeulTa
interdisciplinaruli meTodebiT kvlevas sxvadasxva kulturaTa Sepirispirebis
fonze.
kognitiuri sityva-koncepti naSromSi ganixileba, rogorc swavlebis
dinamikur-SemecnebiTi procesi, romelic moicavs adamianis moRvaweobis orive
mxares, rogorc inteleqtualurs, ise emociurs. aseTi koncepti, romelic mianiSnebs
sxvadasxva mniSvnelobaTa erTdroul, bundovan realizaciaze, teqstSi Seicavs
mraval kulturul Sreebs. (stilistikaSi igi amfibolis xerxiTaa cnobili). am
dros verbaluri niSani mTeli teqstisTvis konceptualuri simbolo xdeba da
erTdroulad amdidrebs studentis kroskulturul cnobierebasac. amrigad, sityva-
koncepti interkulturuli ganaTlebis ganuyofeli nawils Seadgens. bunebrivia,
kulturaTa SepirispirebiT miRebuli gansakuTrebuli da gamorCeuli mniSvnelobebi
unda ganvixiloT didi gulisxmierebiT, rogorc teqstis doneze, aseve istoriul-
kulturuli detalebis Semecnebis TvalsazrisiT; warsulis memkvidreobisa da
Tanamedrove kulturis Tanadrouli aRqma sxvadasxva kulturebTan (epoqebTan)
erTad erT, mTlian wyobas warmoqmnis.
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qarTuli kulturis konteqstSi yuradRebas ipyrobs sityva “jvari”, romelsac,
gansxvavebiT dasavluri Tu sxva kulturebisagan, dadebiTi konotaciebi gaaCnia.
qarTuli jvari ganaxlebis, gadarCenis, gamarjvebis, gardaqmnis, RmerTTan miaxloebis,
axali, maradiuli cxovrebis simboloa. nawyveti qarTuli agiografiidan, romelic
wminda ninos saqarTveloSi Semosvlas exeba, semantikur-stilisturi analizis
saSualebas gvTavazobs:
“xolo nino daSTa da warmoemarTa mTaTa kerZo CrdiloisaTa da movida
mdinaresa mtkuarsa, mohyva da movida mcxeTad qalaqsa didsa mefeTa sajdomelsa.
da iyo sam wel egreT, ilocvida farulad adgilsa erTsa Seburvilsa brZamliTa
mayulisaiTa da Seqmna saxei juarisai, nasxlevisai, da mun daadgra da ilocvida.
da adgili igi iyo zRudesa garsgan. xolo maT mayualTa adgili ars zemoisa
eklesiis sakurTxevlisa adgili”.
aq Sinaarsobriv sityva-konceptad gvevlineba “jvari”, romelic moTavsebulia
mocemuli teqstis Sua nawilSi, saidanac nawildeba SemecnebiTi informacia
rogorc retrospeqciaSi, aseve prospeqciaSi. aRniSnuli sityvis informaciuli
potenciali konkretdeba misi uaxloesi msazRvreliT - “saxei juarisai nasxlevisai”.
irkveva, rom leqsikonebi, rogorc qarTuli ise inglisuri, ase ganmartaven sityva
nasxlevs:
1. gamousadegari vazis ylorti, 2. gadasagdebi, anu 3. balasti. aRniSnuli
mniSvneloba kidev ufro mtkicdeba momdevno paragrafiT:
“vpove cTomasa Sina friadsa Crdiloisa queyanai”. iqmneba metaforul-
kognitiuri informacia: uRvTo, cTomili, warwymedili xalxisa, romelic wminda
ninom kvlav moizida sicocxlisaken da moaqcia isini swori gzisaken “saswauliTa
qristesmieriTa” da “aRaSena eklesia quemo samoTxesa Sina”.
sityvis usazRvrobis semantikuri fenomeni avtoris mier interkulturuli
specifikis dadgenis efeqtur saSualebad ganixileba, vinaidan sityvis esTetur-
SemecnebiTi funqcia informaciulobasTan erTad iqceva Targmnili teqstis azrobriv-
kompoziciuri struqturis ZiriTad maorganizebel principad.
naSromSi agreTve warmodgenilia daviT aRmaSeneblis “galobani sinanulisani”-s
avtoriseuli Targmani inglisur enaze. rogorc ki sityvis usasrulobis potencias
SevigrZnobT, maSinve ufro masStaburi xdeba azrovneba da ixsneba ara marto enis
unar-Cvevebis, aramed sxvadasxva kulturaTa droisa da sivrcis barieric. maSasadame,
miT ufro izrdeba adamianis interkulturuli codna-Semecneba. amiT mkvlevari
erTgvarad amaRlebas ganicdis dro-Jamis mimarT da WeSmaritad eziareba uJamobis
SegrZnebebs.
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daviT aRmaSeneblis “galobani sinanulisani”-s Targmnisas martivi sityva
warmogvidgeba mxatvruli teqstis verbalurad realizebuli mniSvnelobebis
mTel kompleqsad, romelic moicavs informaciis gadamuSavebis kognitiur
proceduras. es ki Tavis mxriv, warmoqmnis mTeli teqstis konceptualur-
stilistur sistemas. magaliTad, sityva ‚monanieba” (repentance)) teqstSi gvecxadeba
sityva-konceptad, sxvadasxva azrTa interpretaciisaTvis, romelic azustebs da
TandaTanobiT ayalibebs mTliani teqstis sazriss. aRniSnuli koncepti “repentance”
gvevlineba funqciurad adekvatur sityvad orive enisTvis, raTa srulyofil
iqmnas rogorc Targmani, aseve interpretacia. am sityvis Secvla misive, arcTu
ise kontrastuli, magram axlo sinonimiT “remorse”, miuTiTebs ara inglisuri
enis arcodnaze, rac SeiZleba davabraloT mTargmnels, aramed warmoaCens gaucxoebul
fesvebs originalis kulturaSi. aq igulisxmeba kroskulturuli mexsiereba anu
lingvisturi azrovneba.
orive sityvisTvis saerTo komponentia sinanuli codvis CadenisaTvis, Tumca
sityvas “repentance” religiuri konotacia gaaCnia da mianiSnebs epitemiaze, anu
codvis gamosyidvis SesaZleblobaze monaniebis gziT. “remorse”is komponentic
sinanulia, magram “repentance” gulisxmobs saqcielis gamosworebas da azrovnebis
Secvlas monaniebis saSualebiT. pirvel SemTxvevaSi gulisyuri gadatanilia
sinanulze da qcevis dagmoba uyuradRebodaa datovebuli, xolo sityvaSi
“repentance”, es komponenti mTavar principul Temad gvesaxeba.*
* ix. amerikeli enaTmecnieris da bibliis ubadlo mTargmnelis i. naidas Sefaseba, Cvens mier
Sesrulebul “galobanis” Targmanze: “nasiamovnebi var Tqveni weriliT, daTariRebuli 1999wlis 23 maisiT
da SesaniSnavi patara wigniT saqarTvelos mefis daviT aRmaSeneblis Sesaxeb. inglisuri Targmani saucxooa,
aRtacebuli var aseTi mSvenieri literaturuli masaliT. i. naida”.
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GEORGIAN CULTURE AND TYPES OF CULTURE
AKAKI KULIJANISHVILI
Tbilisi state university, Georgia
None of the main typological conceptions of culture mentions Georgian culture among
the types of culture. What is the reason for this? First, it may be that Georgian culture is not
an independent type of culture characterized by some specific content and originality.
Second, if it is so and Georgian culture belongs to a particular type of culture, we still have
to clarify its typological characteristics in order to show the type of culture it is most closely
related to. Third, it may be that Georgian culture is a marginal phenomenon, in other words,
it is an eclectic mixture of different cultures, an untenable culture, and therefore it has remained
out of the sphere of interest of researchers. Fourth, perhaps it is the ‘smallness’ of Georgian
culture and its minimal influence on other cultures, or just a scarcity of information on it, that
restrains researchers from including it in their areas of research?
If we disregard some fragmentary discussions of Georgian culture, a systematic-holistic
analysis of it has not been undertaken at any of the leading scientific centres abroad. Georgian
academic institutions have for the most part limited their interest to historical research on Georgian
culture. Neither has a cultural-philosophical analysis of Georgian culture been carried out in our
country. In this paper we consider the history of Georgian culture as a whole. We limit ourselves
to identifying its essential tendencies and to making some conjectures. A thorough study of
Georgian culture is a task for future research.
We shall take as a working thesis the real fact that Georgian culture as such actually
does exist and has a centuries-old history. It is not a marginal culture and, although like
other cultures it has been subject to many external cultural influences, it has nevertheless
managed to ‘Georgianize’ these. Georgian culture is manifestly a national culture; the linchpin
of this culture is the national language. To make this point clear we note that language is not
a unique centre of some oriental cultures. An example is Azerbaijani culture, where the
language is Turkic and not characteristic of this people alone and, although it is an axis of
their culture as a language, it is not a centre of this culture alone. This culture is therefore not
national, but is, so to say, general-Turkic. If we consider this argument valid and admit the
fact of the existence of Georgian culture as a national culture, then we can study its character,
demonstrate its peculiarity, determine whether it is a type of culture absolutely independent
of other cultures or whether we can ascribe it to one of the general types of culture.
The national character of Georgian culture which we have identified above does not
specify it in particular, as the majority of cultures are characterized by this feature. Unique forms
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of culture are formed on the basis of an original world outlook. The earliest forms of world outlook
which determined the specific features of one culture or another are myth and religion. For
example, the character of Chinese culture is essentially determined by Confucianism, that of
Indian culture by a Buddhist world outlook, and so on. As we know, Georgian culture has no such
basis in its ‘own’ world outlook, although original myths can be traced in it. However, these myths
are not of a systematic character and therefore cannot be considered as an overall world outlook.
We can also point to Zoroastrianism, which is believed to have spread to the whole Caucasian
region and perhaps to Georgia as well, but which did not become a national religion defining the
character of Georgian culture. Thus Georgian culture was not formed as an independent type of
culture. This argumentation leads us to the conclusions that, firstly, the existence of Georgian
culture is a fact and ignoring it in scientific studies may be explained by a lack of information
and, secondly, Georgian culture is not characterized by a strongly-marked specificity, that is to
say, it is not an independent type of culture. In this case the following problem needs to be
addressed: What is the type of culture to which Georgian culture displays some resemblance,
and which group can it be ascribed to? In order to determine this let us resort to a widespread
version of the typology of cultures that identifies the following principal types: Near Eastern,
Chinese, Indian and European. The choice of this typology is of instrumental importance only.
Any other typology of cultures might be selected such as, for example, that used by UNESCO.
Our choice is determined by procedural considerations, as our aim is to elucidate the problem
of the typological affiliation of Georgian culture, and some cultures listed in the chosen typology
were historically in more or less ‘close’ relation to Georgian culture. This analysis of the problem
also includes a consideration of other typological conceptions.
To begin with, we can reject any typological resemblance of Georgian culture to
Chinese and Indian cultures. In the first place, these cultures are territorially so far removed
from Georgia that it seems impossible that any of them could have significantly influenced
Georgian culture or vice versa. Although the existence of the Silk Road proves that there
were some contacts between these regions and Georgia, such relations were of an economic
and commercial character only. Besides this – and of crucial importance as spatially
separated cultures can be typologically similar – Chinese and Indian cultures are based on
the world outlook of Confucianism and Buddhism, respectively, and neither is in any way
characteristic of Georgian.
The issue of the relation between Georgian culture and the culture of the Near East (that
is, to Arabian-Muslim culture) and European culture requires a special analysis.
§ 2. GEORGIAN CULTURE AND CULTURE OF THE NEAR EAST
What becomes immediately evident while comparing these cultures is their intensive
interrelations over long periods of history. Historically, they were destined to be neighbours in
the same geographical area and it is not at all surprising that, besides the conflicts, there has
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always been a dialogue between these cultures. Before Islam became dominant in Iran
(according to A. Toynbee it was Islam that hindered the development of Persian culture and he
therefore considers it a relict culture), Georgian culture had intensive contacts with it and
these contacts continued into the later period. The influence and impact of certain elements of
Persian culture on Georgian culture are evident. But a difference in the religious foundations
of these cultures is equally clear. Georgian culture is a Christian culture, while Arabian, Persian
and (in the later period) Turkish cultures are Muslim cultures. Certainly, religious differences
marked their modes of life, value orientations, and so on, although one particular factor must
be taken into account: both Christianity and Islam are Biblical religions and this means that
certain – if not identical, at least similar – elements can be found in them. Let us note one type
of culture in the typology given by Spengler that is at first sight rather strange: the Byzantine-
Arabic culture. According to Spengler, Byzantine-Christian and Arabic-Muslim cultures have a
common basis – a magic spirit which is characterized by a total rejection of everything
corporeal. It follows from this that religious differences as well as resemblances, at least within
this theory, do not mean differences of cultures. By the way, it is possible to discover certain
essential resemblances between the medieval Christian and Muslim cultures. For example,
both cultures are characterized by a rejection of corporeality and the primacy of spirituality,
theo-centrism and collectivity versus anthropocentrism and individualism, intuitivism and
inertness while rationality and dynamism are eliminated, and more. It may be said that there is
an essential resemblance between Georgian and Muslim cultures in the common cultural
features at this stage of the history of culture. Such a resemblance does not result exclusively
from the nature of Georgian culture, but is characteristic of the Middle Ages as a whole. Georgian
culture became fundamentally permeated with the rationalistic spirit of ancient Greek culture.
King David Aghmashenebeli of Georgia (1089–1125) considered Gelati (a cathedral in west
Georgia where an academy of sciences was established) as the Second Athens and the
New Jerusalem. A new stage of European culture originated in the merging of Christian and
classical values and entailed a range of changes in many spheres of man’s life. We cannot
detect a similar process in Muslim cultures.
To sum up we can say that, while being a Christian culture, Georgian culture also
revealed a typological resemblance to Muslim culture in the Middle Ages, as did any other
Christian cultures of this period. In spite of this, Georgian culture distanced itself from Near
East culture during the subsequent period and accepted a European direction of
development. What were the characteristic features of this direction and did Georgian culture
pursue it to the end?
§3. GEORGIAN CULTURE AND EUROPEAN CULTURES
The fact that both Georgian and European cultures are, in general, Christian cultures
does not imply that they are typologically identical. Ethiopians belong to a Christian culture (this
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African nation is one of the most ancient Christian nations), but no one has ever thought of
ascribing it to European culture in spite of their shared religious faith. Similarly, orthodox Slav
culture – which in the latest conceptions of culture is considered as an independent type of
culture – belongs to the Christian culture. Georgian Christianity is also orthodox although, in
spite of this confessional resemblance to Slav orthodoxy, there is no typological resemblance
between them. In support of this statement we may say that Russian culture is characterized by
collectivity, Georgian culture by individualism; Russian culture as an immediate successor to
Byzantine culture is strictly religious and a love of life and mundane pleasures are considered
blasphemy, while Georgian culture is marked by a love of life, joy and – let us say – a certain
aesthetical nonchalance. Georgian culture is a joyful culture.
In comparing Georgian and European cultures we have to consider the stages of
development that European culture passed through. Such a comparison will highlight their
resemblance as well as the differences between them. As we know, the first stage of
European culture is that of the Middle Ages, which is characterized by the replacement of
pagan values by Christian ones. Christianity and its ‘spirit’ penetrate every layer of culture.
In this respect Georgian culture underwent the same processes, only more so: Christianity
was accepted in Georgia much earlier than in many European countries. Thus Georgian
and European cultures of the Middle Ages typologically resemble each other. In the next
stage of history a certain synthesis of Christian and classical values began in European
culture and marked the start of the Renaissance. The same processes developed in
Georgian culture, but the Renaissance and its particular results are not as clearly discernable
in Georgian as in Italian culture. By the way, some consider the Renaissance in the strictest
sense of the term as a purely Italian phenomenon, but this is not of importance for us in this
case as our aim is to demonstrate that the main tendencies that characterized the
Renaissance are not foreign to Georgian culture. The essential characteristic feature of the
Renaissance – a merging of rationality and religion – also occurred in Georgian culture.
Georgians had close contacts with Greek culture as early as classical times. There even
existed Greek city states on the territory of Georgia (Phasis academy was an important
centre of Greek culture in Georgia). Such relations would undoubtedly leave certain traces
in the historical memory of the Georgians. In short, classical culture was not a foreign
phenomenon for Georgian culture even before the Renaissance. We mention this to show
that neither Greek philosophy nor the rational aspect of classical culture were unknown in
Georgian culture in the Middle Ages. The ideas of Neo-Platonism and the Areopagitic doctrine
in particular were widespread in Georgia. By the way, according to one scientific hypothesis
Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, whose doctrine is acknowledged as a theoretical basis
of the Renaissance, was a Georgian scholar, Peter the Iberian. During this period Greek
philosophy was translated and intensely studied at Iqalto and Gelati academies. Such
Georgian philosophers as Eprem Mtsire, Ioane Petritsi, Arsen Iqaltoeli and others worked
in this period. The merging of Greek rationality with the principles of Christianity brought
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about, in the main, the same results in Georgia as in Europe. Mundane everyday life became
of importance in Georgian culture. The evidence of this fact is the development of a secular
literature. Relation to the Universe extends beyond purely religious borders – a love of life,
joy, and a joyful aesthetical attitude to life formed during this period characterize Georgian
culture up to the present day. The source of Georgian individualism is to be sought in this
period. Let us recall the abolition of the death penalty by Queen Tamar. Is this not evidence
of recognition of and respect for man? Of course, we are not asserting that the Renaissance
stage of European culture was fully realized in Georgian culture. As we have already said, it
is a special feature of Italian culture proper, and from this viewpoint other European cultures
share the same position as Georgian culture, although it must be said that the main aspects
that characterize the Renaissance can be traced in Georgian culture as well.
The distancing of Georgian culture from that of Europe becomes evident in the modern
period of the history of culture. In modern times a new scientific paradigm is established,
the universe is studied from a scientific viewpoint, the foundation of which is the activity of
the subject. This brought about socio-political and mental changes. In fact, present-day
European values were formed in this period. Traditional states were transformed into modern
societies. Collectivistic societies were replaced by individualistic societies. Traditional forms
of government changed according to democratic principles. Individualization and
urbanization accelerated, fields of science and technology were established, and so on.
Georgian culture fell behind in these processes, although later (but neither willingly nor through
its own efforts) certain aspects of modern European culture still managed to penetrate it.
The ideas of the Enlightenment were imported via Russia by the ‘Tergdaleulebi’(nineteenth-
century Georgians who had received an education in Russia). Certain branches of science
developed, the first Georgian university was founded (in 1918), industrialization and
urbanization took place in the twentieth century, and much more. However, right down to the
present, Georgian culture has failed to adopt and assimilate European liberal-democratic
values.
To summarize, we may state that Georgian culture displays a certain typological
resemblance to European culture although differing from it in many ways. We suggest that
Georgian culture belongs to a sub-type of European culture, specifically, to the Mediterranean
culture.
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SUMMARY IN GEORGIAN
qarTuli kultura da kulturis tipebi
akaki yulijaniSvili
Tbilisis saxelmwifo universiteti, saqarTvelo
reziume
qarTuli kulturis sistemur-holisturi analizi arc ucxour da arc
qarTul samecniero wreebSi ar ganxorcielebula. am faqts ramodenime serio-
zuli axsna SeiZleba moeZebnos, maT Soris, erT-erT mTavar faqtorad gvesaxeba is
garemoeba, rom istoriulad saqarTvelos politikuri Tavisuflebis dakargva
saocari sizustiT emTxveva kulturis intensiuri mecnieruli kvlevebis dawyebas
evropul saazrovno sivrceSi. Aamitom, qarTuli kultura evropuli mecniere-
bisaTvis ucnob fenomenad rCeboda; rac Seexeba sakuTriv qarTul samecniero
wreebs, aq, ZiriTadad, qarTuli kulturis istoriis sakiTxebiT daintereseba
sWarbobda da ar xorcieldeboda misi kulturologiuri analizi.
qarTuli kulturis komparativistuli analizi evropul kulturasTan
mimarTebaSi, gvaZlevs imis Tqmis saSualebas, rom qarTuli kultura tipolo-
giur msgavsebas amJRavnebs evropuli kulturis mimarT: isic berZnul-iudaur
kulturaTa erT-erTi warmomadgenelia da renesansis epoqis CaTvliT, evropuli
kulturis yvela arsebiT maxasiaTebels Seicavs. Tumca, isic unda iTqvas, rom
sazogadoebis modernizacia evropaSi ufro adre ganxorcielda. qarTuli kultura
am procesSi mogvianebiT CaerTo da Tanac, CaerTo ara pirdapir, aramed dapyrobili
qveynis gaSualebuli gziT. Mmiuxedavad amisa, qarTuli kultura kulturis
tipebs Soris yvelaze met siaxloves evropul kulturasTan amJRavnebs, igi
evropuli sivrcis xmelTaSua auzis kulturaTa erT-erTi warmomadgenelia.
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OTAR JIOEV – RESEARCHER OF PHILOSOPHICAL
PROBLEMS OF CULTURE
IRAKLI KALANDIA
Director of Institute of Philosophy, Georgia
Research into problems associated with values became a priority at the Institute of
Philosophy from the 1970s and was actively conducted alongside the study of traditional
classical philosophical problems. The foundations for this research into values were laid by
Angia Bochorishvili, Niko Chavchavadze, Zurab Kakabadze, Otar Bakuradze, Otar Jioev,
Tamaz Buachidze and, in the later period, by Merab Mamardashvili. It was logical that the
study of the philosophical problems of culture was put on the agenda as culture is a system
of realized values, a process of implementation of spiritual values and, therefore, the internal
links between these sets of problems are evident. In this respect a symposium on the
problems of value which was held in Tbilisi in 1965 was of special importance. Jioev actively
participated in this together with Russian and Georgian philosophers.
It is precisely the fundamental analysis of the concept of value and a deep insight
into its essence that enables us to apply successfully this concept to the philosophical
problems of ethics, aesthetics, philosophical anthropology and culture.
Certainly, it took some time to establish the tradition and to reach the scientific level
of research that exists at the Institute of Philosophy. The ideological atmosphere and the
‘pressure’ under which philosophers of the older generation – our teachers – and even our
generation had to works are well known.
In conditions where the assertion that being determined consciousness and social
being determined social consciousness was dominant, the direction in which research into
the philosophical problems of culture was to be carried out was determined and clear from
the very outset. Many scientists handled with caution and even fear the implication that there
is a certain immanent regularity in the development of superstructure phenomena, among
them culture, and that these are relatively independent of the level of economic development.
In particular, the evaluation of greatness of the classical (Greek) culture by Marx and his appeal
to Shakespeare in this respect are well known, as is Engels’s admission of the unprecedented
development of literature in Norway and Russia in the nineteenth century. This means that the
level of development of culture quite often does not closely correspond to the economic level
of society and its development is characterized by specific immanent regularities.
In spite of all this, problems of culture were analyzed on the basis of the formula that
material culture determines the development of spiritual culture.
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Such was the context when in 1963 a small work by academician Angia Bochorishvili
entitled What is Culture? was published. This work is very important as, in contrast to all
other works published in Georgia, culture is interpreted here as a value phenomenon which
is an arena for revealing man’s essential powers and reflects not only the degree of man’s
domination over nature but also (and this is essential) the degree of transformation of man
himself who at the same time is both the subject creating culture and its object. The author
demonstrated the difference between civilization and culture, interpreting the latter as a
process of realization of values, as a phenomenon expressing the process of man’s
becoming, his ‘humanization’. Bochorishvili established this tradition in the study of the
problem and was the first to interpret and characterize culture as a unity of positive values.
This prepared the foundations for further research.
The difference between civilization and culture is determined by and based on the fact
that man is a child (or citizen) of two worlds, nature and society, therefore of freedom and
necessity. Recalling Kant’s words, there are two things that never cease to fill the soul with
surprise and awe no matter how often we reason on them, namely the starry sky above us and
the moral law within us. We may say that the starry sky and nature in general are governed by
the laws of nature which are necessary and universal, while the character of moral law is
different: it is the ought. In the sphere of the moral it is possible to speak of purposiveness,
regulative character, and so on, but not about necessity and universality. This means that the
laws functioning in nature and society are different. The laws functioning in society, in historical
necessity, are characterized by an important feature that implies that man’s free, purposeful
creative activity participates in the historical process and the realization of historical necessity.
Stressing this aspect in contrast to the materialistic and naturalistic interpretations of history
means that the specificity of historical necessity is conditioned by the existence of value
determinism in history. In other words, man’s creative free, purposive participation in the
process of history, in the realization of historical necessity, is based on a value attitude to
reality, and such activity of man cannot be reduced to natural physical determination. Such
was the interpretation of the specificity of the historical process by Jioev in his work The
Nature of Historical Necessity published in 1967 in Russia (and which was later defended as
a doctoral thesis). I stress the fact that the work was published in Russia as it was immediately
followed by criticism from Moscow where many negative reviews were published (although a
few attempts were made to defend it as well). The fact was that no one could forbid Kant to
discuss the problems of freedom, but when the head of the Department of Historical Materialism
at the Institute of Philosophy puts forward the problem of man’s free participation in history
and argues that people with their ideals, aims and value orientations participate in the process
of realization of historical necessity, and that in contrast to spontaneous regularities functioning
in nature, this is a specific feature of historical necessity, it could not be left without severe
criticism on the part of reactionary forces. Jioev’s attitude was viewed as teleologism,
subjectivism, a revision of Marxism and the inevitable criticism followed without delay, but this
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is a matter for separate discussion. I stress this fact only because a study of the nature of
historical necessity and the specificity of man’s free purposive activity in history led the author
to research the philosophical problems of culture.
The first thing that a researcher into the philosophical problems of culture has to do
is to determine the concept of culture. Perhaps there is no other concept (term) that has so
many definitions as culture (there are almost three hundred definitions of this concept which
at first sight appears so familiar and clear). Each of the definitions puts forward one aspect
or another of culture and attempts to use this as a basis to elucidate the essence and nature
of culture.
According to the most widespread and less controversial definition, culture is creation.
But creation itself is an extremely specific and complex phenomenon. Equally (if not more)
complex and specific is freedom, which is one of the principal and most important conditions
of creation. Jioev in his works attempted to elucidate specific features of culture as creation,
and concluded that the necessary conditions of creation as the formation of new values
(that is, of culture) are: purposiveness, existence of the subject of activity, freedom, and the
realization of values. Of course, these conditions imply each other: a real subject can be
given if there is freedom, realization of aims and values, and so on. In order to discover how
these conditions of creation are realized in the sphere of culture, it is first of all necessary to
elucidate the relation of creation to man and his essence. This is just the way to determine
that freedom and purposive action are possible if man’s activity is not reduced to natural,
physical determination (and it is not). Thus, creation as an essential aspect of building
culture – and, therefore, of man’s active, purposive transforming activity – conditions and
expresses man’s specific character.
Considering creation as man’s essence and his specific feature means that only
man can transform the universe and reality, and only he does not subject himself to the
outside world but imposes his will on it. As Jioev emphasizes, this of course does not imply
that nature is changed only due to man’s creative activity, as the same result can be achieved
as a result of the activities of animals. In the case of man we speak about transforming
reality according to certain aims. Creation is essential for man because it is a necessary
aspect of man’s active transforming activity and this aspect determines his human specificity.
It must be said that creation as an aspect of man’s transforming activity is essential
for man not merely because it is a distinguishing feature of man but because it has an
explanatory force as a necessary condition of man’s transforming activity: when we say that
man in the process of transforming reality transforms himself as well we imply the importance
of creativity.
Discussing the above issues Jioev draws attention to the fact that the realization of
values is a necessary condition of creation and that creation itself is a value. Of course,
creation is a value though its value depends on what is created. Creation cannot be a final
criterion of value. But neither can man be such a criterion, as it is important to find out what
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can be a criterion of value for man (objectivity of value is necessarily specific: it must be of
universal character while at the same time it can have meaning only in relation to man).
In so far as value has some meaning in relation to man the character the phenomenon
has to which man is to strive to and which still retains a certain objectivity must be shown.
Jioev’s answer to this problem is the following: nothing can have any value for man but that
which corresponds to his nature, to his essence, to his self. He demonstrates that it is
impossible to understand value as a condition and criterion of creation unless we take into
account the importance of the social nature of man and interrelations between individuals,
between ‘I’ and ‘you’. This means that the problem of the criterion of creation naturally and
logically leads us to the problem of the criteria of culture and value. These problems require
special research and Jioev also analyzed them carefully. We can state that creation
necessarily means the realization of values, and speaking of creation in any sphere of culture
implies (and really is) a realization of values. Without a realization of values we would be
dealing with a game and not with the creation of culture.
Discussing problems related to interrelation of science (cognition in general) and of
creation and morals and creation Jioev rightly concludes that creativity is characteristic not
only of the creation of culture but also of the process of adoption of the values of culture.
Jioev paid special attention to the analysis of the dialogical nature of culture. Culture
as a process of the realization of values is a dialogue – it is a dialogue with the past, with
other epochs, other cultures and people. Due to its dialogical nature and by means of this,
people of different epochs can understand each other. Culture as a dialogue, as a condition
of man’s socialization, forms a person, makes him a tolerant being who can direct his own
activity according to values common to the whole of humanity.
There is one more important issue which it is necessary to consider in order to
characterize culture and elucidate its essence. This issue received close attention and has
been thoroughly analyzed in Jioev’s works. It is a problem of the structure of spiritual culture.
The structure of culture is determined by the relation of man to the reality, by the interrelation
of the forms of spiritual mastering of the world. According to the level of development of a
society these forms are different in different epochs, although there are identical elements
which enable us to characterize the structure of spiritual culture. These elements are
mythology, religion, ethics, art, science, philosophy, legal norms, and so forth. The main
elements of spiritual culture fulfilled different functions in different epochs, and relying on
this fact it is possible to speak about the specificity of value orientation of any given society:
if a belief in supra-natural powers is a starting point for mythological-religious consciousness,
then classical philosophy – which is oriented toward the world and man – accepts reason
and logic as criteria of the truth. The Middle Ages were oriented toward faith and God, and
therefore the Bible is the only criterion of the truth. During the Renaissance artistic creativity,
the arts, the reflection and expression of man’s bodily and spiritual harmony interpreted as
the unveiling of the beautiful, were considered to be the main objectives. In modern times
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the unprecedented development of science brought to the fore the importance of knowledge
and therefore of science. This tendency is also the most important for the contemporary
European (Euro-American) civilization at present. Exaggerating of the importance of science
and technology is characteristic of Western civilization (Oriental Indian-Chinese civilization
is of a different type). Well known debates between the extreme scientific and anti-scientific
positions are not at all as harmless and purely theoretical as they might appear. The core
problem of these debates is the following: is the harmonious interrelation of elements of
culture more fruitful for the development of culture and for social progress, or is exaggeration
and absolutization of the role and importance of some of these elements at the expense of
others more desirable? If at any stage in the development of society science and technology
are considered of crucial importance, and if in such a society they are considered the most
important elements of culture while the importance of other elements (morals, art) is ignored,
we can state that in this society consuming tendencies prevail, moral consciousness lags
behind the speed of technical progress and culture is in crisis in such a society where the
technical mode of thinking is absolutized. Any society that is oriented on possession and
not on being (to use Fromm’s terms) develops one-sidedly. According to Aristotle, a society
which develops science and technology and progresses in this direction but is retarded
with respect to morals is moving not forward but backwards. This problem is connected
with an important problem of culturology. It is a problem of types of cultures and, accordingly,
of civilizations.
A civilization or a culture which is oriented in the main on domination over nature and
on procuring material comfort (well-being) is of different type to that which is in the main
oriented toward spirituality and the perfection of man’s inner world. Western civilization
(which is called ‘enchanted by things’) belongs to the first type, while Oriental civilization
(and culture) is of the latter type. If the first type of culture is oriented toward ensuring material
comfort (well-being), the second is oriented toward man’s spiritual perfection. These
civilizations and cultures contain different understandings of man’s life, of the essence of
his being and the importance of metaphysics for man. It has its own world outlook and
metaphysical foundations. All these problems were thoroughly analyzed by Jioev.
Jioev analyzed different aspects of understanding the concept of culture, the problem
of culture as a value phenomenon, problems of the interrelation of culture and creation, of
culture and civilization, of culture and freedom, the problem of the dialogical character of
culture, problems of developmental regularities of culture and the criteria of this development.
He put forward many interesting and well-reasoned ideas which should be taken into
consideration by those scientists who study the same problems.
Thus Jioev made a very significant contribution to and impact on research into the
philosophical problems of culture, and he established the tradition of corresponding research
at the Institute of Philosophy (and in Georgia). His works determined to great degree the
standard of research into the philosophical problems of culture.
167
SUMMARY IN GEORGIAN
oTar jioevi – kulturis filosofiuri
problemebis mkvlevari
irakli kalandia
savle wereTlis filosofiis institutis direqtori, saqarTvelo
reziume
statia eZRvneba oTar jioevis damsaxurebis warmoCenas, saqarTveloSi
kulturis filosofiuri problemebis kvlevis arsebuli tradiciis mimarT.
kerZod, naCvenebia, rom man Rirebulebis cnebis safuZvliani damuSavebis Sedegad,
Tanamedrove azrovnebis standartebis doneze gamoikvlia kulturis, rogorc
RirebulebiTi fenomenis, kulturis rogorc sulieri struqturis, kulturisa
da Semoqmedebis urTierTobis, kulturis dialoguri bunebis da kulturis
ganviTarebis kriteriumebis aqtualuri problemebi; aRniSnuli sakiTxebis
maRalmecnieruli analiziT oTar jioevma mniSvnelovani wvlili Seitana qarTuli
kulturologiis ganviTarebaSi.
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INTERPRETATION OF PROBLEMS
OF PHILOSOPHY OF CULTURE
IN PROFESSOR TAMAZ BUACHIDZE’S WORKS
IRAKLI KALANDIA
Director of Institute of Philosophy, Georgia
Culture is the place where the essential powers of man are revealed. It is a
phenomenon demonstrating the level of formation of a person. The purpose of culture cannot
be identified either as a mere enlarging of the area of man’s mental vision or as the education
of man, but its aim first and foremost is the perfection of man’s spiritual world and the
sophistication of his soul, in other words, the development of the ability of overall sensitivity
and perceptiveness in man’s spiritual organization. This is the reason for Otto Spengler’s
statement that spirit dominates in culture and intellect in civilization.
Culture does not only express the level of man’s domination over nature. The process
of creating culture reflects how man – a subject who creates culture – is changed and
transformed. People transforming the outside world (and their own selves as well) in contrast
to other beings create a new reality, a world of culture. Man’s life is a life realized in culture.
These are the issues discussed by Tamaz Buachidze when, in analyzing the Hegelian
understanding of the essence of history, he reflects upon the interrelation of man and history
that is the meaning of philosophy and writes: ‘Man is a dialectical unity of different essential
forces. History is not a realization of the absolute might of reason: it is a process of realization
of essential powers of different range given in man, and this process corresponds to that of
forming different spheres of culture. The level achieved by culture forms new possibilities
and originates new interests that determine the transformation of culture. Culture changes
and so correspondingly does man also. [Ref. 1, pp.244-5]
Buachidze considers as valid the idea that the only subject, the only moving force of
history, is man, and it is therefore unnecessary to seek some transcendental factors in
relation to man and human society when talking of the meaning of history. The problem of
the meaning of history must be founded on an analysis of human nature: ‘One of the essential
and most evident features distinguishing man from the animals can be characterized only in
the following manner: the environment suitable for animals to live in is nature, the environment
suitable for man is culture. Animals live and act in those settings that are formed in the
process of the development of nature and do not form any new world. The human world is
not solely a result of the development of nature, but is also a result of human activity. Man
transforms nature and creates a new reality, culture.’ [Ref. 2, p.33]
169
Such a situation is not accidental for man as animals are better adapted to nature
than is man. While the means necessary for living are ‘ready-made’ for the animals, man
cannot live if he does not struggle to overcome his somatic unfitness to live in nature, and he
does this by creating a new reality. This means that man, unlike the animals, cannot be only
a consumer. He must of necessity produce in order to consume later.
Therefore, man in order to exist has to cognize the natural regularities and ‘transform
and subdue’ nature. He can do this only if he creates such a phenomenon that will be different
from nature and will help him reach his goal. Culture is just such a phenomenon.
However, the destination of culture is not limited by the fact that originally it was a
means of satisfying man’s vital needs. The content of this demand has changed over time: In
ancient Rome, the plebs demanded not only bread (food in general) but also entertainment.
Since creating culture became a profession it has ceased to be simply a means necessary
for preserving man’s life and it has established itself as an arena for revealing man’s essence
and his essential powers. Not only did Greek art or culture serve the slave-owning state, but
the Greek slave-owning state was a means of – and an arena for – the development of classical
culture. In other words, culture responds to such essential demands of man as creation and
active and free action and activity. As Thomas Mann said, culture is precisely what differentiates
man from the animals. Culture is synonymous to humanity: it is the eternal striving of man
towards ideals. It is a tendency to reach perfection and an eternal striving toward it that is
originally ‘nestled’ in man. The transformation of nature and changing the environment according
to values is the basis of man’s activity directed toward the formation of culture (both material
and spiritual). In this sense, as Buachidze has shown, ‘man’s history is nothing but a process
of the realization of essential powers of different range given in man’s potentialities that
corresponds to the process of forming different spheres of culture. The phenomena of culture
are the bearers of values, they are things of value… That is why we can say that history as a
process of the realization of essential powers. It is a process of creating culture and at the
same time is a process of creating phenomena of value.’ [Ref. 2, pp.35-6]
Buachidze emphasizes the fact that every new level of culture forms new possibilities
and new interests for man and those different spheres of culture correspond to different
essential powers of man: ‘Each essential power “attempts” to “reify” and realize itself. But
the difficulty of history is precisely that realization of one essential power becomes a reason
for hindering other essential powers: it opposes the process of the realization of other
essential powers. An essential power realized in one sphere of culture either hinders some
other essential powers given in man’s potentialities or opposes the essential power realized
in any other sphere of culture.’ [Ref. 1, p.245]
On the basis of an analysis of the Hegelian understanding of the essence of history
Buachidze rightly concludes that the struggle to overcome opposition between realized and
potentially given essential powers has accompanied history from its beginning (and will
continue to do so in the future). He writes: ‘It is a movement towards man, towards a free
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realization of every essential power of man, and this is revealed in removing the opposition
between realized and potentially given essential powers of man at every new stage of the
development of humanity, or between essential powers realized in different spheres of
culture. This is precisely the meaning of history and its main content.’ [Ref. 1, p.246]
The above is echoed in an analysis by Buachidze of one of the main statements of
Nietzsche’s doctrine, the reappraisal of values. He showed that, according to Nietzsche,
tendencies of nihilism are potentially and implicitly given in the traditional world outlook
where the values of the mundane world are generated on the basis of the transcendental
ideal world. Thus, according to Nietzsche, the traditional world outlook contains in itself
conditions of its own destruction and, therefore, in the process of its historical development,
it moves towards a depreciation of the values established by it. He writes: ‘The possibilities
of nihilism are already given in that principal act which, according to Nietzsche, determined
the subsequent history of European culture. This is the act of dividing the world into the real
and the seeming worlds.’ [Ref. 3, pp.481-2].
The death of God and the domination of nihilism that is the process of the depreciation
of traditional values is inherently connected with scepticism, hopelessness and passivity. But
‘passive nihilism’, according to Nietzsche, is pernicious to humanity: it is limited to destruction
only. It would therefore be fatal for history to stop at this stage. Nihilism must put an end to the
old, but nihilism must become a foundation for building the new. Nihilism is to be not an end
but a transitional phase. A new perspective is pointed out and new possibilities are opened
up in nihilism understood as a process of the depreciation of false values. The process, which
is directed at destroying old-fashioned values, is to be brought to an end.’ [Ref. 3, p.482].
Nietzsche demonstrates a deep understanding of man, his soul and his internal world
in his extremely interesting analysis of the origin of the Greek tragedy. In this work, The Birth
of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music, the problem of the origin of Greek tragedy is interpreted
philosophically. The author presents art as a specific revelation of two forces that form the
foundation of the world, as two sources of the world: the Dionysian and the Apollonian.
According to Nietzsche, it is from such an understanding of the metaphysical sources
of the world that it is possible to conclude that art, man and culture can be perfect only if both
sources of the world are organically united in them. Tragedy is a model of such perfection,
but this art too had its end. Nietzsche considered that at a definite stage in historical
development a new world outlook formed in the classical world. This world outlook was
marked by a scientific spirit and did not take into account the Dionysian. Tragedy and the
tragic experience of the world were killed by reasoning, logical, scientific man. Boisterous
Dionysus was replaced by ‘theorizing’ Socrates and myth by science. A period of decline in
the history of European culture began and a new culture arose, the Alexandrian, based on a
scientific outlook.’[Ref. 3, pp.501-2]
Nietzsche considered contemporary man lived in a culture that was devoid of the
Dionysian and therefore one-sided. This explains the extremely negative attitude of the
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author of The Birth of Tragedy to his contemporary culture and to his epoch in general.’
[Ref. 3, p.502].
It is therefore not accidental that Nietzsche – who was worried over the fate of man
and was searching for ways out of this situation – attempted ‘to unmask his contemporary
metaphysics, religion, art, morals and law. He attempted to prove that, beyond the elevated
phrases of different branches of culture, trivial, “mundane”, “rather human” strivings were
hidden. According to Nietzsche, the culture of his epoch was an arena of illusions and
falsehood. That is why at this period Nietzsche’s ideal is “free spirit” which, in contrast to
“bound spirit”, opposes the traditional culture and is free from its illusions.’ [Ref. 3, p.503]
Analyzing Wilhelm Dilthey’s views on the importance of an objective spirit and his idea
that relying on the works of men of genius it is possible to study the ‘energetic action’ of certain
forms of spiritual activity as results of general spirit found in language, myth and religious
customs, traditions, law, and so on, Buachidze rightly points out that Dilthey’s considerations
on objective spirit are certainly of great importance in cultural studies. He writes: ‘And really,
what is culture if not objective spirit! Every culture… is reified, objectified spirit. The phenomena
of culture reveal the soul of their creators, their world outlooks, aims, ideas and values. If you
want to grasp this soul and its activity, it would be most fruitful to grasp those sensual phenomena
of this soul in which it is “placed”… The soul of the Georgian nation – its world outlook – is
originally embodied in every phenomenon of objective spirit or culture: in Georgian ornaments
and frescos, songs and shairi (a form of folk musical-poetic art), religious rituals and dance…
Georgian mythology, fairy tales, proverbs, habits and customs, literary art, law, philosophy…
in a word, everything that is not psychic but exists in a form of objective spirit, that is, is more
than psychic, is a starting point and the firmest foundation for those who intend to investigate
the “Georgian” phenomenon.’ [Ref. 4, p.28].
This same idea is developed when Buachidze asserts that, in general, history is a
process of creating value phenomena (as mentioned above). The same is true of the history
of every nation. The creation of value phenomena is the creation of culture. Culture as the
second nature, a new reality, is created by man who, in contrast to all other beings, is
endowed by a spirit whose main characteristic is freedom. As a result of a thorough analysis
of Max Scheler’s theory, Buachidze puts forward the idea that man endowed by spirit is
able to ‘look from the outside’ at himself, his instincts and natural yearnings, and liberate
himself from their domination. In this sense, spirit as an ability for self-knowledge is, on the
one hand, a negative freedom: it means freedom from something. But spirit is not only
negative freedom, it is also positive freedom. Spirit can be free not only from something but
it can be free for something, it can be a creator. Man as a spiritual being is a creator of
culture and, in fact, of everything marked by spirit. Culture exists as a variety of national
cultures. Culture in general is a unity of German, French, Russian, Georgian and other
cultures. Each nation singles out and transforms those aspects and phenomena that are
meaningful and carry certain values for it.
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Buachidze holds the view that each national culture reveals the image of one nation
or another, its needs and demands, nature, and characteristic features. He stresses that,
according to the famous modern philosopher Erich Rothacker, the ancient Greeks are the
authors of philosophy and art, in which their spirit was reified. The ancient Jews did not
know philosophy although they were (religious) genius in religion. As for the Romans, they
did not have their own (original) philosophy or philosophical conceptions, and their interest
was directed towards domination, legal norms and issues of state government. Buachidze
shares Rothacker’s opinion that the demands, needs, interests and world outlooks of every
nation are reflected in language as well as in culture. For example, while such words as
‘logos’, ‘cosmos’ and the like were very often used in statements made by the ancient Greeks,
the Romans preferred such terms as ‘civic’, ‘imperium’, ‘nomos’ and so on.
Buachidze paid special attention to an analysis of the views of Otto Spengler, the
well-known thinker and outstanding researcher on the problems of culture and civilization.
The limitations of this paper rule out a full discussion of Buachidze’s views on these problems,
and so we must confine ourselves to a few remarks.
According to Spengler, historical reality is a unity of different cultures. A superficial
external observer can discern only the chronological order of different cultures in this historical
process, but a deeper insight into history reveals that cultures are not only different, but
there is also a certain resemblance between them. As Buachidze asserts, Spengler – like
Goethe, who attempted to solve problems of the morphology of living organisms in order to
explain how nature in general came alive – attempts to discover the ‘initial phenomenon’ of
history. The morphology of world history must study individual and unique ways of the
realization of spirit (which results in culture) in different cultures (Chinese, Babylonian,
Egyptian, and others). ‘At the same time it must compare the phases of different cultures
and detect resemblances between them. In order to achieve this aim, the morphology of
world culture, according to Spengler, uses a specific tool, analogy… Only analogy reveals
the real essence of cultures: the fact that each culture is an organism.’ [Ref. 4, pp. 85-6].
Since culture is an organism, it must be characterized by the same features as a
living organism: it is born, grows, becomes old and dies. According to Spengler, the spirit of
each culture strives to fully realize its possibilities and to establish itself in material substance.
‘Young’ culture is creative and full of energy; it is in the process of becoming. But culture as
an organism passing through different stages gets older and its creative forces are
exhausted. The process of becoming is replaced by creation, live by lifeless, and movement
by stagnation. Spengler calls this last stage of the development civilization.
Buachidze rightly notes that Spengler is an uncompromising opponent of
mechanicism, that the morphology of world culture is incompatible with a mechanicistic
interpretation of the history of culture, as cultures are living organisms and reducing them to
mechanical regularities will not justify the essence of culture. However, Spengler runs to
another extreme: his theory is biological. Buachidze writes: ‘It is indubitable that culture is
173
alive and not dead. But it is a spiritual life. Man endows it with life and not nature, and this is
of decisive importance… The decision is up to man “himself”: it is up to the spirit of man
which is directed not only towards nature but also towards “higher values”. Man is not
determined by nature. On the basis of free spiritual acts he creates culture which is
ontologically quite different from the existence of nature. The “ether” of natural existence is
necessity, that of cultural existence is freedom.’ [Ref. 4, p.97].
Taking all this into consideration, Buachidze is absolutely right when he states that,
as culture is not (and cannot be) a biological phenomenon, it is impossible to extrapolate
the laws that characterize the biological. He writes: ‘It is impossible to say that the life of
culture passes through the same phases as that of animal or plant life. In the sphere of
culture it is not at all impossible for an old culture to find a new impetus of life and start full-
blooded life.’ [Ref. 4, p.98] This requires certain impetuses, and such impetuses are not
unknown in history. They somehow correct Spengler’s idea that ‘every culture is enclosed in
itself’. ‘Encounters’ with different cultures and the assimilation and creative acceptance of
their achievements are instances of such impetuses.
In spite of various shortcomings in Spengler’s doctrine ‘one thing has undoubtedly
been treated with a very deep insight: every phenomenon of culture – even the least important
– is an expression of spirit, is a result of the activities of this spirit and therefore forms a
wholeness, a unity… Each culture has one creator, and this creator is its spiritual soul or
spirit. The soul, in a narrow, psychic sense, cannot create culture: it is man’s individual
state, it is part of man’s internal life and remains such to the end. Spirit can be ‘reified’: it
can turn into a word, a poem, an ornament, a sculpture, a painting … The life of the spirit is
creation.’ [Ref. 4, pp.99-100].
Buachidze specifies the notion of creation and states that creation is a synthetic
process, the origination of a new living organism (here, living does not mean biological life,
but the life of the spirit or spiritual creation). Creation is the introduction of life into material.
It is the animation of sensual substance, its spiritualization. He writes: ‘It is a free act as a
result of which a unique, original and different living thing is born. Such a living thing may be
a poem, or a musical composition or a work of architecture… The result of the creative
activity of the national spirit is a spiritual phenomenon, a spiritual culture which can be
interpreted and understood.’ [Ref. 4, p.101].
Creation is a form of activity, a process of forming something new. It is man’s specific
ability that distinguishes man in the world. Creation can exist only in conditions of freedom.
Discussing the interrelation of the most important concepts of culturology – freedom
and culture – Buachidze concludes that ‘man as a spiritual, cultural being observes everything
through the prism of his contemporary culture. Man’s freedom is not absolute (it cannot be
such): it is confined by a system of values or culture, the second nature. In spite of such
“confinement” man is a creative free being. This freedom is based on spirit as the ability of
man to remain human.’ [Ref. 5, p.110]
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SUMMARY IN GEORGIAN
kulturis filosofiuri sakiTxebis kvleva
profesor Tamaz buaCiZis SromebSi
irakli kalandia
savle wereTlis filosofiis institutis direqtori, saqarTvelo
reziume
Tamaz buaCiZes kulturis problemebisTvis specialuri gamokvleva ar miuZRvnia,
magram statiis avtori fiqrobs, rom miuxedavad amisa, mis SromebSi, Caqsovilia kulturis
bunebis, arsis, adamianisa da kulturis urTierTobis, istoriis, rogorc Rirebul
fenomenTa Seqmnis, anu kulturis Semoqmedebis procesis sakiTxebis Rrma analizi,
gamoTqmulia araerTi sagulisxmo mosazreba da Camoyalibebulia debulebebi, romelTa
gaTvaliswineba metad mniSvnelovania kulturis filosofiuri problemebis mkvle-
varebisTvis.
Thus, although Tamaz Buachidze has left no work devoted specifically to the
philosophical problems of culture, his writing on the analysis of the doctrines of some
representatives of the philosophy of life and his research into actual problems of philosophical
anthropology are quite illuminating as far as some of the principal problems of the philosophy
of culture are concerned. This owes to the profound insight and substantiality characteristic
of Buachidze’s thought.
REFERENCES:
1. Buachidze, T. Philosophical Studies, vol. 1. Tbilisi, 2003 (in Georgian)
2. Buachidze, T. ‘The philosophy of history and the problem of the essence of philosophy’. In On the
Matter of Historical Materialism. Tbilisi, 1973 (in Georgian)
3. Buachidze, T. Philosophical Studies, vol. 2. Tbilisi, 2005 (in Georgian)
4. Buachidze, T. Philosophy of Life. Tbilisi, 1991 (in Georgian);
5. Kalandia, I. ‘On some aspects of research into problems of the philosophy of culture’. In Institute of
Philosophy 60. Batumi, 2006 (in Georgian).
175
SYMBOLS OF CULTURE AND DIALOGUE
OF CULTURES
TEIMURAZ MTIBELASHVILI
 Institute of Philosophy, Georgia
The character and structural peculiarities of the system of social life and being in
general are determined by an essential element of this system, known as eidos in the ancient
Greek tradition and called idea by Plato and form by Aristotle. The nature of idea-form is
such that it never undergoes any changes nor is it ever transformed into any other form. In
this sense it is eternal and unchangeable and functions constantly, at least until it is replaced
(forced out) by another form. At the same time, such replacement is not immediately
connected to either the course of objective physical time or to the quantitative change or
qualitative development of things and events. These idea-forms are such ontological
foundations of the whole universe understood as the cosmos (in the ancient Greek sense of
this word), the mode of existence of which cannot be explained comprehensively from a
philosophical perspective by pointing to the fact of human or divine creation. This aspect is
clearly revealed as early as in Aristotle’s philosophy where form taken in its extreme state
presents itself as a pure form, God.
It is important to take onto consideration the fact that the philosophical thinking of
Socrates-Plato-Aristotle moves in the space of such language dispositions in which the
word God (Theos) – as noted by many researchers on ancient Greek philosophy and
language – was used preferably in a predicative rather then a substantial sense. Therefore,
in contrast to the Christian, for whom ‘God is love’ and who proceeds from an admiration of
God’s existence and only later enumerates its predicates, for the ancient Hellene ‘love is
Theos, that is, God’. [Ref. 1, p.28]
An almost similar situation occurs in the Bible. In the sacred history of creation such
words as ‘created’ and ‘made’ are used (the Hebrew word ‘bara’ means created from nothing,
while ‘assa’ means to make or to model from some given material). These indicate that man
of that period was much closer to the mysteries of being than are our contemporaries whose
consciousness is burdened by the scientific spirit of our time and by the rigid, lifeless and
rationalistic constrictions of theoretical thinking. This closeness is also revealed in his less
referentive (when language is perceived only as a system of certain signs) perception of
language: the words expressing the deepest foundations of being were used as metaphors
and symbols. In using metaphors and symbols man more actively co-participated in the process
of creating his being or, to use philosophical terminology, he spiritually communicated with the
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metaphysical foundations of the universe. These acts of co-participation were much less
determined (in comparison with the contemporary) by the rational aspect of his consciousness
which, none the less, gradually strived to subject the whole of reality to the rigid and lifeless
constructions built by it.
The main means and ‘tools’ of this striving, if we consider it in its extreme state, are
such contents of consciousness received via abstraction from the variety of reality (for
example, concepts and objective laws). It extremely impoverished the whole of reality as
well as human beings, since such an attitude eliminates eternal impulses and vital forces
and, in the end, even those mysteries that are given in the foundations of being. There is
only way to understand and grasp these mysteries, namely by using symbols in order to
penetrate and stay in them.
The internal kernel of this mystery is that there is always an element in our historical life
and culture, in our being in general, that resists analysis and cannot be fully cognized. This
element is simply ‘the unknown which we do not know, and do not know it in its essence.’ [Ref. 2,
p.198] Our consciousness is able to ‘obtain’ this ‘unknown’ and grasp and understand it to a
certain degree, not with the assistance of concepts and laws as these contain no mysteries at all
(although we do not reject their important role in the process of cognition of reality), but via
symbols which, as the main ‘tools’ used by man to penetrate into these mysteries, turn man into
a co-participant and (in extreme cases) into a co-creator of the system of being. We think it is
possible to consider Plato’s idea and Aristotle’s form as such symbols. The fact that these
philosophers did not realize this aspect (although it is true that certain conclusions drawn by
Plato in his dialogue Parmenides as well as the character of conceptualization of ‘pure form’ by
Aristotle make this assertion less categorical) can be explained if we remember that in a space
that was not yet burdened by the system of philosophical concepts of the ancient Greek language
there was no possibility of such conceptualization, even on an intuitive level.
Word-symbol in contrast to word-sign has an additional meaning as it points to
something that is cognized only by abstract thinking and it participates in ‘the force and
meaning of this something’. [Ref. 3, p.275] Symbol is the main ‘tool’ which man uses to
gather and organize events and phenomena into a united system that, if taken by themselves
without this organizing principle, are dissociated and scattered in space and time and are
thus characterized by different levels of being (past, present, future). These events and
phenomena are very often so distanced from each other that there is reason to speak of
their objective (free from the participation of man’s will and consciousness) unity and
association: neither nature by itself, nor the natural present in man has such a mechanism
that would ensure the natural reproduction of those moral actions of people that are
sometimes too distanced from each other in time.
The abilities to reproduce such unnatural and, in this sense, supernatural events and
phenomena are purely spiritual abilities. They originate, are born or are produced in man
only in the space of his interrelation with culture and in its spiritual assimilation.
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Culture fulfils this function in man’s life due to its symbolical character. In contrast to
concept, symbol is, as mentioned above, something that enables man to exceed the limits
of empirical reality and communicate with the mystical depths of being. As a result, symbols
turn into conscious constituents of reality that cannot be reduced to its passive reflection
and the imply a creative attitude to it.
In a general philosophical context the result of this attitude is a system of being – the
unity of ‘I’ and ‘non-I’ – that is situated between man and external reality and is clearly
expressed in any natural language. It is, in other words, as Wilhelm von Humboldt writes, ‘a
world lying between the world of external events and the internal world of man’. [Ref. 4,
p.304]
The creative participation of man in the process of forming this linguistic world which
exists between man and external reality is expressed in the fact that each natural language
contains word-symbols that point to something which has its own individual appearance
and, due only to these symbols, is involved in the system of being.
Symbols enable man to grasp those forces and principles functioning in the system
of being in general and in man himself in particular which, as basic principles of the
constitutive order of being and the universe in general, determine its existence in the form
of the cosmos. In the philosophical context Plato’s idea and Aristotle’s form are just such
symbols. The analogical symbol is God (Theo’s) in the ancient Greek world vision and
therefore it had rather predicative force and pointed to something that ‘exceeds man, is not
subject to death, is eternal’. [Ref. 1, p.29]
We suppose that it is in such a context that we have to seek an explanation of the fact
that Aristotle identified form taken in its extreme state (pure form) with God.
Idea, form, God… these are just a few of the endless variety of symbols of culture
(philosophical, artistic, religious, and so on). Their importance and strength in man’s life is
clearly seen in the fact that they somehow mysteriously manage to penetrate and resound
in the inner world of man and originate corresponding forms in him.
These symbol-forms originating in man fulfil a decisive ontological function in his life
primarily as they purposefully transform and individualize in an organized unity those diverse
forces, vital energy and natural elements existing in man himself which, in these forms and
on their basis, reveal themselves in man’s life as the spiritual energy that creates culture
and man’s being in general. They are precisely those forms that determine and define
everything that is human, everything we do and create in our lives. If we consider
metaphorically this life as a ‘text’, we may say that if not this ‘text’ as a whole, then at least its
human aspect is ‘written’ by these forms themselves. This happens to the degree and extent
that these forms are in us and that we, in our turn, are in them.
It is therefore possible to say that our ‘I’ and our being as a whole, are the same as
those forms in which we realize ourselves and such as our Gods are. These forms, driven to
their extremes, exist in us in their pure state and then our ‘I’ (and our being as a whole) is
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completely embraced by these forms (in other words, we completely exist in them). If we
resort to the images of the ancient Greeks we can say that we become like that endless
sphere, the centre of which is everywhere although its periphery is nowhere, and in which
there are no ‘privileged points’.
It is just in such a ‘spiritual state of our being’, based on a perfect religious feeling or
on a philosophical world vision that a common cultural field is found for the most fruitful
intercultural dialogue and for a truly spiritual unifying of humanity (something that is so
important for the peaceful development of the globalization process). The fact that the
‘spherical state of being’ includes not only the personified ‘I’ of the spirit of one or another
culture, but also the whole volume of the ‘non-I’ – everything that really exists or is possible in
the future of culture – provides a firm foundation for this perspective.
In all other cases a culture is under threat of being forced out of the ‘brackets’. In such
cases, due to the absence of a common spiritual super-temporal space, any encounter with
a different culture takes place in real space and time and is therefore determined by different,
often spiritless and thus mutually exclusive interests. There is a risk that it will result not in
the positive cultural outcome of a fruitful dialogue, but in a real war. Events occurring in the
world nowadays provide good evidence of this, and point to an acute lack of an overarching
world outlook (philosophical in the main) and also to the imperfection and extreme scantiness
of the religious feeling of present-day man.
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SUMMARY IN GEORGIAN
kulturis simboloebi da
kulturaTa dialogi
Teimuraz mTibelaSvili
saqarTvelos savle wereTlis filosofiis instituti
reziume
adamianis cxovrebaSi da mTlianad yofierebis sistemaSi yovelTvis monawileobs
raRac iseTi elementi, rac bolomde arasodes ar eqvemdebareba racionalur analizs.
amitom,  misi amomwuravi Teoriuli Semecnebac principulad SeuZlebelia. Ees is
elementia, rasac platonma da aristotelem, Sesabamisad, idea da forma uwodes da rac
arsebiTad warmoadgens uzogadesi filosofiuri cnebis rangSi “amaRlebul” kulturul
simbolos. es sruliad kanonzomiericaa, radganac aRniSnuli elementis, ase Tu ise,
moxelTebas da cnobierebis velSi Semoyvanas adamiani, upirvelesad, swored kulturis
simboloebiTa da maTi sulieri aTvisebis procesSi TviT masSive ganviTarebuli
specifikur-adamianuri (da am azriT ze-bunebrivi) unarebiT anxorcielebs: kulturis
sulieri aTvisebisas, misi simboloebi da, Sesabamisad, misi ZiriTadi formebic, raRac
idumali gzebiT aRweven adamianis imanentur samyaroSi da warmoSoben (badeben) masSi
Sesabamis formebs, romlebic Semdgom gadamwyvet rols TamaSoben yofierebis mTeli
sistemis formirebasa da adamianis cxovrebis wesis gansazRvris procesSi.
aRniSnuli formebis zRvruli sisrule realurad miiRweva adamianis srulyofil
religiur grZnobaSi, an kidev, umaRlesi donis filosofiur gamocdilebaSi. amaTgan
pirveli iseTi SamTxvevaa, rodesac adamianis rwmenis “obieqti”, anu misi zRvruli
interesis “sagani”, Tavisi bunebiT, namdvilad zRvrulia (monocentristuli religiebis
RmerTi), xolo meore ki iseTi, rodesac adamiani, kognitur situaciaSi miRweul
egzistencialur poziciaSi uSualod Wvrets samyarouli wesrigis substanciur
safuZvlebs.
absolutur zRvrulobamde misul am orive SemTxvevaSi miiRweva Cveni zneobrivi
da Teoriuli cnobierebis (nebisa da codnis, gulisa da gonebis), ufro zogad konteqstSi
ki Cvenive yofierebis iseTi srulyofileba, romelSic Cveni “me”, Zveli berZnebis
cnobili metafora rom gavixsenoT, emsgavseba im “usasrulo sferos”, romelSic centri
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yvelganaa, _ periferia ki arsad da sadac ar arsebobs araviTari “privilegirebuli
wertili” (an sxvagvarad, sadac yvela “wertili” Tanabrad privilegiribulia).
swored yofierebis aseTi sisrule unda miviCnioT nebismieri adamianisa da misi
kulturis ganviTarebis umaRles safexurad, im idealur miznad, romlisken swrafvamac
SesaZlebeli unda gaxados mTeli kacobriobis sulieri gaerTianeba da WeSmaritad
produqtuli dialogis safuZvelze am kulturebis iseTi erTianobis uzrunvelyofa,
sadac, imavdroulad, SenarCunebuli iqneba TiToeuli maTganis TavisTavadoba da
individualuri saxe.
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GLOBALIZATION AND ORIGINALITY OF CULTURES
MARINE AMBOKADZE
Institute of Philosophy, Georgia
It is universally acknowledged nowadays that the globalization processes under way
in the contemporary world entail not only positive but also negative aspects and that
concentration on these negative tendencies and attempts to avoid their possible outcomes
are amongst the most pressing issues of the day. One such negative tendency of globalization
is the danger of dismantling interstate borders, which can result in the disappearance of
national states and the death of nations. This tendency is thought to bring about a levelling
of national cultures and thus is of extreme danger, especially to the cultures of small nations.
A loss of cultural originality is tantamount to the physical disappearance of these nations.
The preservation of cultural originality and cultural identity means finding a way to save
one’s own culture and originality. But what can small nations – and Georgia in particular –
do to avert this danger? Where can they find a firm basis that can be used as a guarantee
of salvation and future existence and development?
Georgians have more than once faced the danger of linguistic and cultural
assimilation. During the past two or three centuries the source of this danger was mainly
Russia. The forcible incorporation of Georgia, first into the Russian Empire and later,
following the intervention of Bolshevik Russia and the occupation of Georgia, into the Soviet
Union, made the problem of defending and preserving national culture and national originality
extremely acute. The formula given by Ilia Chavchavadze ‘language, homeland, religion’
embraces all aspects of this problem and points out the direction of the necessary steps to
be taken for the self-protection and preservation of our nation.
In order to illustrate the constant anxiety of Georgian thinkers over the defence and
preservation of national Georgian culture, we have chosen Kikodze whose journalistic and
literary activities were directed towards popularizing Georgian culture and emphasizing its
importance.
Kikodze, who studied at various universities in Germany, wrote in his memoirs From
Dawn till Midnight: ‘In vain I tried to find in European science answers to the questions that
tortured me. It was impossible to fill the spiritual emptiness with Flaubert’s novels and
Chopin’s preludes. I was not then well-acquainted with the history of Georgian culture, although
my intuition was right: that only in the cultural past of my homeland was it possible to find a
candle that would light the dark paths in the labyrinth of scepticism’.1
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His interest in issues of the national spirit and of the national energy embodied in
Georgian culture and in the Georgian language formed the mainstream of Kikodze’s work.
He constantly resorted to these issues when problems of Georgian culture and art were
discussed, and these issues are raised in letters addressed to representatives of different
cultures and art.
Kikodze’s philosophical, aesthetic and culturological views have several theoretical
sources. The most prominent are romantic philosophy (that of Hegel in particular) and
Wilhelm Wundt’s psychology. According to Kikodze, a positive result of the views formulated
and developed in these schools was the establishment of the idea that a person is to be
understood, not as an absolutely free and independent individuality, but as a subject who
has complex and multifaceted interrelations with a social object. Kikodze shares this position
when he discusses the national problem or when he, in his own words, attempts to find out
whether – independent of man and above him – there exists some social entity, specifically
a nation, as a creative psychic spirit and ethical value, or else both these must be attributed
solely and completely to the person. According to Kikodze, a reasoning person considers
himself, not as an isolated island in the boundless sea of life, but as a living part of a social
entity (of a nation) whose growth, development and regeneration are as useful for him as its
degradation, retardation and distortion are harmful and dangerous. Man realizes that there
is something next to him and above him that creates things greater and more beautiful that
an individual can. This active creative force is a reality of a higher degree and value than an
individual spirit, and it is itself immortal and makes a person immortal in so far as that
person enhances its progression.
Kikodze considered the nation a sprit, a psychic entity. He resorts to Wundt’s
psychology in order to demonstrate and prove this idea. In his view, the reality of social
psychics is given in the interrelations of phenomena that, in their essence, are the products
of spiritual creativity, although they stand above individual possibilities. These socio-psychic
phenomena are language, arts, religion, mythology, world outlook, habits and traditions,
and they demonstrate the reality of the national spirit just as the presence of intellectual and
emotional elements witness to the reality of an individual spirit. The essence of both individual
and national spirit consists in activity, creativity and motion.
According to Kikodze, a proper esteem and respect for the original and the unique
that form a person and a nation are of the utmost importance. It is in this context that he
discusses the interrelation of the national and the universal, and shows that such an attitude
made it possible to discard the colourless ideal of world citizenship. In his view, we must
consider important and progressive just those phenomena created by individuals and nations
that are new, anomalous in the most noble sense of the word, and brilliant in their unpredictability
and that, when involved in free competition with others, make humanity’s life more colourful
and interesting2 . It must be stressed that Georgian culture has never been characterized by
particularism and isolationism. Whether due to its geographic location or to its historical fate,
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Georgian culture has experienced foreign cultural influences, although it always managed to
neutralize such influences and transform alien elements into organic parts of Georgian national
culture. Kikodze emphasizes that Georgia united three cultures, the Byzantine, Oriental and
Hellenistic-Classical. But it united them in such a manner that ‘a completely new national
image emerged that differed markedly from the cultures of Byzantium and Persia, as well as
from that of Asia Minor3 . Kikodze notes that the ancient Georgians were an energetic nation,
and this is expressed not only in the building of monuments of material culture, but also in
language and literature. This can be illustrated best of all by the fact that Georgians introduced
strong national elements into foreign literature: ‘Persian poems and novels were more
Georgianized than translated.4 ’ Kikodze shows that ignoring the importance of international
relations in literature and the arts is chauvinistic narrow-mindedness. He stresses that the
interchange of ideas and viewpoints is characteristic of cultural humanity. Progressive humanity
posed deep problems, and paid serious attention to man and the problem of his destination.
According to Kikodze, only those nations that can properly take these problems into account
and give original answers to them can be considered mentally mature. He concludes that no
nation can follow an accelerated pace of culture if it is isolated spiritually, relying only on its
own capacities5 . Such an understanding of the interrelation of the national, individual and
universal is typical of Georgian thought and spirit. Consider Vazha Pshavela, a great Georgian
poet, who in an article entitled Cosmopolitism and Patriotism states that every real patriot is
a cosmopolitan and, similarly, every reasonable cosmopolitan is a patriot6 . Kikodze in his
turn shows that every aesthetic culture is national, and any culture that has not originated from
a national spirit cannot be a genuine aesthetic culture7 . Kikodze demonstrates that the specific
features and individuality of a nation and, specifically, national phenomena are to be sought in
the sphere of spiritual culture, as it is precisely here that national uniqueness and self-sufficiency
stand out most distinctly. He felt that the national spirit can be seen most vividly and substantially
in language and in those spheres of spiritual creativity that use language as their medium.
These are customs and traditions, aesthetic and ethical culture, social and philosophical
outlooks, and mythology and religion.
Kikodze formed his understanding of the essence and importance of language and
of national languages in particular on the basis of Humboldt’s conception of language. He
studied Humboldt’s views through Wundt’s interpretation. Humboldt’s conception, as a
Georgian linguist, Professor Guram Ramishvili points out, is not easy to understand. Some
of his statements need interpretation and others resemble stimuli for further research more
than a set of explanatory statements. Although it is certain that Humboldt considers national
languages as a vital force and not as a lifeless product codified by a set of grammatical
rules, language is energy and not ergon8 . There is an internal unity between a nation and its
language. It is impossible to detect precisely the moment when a national language
originated, therefore the origin of a nation is simply a transition from one stage of a given
stable range to another. It is thus impossible to identify the exact moment when a nation and
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its national language originated. According to Humboldt, different languages are not different
signs of the same thing, but are different visions of the same thing9 . Ramishvili shows that
getting away from an understanding of language as a ‘mirror of culture’ and changing to an
understanding of language as energy offers us a key to the proper realization of the
interrelation of language and culture, as language appears on the stage not at the end of
cultural creation, but is a given from the very beginning.
These are the aspects of Humboldt’s conception that are important for Kikodze who,
to his credit, demonstrates that language is not a means formed once and forever, but is
itself a spiritual action that incessantly creates it. Language, as Kikodze showed, is an
‘expressive movement’; it is an expression of a nation’s spiritual world. Language is a force
of culture and is a means of storing and keeping social experience. Kikodze notes that
language is a social knot that unites a society far more closely and safely that political or
religious organizations.
Kikodze emphasized the special place of one’s mother tongue. A mother tongue is
organically intertwined with thinking. Language difference is a result of difference in thinking.
A sameness of language means a sameness of will and, therefore, a sameness of creative
spirit and talent. Kikodze justly remarks that it is precisely language that shows the richness
and strength as well as the poverty and weakness of a national spirit. The maturity of thinking
of a nation, the variety of feelings and the vitality of a national character are revealed in
language. Language facilitates concentration of national energy as it unites not only living
generations, but draws together the past, present and future and, as a word is passed on
through the channel of thought, posterity inherits traditional ideas alongside with that word10 .
We can agree with the idea that language is a constituting factor of a nation and, therefore,
it is a means of forming nation as a cultural organism11 .
As we have demonstrated above, Kikodze preferred those phenomena in the sphere
of culture that use language, first and foremost, fiction. In his numerous articles and essays
on the heritage of Georgian writers, Kikodze strives to show the glimpses of the national
energy accumulated and revealed through language. The main ethos of these works is
directed towards the protection of the national language and national spiritual culture.
Taking all of the above into consideration, it seems natural that Kikodze is confident
of the decisive importance of the national element for aesthetic creative activity and for
literature in particular. Literature expresses the national creative might and variety. It facilitates
the revival of national energy, aesthetic education and moral perfection. As words are more
closely associated with national psyches than the languages of architecture, painting or
music, the task of literature is to express national reality, its past and its present, and the
feelings and ideals of the nation. Although in the main art and literature are much more than
contemplative expression of life, they are also mighty forces of national revival. That is why,
thanks to art and literature it is possible to educate a nation aesthetically, to regenerate it in
185
a multicoloured aesthetic culture, and to enhance its rebirth. Kikodze had a strong faith in
the great national mission of art.
Although Kikodze in his analysis of national culture mostly emphasized literature, it
does not follow that he considered other spheres of culture less important in expressing
and strengthening national energy and spirit.
Kikodze’s articles and essays (this paper deals with those published at the beginning
of the twentieth century) are filled with optimism and an unshaken faith in the revival of the
Georgian nation. After almost a century Georgia and Georgians face the same or even
more serious and severe problems in retaining national originality, strengthening the national
spirit, and reviving and developing the national culture, but one thing remains certain: Kikodze
showed a real way of national survival – respect for national culture, strong ties with one’s
own historical roots, and, first and foremost, care for and the development of one’s own
mother tongue.
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SUMMARY IN GEORGIAN
globalizacia da kulturaTa
TviTmyofadoba
marine ambokaZe
saqarTvelos savle wereTlis filosofiis instituti
reziu m e
statiaSi naCvenebia, rom globalizaciis process Tan axlavs araerTi
safrTxe, maT Soris saxlmwifoTa sazRvrebis gauqmebis saSiSroebac,  erovnul
saxelmwifoTa gaqrobisa da erovnul kulturaTa gadagvarebis sabediswero SedegiT.
es saSiSroeba gansakuTrebiT didia mcire erebisaTvis da saxeldobr, qarTveli
erisaTvis. statiaSi ganxilulia geronti qiqoZis Sexedulebebi qarTuli kulturis
arsis da Taviseburebis Sesaxeb. naCvenebia, rom geronti qiqoZe erovnuli
TviTmyofadobis, erovnuli kulturis SenarCunebisa da gadarCenis mTavar gzad,
eris istoriul-kulturuli memkvidreobis dafasebas da qarTuli enis, rogorc
erovnuli energiis mqone, cocxali SemoqmedebiTi Zalis ganviTarebas miiCnevs.
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MYTHIC MODEL OF THE UNIVERSE
AND RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS
KAKHA KETSBAIA
Institute of Philosophy, Georgia
Science has for a very long time asserted that the earth is spherical. Today, even a
third-grade pupil knows this, but it would be better if we considered more carefully one of
the oldest mythic truths according to which the earth is flat. In ancient times, people had no
doubt as to the truth of this statement. There was a time when such a notion was the only
model of cosmic and human existence, and it was the truth for millions of people. There
were famous scholars, thinkers, military and political figures among these and, what is more,
the spiritual fathers of mankind, great religious authorities and clergymen shared the same
idea. Hence, we would be quite right in raising the question as to whether this assertion of
our ancestors contains some valuable information by today’s criteria, or whether everything
is the result of the weakness and stupidity of the human mind, something that evokes nothing
more than a smile nowadays. But the latter is less acceptable. We can acknowledge that
our ancestors were not so unintelligent and backward as not to know that the earth was not
flat, but round! They deliberately masked this, attaching sacral and esoteric meaning to it,
and covered the real essence of matter with poetic and mythic images. However, for its
part, the later kept information of great sacral importance (Let us recall what type of sacral
and esoteric meaning was attached to numbers by Pythagoreans and with what respect
they kept numerous secrets connected to them. We know from the history of philosophy that
one of the Pythagoreans killed himself because he had given away the secret of the number
N.) Our ancestors would have known that, besides this world, there is another universe in
another dimension or without any dimension at all – in the form of a super dimension (‘the
kingdom of heaven’, ‘paradise’). The earth is flat! It stands on three whales, and these
whales themselves stand on a turtle.
Such is a very short statement of mythic cosmology, which is a poetic mythic-
archetypal expression of the real essence of matter. The whale is a water animal, and so is
the turtle. In both cases we are dealing with water, something that cannot be accidental. The
fact that the origin of life is connected with water is scientifically acknowledged. It is not
accidental that the first philosopher, Tales of Miletus, acknowledged the water element as
the source – ‘arche’ – of the universe. One of the seven Christian sacraments, baptism,
which is the beginning of Christian life, is also connected with water. According to the above
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archetypal model of the universe, it stands on water or its origin is connected with water.
The Bible also confirms this. The prophet David says that God established the world on the
water. ‘[He] stretched out the earth above the waters.’ (Psalm 136.6). The same idea appears
in Genesis, according to which ‘Darkness was upon the face of the deep. And the Spirit of
God moved upon the face of the waters.’ (Genesis 1.2). John of Damascus explains that
‘the deep is nothing more than a large amount of water’, ‘God created the universe to
separate the upper universe water from the lower universe water’, as he ‘established himself
in the middle of the water deep’ (God placed the water above the universe in order that it
would not be burnt in the intense heat of the sun and the heavenly bodies.). The closeness
and connection of the archetypal model of the universe to the Bible is evident from the
above. It is clear that myth secretly tells us the Biblical truth, which raises the possibility of
asserting that the basis of the archetypal model of cosmic and human existence is the
Bible, Holy Scriptures.
Mythic and religious notions of the structure and regularity of the universe were not
yet complete at the stage of culture and civilization in question. It is true that religious notions
dominate, but mythic ones are not yet rejected. Moreover, there is no conflict between these
notions: quite the contrary, myth serves religion. It is in the service of religious faith because
it is a purely specific human phenomenon. A geocentric system proved religious
anthropocentrism, to which the notion of the earth’s flatness corresponded. It is true that in
Ptolemy’s time the spherical configuration of the earth did not give rise to any doubts, but
these ideas came a from mythic consciousness and did not oppose religious doctrine.
If we want to comprehend the essence of the phenomenon, we should not only be
scientists and scholars, but poets as well. Poetry is very close to both philosophy and religion
(the poetic images of the Psalms are not accidental).
When someone says ‘I am standing on something’ the speaker’s own belief and
faith is always underlined, and it is just this idea that is meant in saying that the earth stands
on three whales or on an elephant (as in the Hindu myth). The whale and the elephant are
the largest animals in the universe. Greatness is underlined by them: something huge, global
and universal is implied (the universe, the cosmos). Their number is three, a symbol of the
old triad of love, kindness and beauty, or a symbol of God, the creator of the universe. The
turtle, which figures here, is certainly a symbol of time, which flows slowly like a turtle (a turtle
is nearly always a symbol of slow movement). Let us recall the paradox of Zeno of Elea,
Achilles and the Turtle. This paradox, besides its metaphysical and logic-philosophical
content, also has poetic, mythic and religious aspects, namely, a man, even the swift-footed
Achilles, could never outrun turtle-time!
According to mythic notions, the earth is at the centre of the universe (geocentrism).
This is one more archetypal scheme. Information and knowledge given here must not be
considered on a physical plane, but looked at ‘with understanding’, obtained ‘with
understanding’ on a hermeneutic plane (Wilhelm Dilthey). We can then discover that our
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planet, the earth, is not in the spatial centre relative to the universe, but is in the centre of
attention of a supernatural, super cosmic being: God. That is why anthropocentrism is a
necessary feature of religious and mythic thinking. That the earth is flat and stands in the
centre of the universe and is supported by three whales standing on a turtle (water) means
that the three-dimensional universe (earthly civilization) is at the centre of attention and
protection of a superior supernatural being, God, and the extraordinary long path to him can
be traversed with love, kindness and beauty (love-faith, kindness-moral, philosophy and
aesthetics-beauty). The fascination and beauty of old myths are exactly in this. So our
ancestors did not have a false and scientifically unjustified model of cosmic and human
existence after all.
Ancient (eastern, if you wish) scientific or philosophic thinking is nourished by mythic
archetypal images of the universe. For its part, Biblical thinking is a nourishment of myth.
Mythic images are closely interwoven with scientific opinions. Where ‘ratio’ does not feel
itself confident it always resorts to the help of myth, as a result of which the revelation of
mythic images and symbols becomes necessary. Even the genius Plato addressed myth in
his very critical moments, when pure reason (mind) was not capable of progressing because
of a lack of power and skills. That is why man’s mind devours myths like spring water, this
likeness of the truth, and there is nothing extraordinary in this. It can be said that it a necessary
feature of ours (human beings), as human beings are the creators of myth and symbols
(Ernst Cassirer). Symbols and myths themselves are regulators of our experience and
explanation-understanding and are thus worthy of attention. It could be added that myth
interpreted in this way is in unison with religion, namely, with Judaeo-Christian doctrine as
given in the Holy Scriptures.
Unfortunately the ‘living perception of myth’ is lost. It is out of reach and, in some
cases, is even unacceptable to modern, totally estranged persons. However, myth does not
require our faith, but our understanding. That is why it is time for us to treat it ‘with
understanding’. Myth hides the truth in itself. This can be said especially of religious truth,
which has an objective, ontological meaning and is of heavenly origin. Esoterically given
truth connects it with religion, namely, Christianity – Orthodox Christianity – which hides
heavenly truth in itself.
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SUMMARY IN GEORGIAN
universumis miTosuri modeli
da religiuri cnobiereba
kaxa qecbaia
saqarTvelos savle wereTlis filosofiis instituti
reziume
statiaSi gamoTqmulia mosazreba, rom samyaros Sesaxeb arsebuli miTosuri
(igulisxmeba kosmogoniuri xasiaTis miTebi) modeli, xSir SemTxvevaSi saRi
azris poziciebidan daujerebelic ki, srul unisonSi SeiZleba aRmoCndes religiur
cnobierebasTan. gansxvaveba mxolod isaa, rom miTi bibliur kosmogonias poetur-
filosofiur formaSi gadmoscems. am SemTxvevaSi miTosi universumis yofierebis
idumali enis rols asrulebs. Zveli miTebi Taviseburi filosofemebia, romlebic
dafiqrebas saWiroebs. am filosofemebsa da miTologemebSia davanebuli Zveli
miTebis xibli da mSveniereba, romlis mizania adamianis ziareba uzenaes siyvarulTan,
sikeTesTan da mSvenierebasTan.
antikuri mecnieruli azrovneba miTosiTaa nasazrdoebi. miTosuri saxeebi
mkveTrad iWrebian mecnierul msjelobebSi. iq, sadac ~racio~ myarad ver grZnobs
Tavs, goneba yovelTvis miToss moiSveliebs. amitomac aucilebelia miTosuri
saxeebisa da simboloebis filosofiuri interpretacia. genialuri platonic ki,
kritikul momentebSi, roca wminda gonebas aRar Seswevs samyaros wvdoma, miToss
mimarTavs. Cveni goneba, mowyurebuli STagonebas, ewafeba miToss _ WeSmaritebis
am poetur gansaxierebas da ase cdilobs moawesrigos sakuTari yofiereba.
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GLOBALIZATION AND THE MAKING
OF PLANETARY ETHICS
A. NYSANBAYEV
Institute of Philosophy and Political Sciense, Almaty, Kazakhstan
The question arises as to whether we can, today, in an epoch of extending
globalization, discuss and philosophize in a purely academic manner, delving deeply into
theoretical discourse, while leaving behind our attention to a world storming with passion
and unsolved problems. Pain and anguish, in the words of modern philosophers, are
contained in the essence of conceptual thinking. A thought must be sensitive to the sufferings
of billions. And the twenty-first century has already brought horrible ecological and social
cataclysms. Entering the new millennium, we bear in mind Karl Jaspers’ words: ‘The twenty-
first century will be a century of the humanitarian sciences or it will never be at all.’ And what
is happening? The tension and stress of human existence are increasing every day.
Two directions are usually identified, two areas of increasing contradictions: man’s
attitude towards nature and the ecological crisis, and the attitude of people to each other
and social conflicts. My first thesis concludes by bringing these two contexts together, as
everything that happens between people has an effect on the universe. The idea of the
integrity of human culture and the world of nature is well-founded in the conception of Teilhard
de Chardin. He proved that evolution is, first of all, a psychic transformation as consciousness
is ‘the substance and blood of growing life’. Geogenesis and biogenesis are per se
psychogenesis. A particular stage of development, the era of noogenesis is beginning: a
new cover or noosphere is being formed around the earth. The thinking layer is opening
beyond the biosphere and above it. That is why man is not just a link in the chain of evolution.
This is a fundamental event in the life of the whole Earth: it, in de Chardin’s words, ‘is changing
its skin’, is finding its soul. [1]
The scientific argument for this revolutionary thesis was given in Vladimir
Vernadski’s conception of the noosphere enveloping the Earth as a ‘thinking’ or ideal
membrane. Man is not just ‘present’, ‘mastering’ the surrounding world; his thought and
his activity have a cosmic sense. Man and Earth are indivisible, representing a particular
structural element of space.
Relying on these ideas, the thesis of the close inter-influence of social conflicts and
ecological cataclysms might be well founded. Speaking of the first aspect, it is, above all,
the increasing clash between Christian (Western) and Islamic (Eastern) civilizations. It is
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already quite usual to mention the ‘clash of civilizations’ and the numerous refutations of this
view. Leaving the debates to one side, real tension is indeed growing. And the most usable
term to characterize this situation is ‘terrorism’.
But should not the politics of a superpower towards weak countries be described in
terms of terrorism? Is not confirmation of the rights and freedoms of man and of democracy
with the help of military power a manifestation of terrorism? How can the extermination,
humiliation and plunder of the cradle of eastern culture, the blessed, luxurious and diverse
Baghdad, the city of the Thousand and One Nights be called anything else?
Terrorism is anywhere and everywhere: it does not have a frontline, it brings danger
and threat to each and every one, right here and now. That is the nature of the fourth world
war that is already being fought.
There is no place for terrorism in Islam. By their spiritual and moral potential
Christianity and Islam are kindred religions, confirming the universal values of mercy, love
and compassion. There is not a single mention in the Koran that violence and murder
open a way to Paradise. The history of Islam acknowledges the humanistic orientation
and astonishing tolerance of this doctrine, always finding possibilities for acceptance of
and dialogue with other religions and with Christianity in the first place. The problem of
the modern world is the establishment of a spiritual equilibrium between these two world
religions which have common historical roots and identical spiritual and moral aims and
orientations. It should not be permitted for traditionally tolerant religious doctrines to collide,
engendering a ‘clash of civilizations’. A spirit of tolerance and mutual confidence must be
the highest priority.
When we speak of global or planetary ethics of solidarity and co-operation we
primarily mean the transformation of the consciousness and psychology of all mankind,
their incentives to peacefully resolve problems and conflicts, and to co-operate and work in
partnership without heinous acts of violence and terror.
The globalizing world must have global principles. Global egoism will lead to the
collapse of humanity on Earth. Consequently, global egoism must be opposed by humanity’s
spirituality, that is, by planetary ethics. ‘Planetary ethics’ means those moral aims and actions
that are typical of the very essence of man, his spiritual and moral basis. In other words,
planetary ethics is the simple human norms of morality that must be necessarily distributed
everywhere in today’s world.
The philosophical substantiation of such planetary ethics is to be found in Immanuel
Kant’s famous treatise Perpetual Peace. The philosopher did not, of course, know the term
‘terrorism’ and its associated horror but, from a position of intellect he expressed the idea
of the possibility of stopping warfare among peoples then and forever. Under natural
condition, Kant says, it is difficult to imagine the extinction of man’s aggressiveness. The
condition for perpetual peace must be established according the principles of morality and
international law.
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Kant’s idea of perpetual peace is becoming more relevant under modern conditions
of globalization. Even in the middle of the last century, as Karl Jaspers shows, the
prerequisites of a common world history and a real unanimity of peoples on Earth were
created. Our planet has become ‘smaller’ than the Rome Empire in its day. No important
event – and even insignificant ones – can be localized or kept in the spatial gap. But, as
Jaspers says, the spiritual situation of the epoch is very paradoxical. With the help of science
and technology the new world is approaching unity, but losing sense.
Humanity, having achieved scientific and technological successes that astound our
imagination, discovers ‘a catastrophic impoverishment in the sphere of spiritual life,
humanness, love and creative energy’. The unity of the world’s history has been reached
beyond the contexts of sense. Globalization unites and binds together the powers of evil as
well. Terrorism becomes international, making use of information technology and the Internet
for its destructive goals. Kant’s idea of life without wars and violence and based on the
intellect and moral principles becomes vitally urgent.
In the twentieth century numerous thinkers and public figures raised their voices to
advocate perpetual peace: Mahatma Ghandi with his active ethics of non-violence, Mother
Theresa with her inexhaustible attempts to help all the needy, Albert Shweitzer with his
conception of reverence for life, and many others. Thanks to such individuals the idea of
planetary ethics can become a reality today, as those who have laid the foundation of its
conceptual basis have shown how to accomplish the idea in practice.
As alarm bells sounded throughout the world, Albert Shweitzer decided to take a
brave step: to reveal the sources of the modern tragedy of humanity. He supplemented
Kant’s idea of perpetual peace with a moral postulate of reverence for life, not only that of
man, but life in itself. ‘Ethics is the boundless responsibility for everything living.’[2] This
principle includes not only a social, but also an ecological dimension: life in itself is sacred,
be it man’s or that of an animal or a plant. ‘When in the spring last year’s grass gives way to
fresh greenery, this happens because the plant’s roots sprout billions of new shoots. In the
renewal of ideas, too, so essential to our time, this is the only way: all people have to renovate
their views and ideas, concluding from them a sense of life and peace.’ [3]
This means that terrorism directed against humanity and nature must be opposed
by non-military power, but such a method cannot defeat terrorism. There is a need of anther
invincible power: good will, human morality and spiritualness. The sages insisted that ‘hatred
cannot be stopped with hatred, but with love’. Power must indeed be opposed with power,
but with the power of the national spirit. On this occasion we will not be acting defensively,
rather terrorism will be put on the defensive; it will hide and escape, losing its militancy and
offensiveness by the hour and by the day. And these are not just good intentions in the
manner of Manilov. Morality and spiritualness have real possibilities to stand against universal
evil. First of all, it should be in the sphere of education that new intellects are formed, with
their value purposes and preferences. We need a radical transformation of the educational
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process in both East and West. Young people must be brought up in a spirit of tolerance
and mutual respect, developing the abilities of dialogue and common understanding.
Today, more than anything else, philosophy as a human doctrine and as a spiritual
universal is responsible for saving peace and for a planetary perception. Its power often
underestimated, and it is appropriate to mention that it is precisely as an idea that philosophy
is the start of a real, often even revolutionary, change of situation. Indeed, philosophy is able
to do many things: to astonish, to agitate, to plunge into doubt, to absorb with its profoundness
of thought, to prompt self-education, and to reveal the essence of the universe and human
history. As Maurice Merleau-Ponty writes, humanity today as never before needs philosophy,
the designation of which is the salvation of the world. ‘The discourse is about to remind
people of their association to the universal being, which they should not forget.’ [4] The
world is wrapped in the web of the Internet. There are many mediators between man and
reality: words, signs and terms that distance the vivid flesh of life. Philosophy, which always
counted general thinking as a point of pride, from now on is called to do another task: to
teach man to see the world anew in all its vividness and unique fascination. And then he will
join the mystery of Universe, will acquire integral thinking, planetary thought. [5]
Shifting of accents to the conception of the ‘planetary ethics’ of William Blackstone
and his associates (Blackstone was professor of philosophy in the state of Georgia in the
early 1870s) took place in the modern ecological problems. The process of a new ecoculture
is now forming, and also a new ecological ideology, the basis of which is Blackstone’s
planetary ethics and the ‘sense of globality’ of A. Pecheyi. I mean the well-known position of
Blackstone’s American associates that has become orthodox in the West and which may
be expressed rather succinctly as: ‘We should accept not only non-anthropological values
and the right of other species in the realm of animals, we should agree that it is normal to
think about inanimate substances, that they have moral rights. Trees, rivers, mountains and
oceans, having moral rights, must have legal rights.’
Thus planetary ethics is a whole complex of interrelated principles, aims and ideas,
a whole and dynamic complex to be put into a working system. All these ideals and principles
derive from human moral values, residing in the best philosophical works of various countries
and peoples, and in religious doctrines with their legacy of love, mercy, moral purity, the
aspiration to live in harmony with nature and with each other. The traditional values of the
Turkic world call for it. To the specific principles of planetary ethics we should attribute:
· Tolerance;
· Peaceful and constructive dialogue between cultures, civilizations and
confessions;
· Education for all that prioritizes upbringing over imparting this or that kind
of knowledge or professional skills;
· Ecological imperatives of human culture.
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The principles of integral ethics should be perceived by each and every one: heads
of states, heads of international organizations and civil structures, and individuals. This is
Kant’s categorical imperative, knowing no concessions or reservations. From the point of
view of such an approach it is necessary to accomplish an inversion of the thesis that is now
popular: thinking locally, acting globally. In its new form it sounds differently: thinking globally,
acting locally. It means that relying on integral thinking, it is important to take into consideration
the particularities of situation, region and national traditions.
Speaking of international organizations, the first to command our attention is the
United Nations, which has done much for the cause of peace in the world. But today, the
conceptual positions of the UN obviously does not meet the spirit of our time. We need a
new UN philosophy, a new value strategy, oriented to the expressed positions of integral
ethics, and an accompanying institutional and structural transformation of the organization’s
activity. The issue is also about other international organizations. Their conceptual strategies
and the nature of their activities should be reformed in accordance with the key task of the
current situation: the shift from terrorism to a planetary ethics of consent and tolerance. The
moral principles of such an ethics should be realized with the help of well-developed and
reliable legal mechanisms. (In this connection let us recall Immanuel Kant’s writings.)
Today, informal, popular humanistic movements form part of the globalization
processes, attaching to them a humanistic character. For example, after the death and
destruction of the 2004 tsunami in South Asia / Pacific, millions of people made voluntary
donations to provide humanitarian aid to the victims. In general, the role of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) is growing. Planetary ethics cannot be realized from ‘above’ alone,
nor solely by politicians, all the more so as they often pursue narrowly practical interests,
either private or state. By the way, the events in South Asia / Pacific after the catastrophic
earthquake and tsunami showed that it is impossible to survive by oneself. The
consequences of large natural disasters can be coped with only on a global scale.
The principles of planetary ethics should also become supreme on state level. We
may note that the President of Kazakhstan has already followed these principles, for example,
in his actions over the delimitation of the borders with Russia and China. Discussions and
negotiations were conducted over a period of about seven years, and we can now see the
tangible result. There is joint patrolling of the Russian-Kazakhstan frontier, which promotes
security and confidence in both states’ borders.
The Kazakhstan delegation spoke in public at the 32nd UNESCO General Conference
in Paris on declaring 2006 International Year of Planetary Consciousness and on the ethics
of the dialogue between civilizations. Kazakhstan was the first state to abandon nuclear
weapon tests. Kazakhstan’s Eurasian integration initiatives can also be considered in the
context of the requirements of planetary ethics, the ethics of co-operation, collaboration
and mutual aid. Congresses of world leaders and traditional religions were held in 2003
and 2006 at the initiative of President Nursultan Nazarbayev. A general issue is the very
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practice of the peaceful, good neighbourly and creatively mutually enriching co-existence of
the various peoples on the territory of a unified unitary state. This speaks of Kazakhstan’s
readiness to conceive the principles of planetary ethics and to put them into practice,
presenting a unique Kazakhstan model of international relations, a model of inter-
confessional, international accord, the way it should be in the modern world.
These should be constructed precisely on principles that prioritize spiritual and moral
values. This is why it is important that the notion of ‘planetary ethics’ is filled with a sense of
not just formal, especially external, contractual ‘morality’, but with a sense of real morality
coming from the very heart of man.
Thus, the humanity is on the way from terrorism and violence towards the planetary
ethics of confidence and mutual harmony. In the process it derives its strength from the
treasury of world culture, and most of all, from philosophy. Perpetual peace, respect for life,
and spiritual renewal are not merely grandiose phrases, but the planetary ethical Code,
opening perspectives of humanitarian collaboration and common understanding, confidence
and solidarity, reasonableness and spiritualness. Having become unified, humanity finds
real Sense.
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SUMMARY IN GEORGIAN
globalizacia da planetaruli eTikis Seqmna
a. nizanbaevi
folosofiisa da politikur mecnierebaTa instituti, almaata, yazaxeTi
reziume da komentari
Tanamedrove msoflio katastrofis winaSe dgas. avtori asaxelebs globaluri
saSiSroebis or arsebiT mizezs: adamianur urTierTobaTa gaucxoebas, gadazrdils
erTa Soris konfliqtebSi da umZimes ekologiur situacias. Tanamedrove
filosofiis amocanaa ganWvritos Rrma, Sinaarseuli da sabediswero kavSiri
aRniSnul mizezebs Soris.
msoflio kataklizmebSi gzadabneuli adamiani unda daubrundes RmerTs.
islami Sors aris agresiisgan. msgavsad qristianobisa, igi qadagebs mimteveblobasa
da siyvaruls. avtoris azriT, religiaTa harmoniuli Tanaarseboba adamianuri
samyaros gadarCenis gzaa. adamiani unda aRizardos axali, planetaruli eTikis
mixedviT, romelic religiidan sesxulobs tolerantobas, siyvaruls, sikeTiT
borotebis Zlevas...
am mxriv sayuradReboa, rom msoflios globalizacia ar aris mxolod
pozitiuri movlena. sikeTis ZalTa konsolidaciasTan erTad, globalizaciaSi
borotebac erTiandeba msoflio terorizmis saxiT. avtoris msjeloba STag-
vagonebs ideas, rom msoflios integracia unda xdebodes ara meqanikurad da
ganukiTxavad, yvelasa da yvelafris gaerTianebis mizniT, aramed gacnobierebulad,
filosofiuri azrovnebis doneze, rac saganTa da movlenaTa arsobriv urTier-
Tqmedebas da sinTezs gulisxmobs. aseT arsobriv integraciaSi boroteba ver
miiRebs monawileobas, ramdenadac borotebas arsi ara aqvs.
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HUMAN SUBJECTNESS
AS SPIRITUAL-MORAL PHENOMENON
A. NYSANBAYEV
Institute of Philosophy and Political Sciense, Almaty, Kazakhstan
Nowadays an anthropological revolution is taking place all over the world, and not
only in Kazakhstan. At the end of twentieth century a strong necessity for the recognition of
the specifically human became apparent.
This is connected with the fact that reality is changing fast, attitudes towards reality
are also changing and, finally, the understanding of man is changing among philosophers
and scientists.
The main strategies in the modern interpretation of man can be called constructive
and spiritually creational.
The first of these is the idea that reality is a construction by man on the basis of a
conviction of its non-substantiality, like a game with no rules. The view is that a man has no
essence or that he has a multitude of essences.
The consequence of such an understanding in the framework of social reality is chaotic
and pluralistic transformations, voluntarism and anarchism. In the best case, it is
technocratism as the power of constantly changing and evolving technologies, with which a
man is not able to keep pace.
As the Russian scientist Alexander Dugin writes: ‘The object of modern anthropology
is “man minus soul”.’
The continuation or converse of the first tendency is trans-humanism: an attempt at
the literal universalization of man. It is an attempt to imbue him with a whole from various
essences. Trans-humanists are those people who use the modern achievements of science
and technology for a transition to the ‘post-human’, a creature with radical new abilities. The
main goal of trans-humanism is the endless perfection of man by all possible methods.
Most trans-humanists consider that by 2030–50 continuously accelerating technical
progress will permit the creation of post-man, whose abilities will be radically different from
the abilities of modern people. This process will be especially accelerated by genetic
engineering, molecular nanotechnology, neuron pharmaceutics, the creation of the neuron
prostheses and direct ‘machine-brain’ interfaces.
As Francis Fukuyama underlines in his book Our Posthuman Future: ‘The aim of our
book is the statement that the most serious threat created by modern bio-technology is the
possibility of changing human nature and thus a transition to the “post-human” phase of history.’
199
The second modern anthropological tendency is spiritually creational. Changing
man is understood as his animation.
The anthropological revolution in modern philosophy and culture permits a visualization
of the entire system of values – and its main part, the system of spiritual values – in a new
way. Man appears again as a certain unity determined through a system of spiritual values.
The spiritual values themselves appear as creating and forming culture.
The spiritual anthropological tendency is the most adequate to man’s essence. It
contains a direction towards man’s evolution within in it, but on the basis of spiritual development,
and not on the basis of interference by artificial technology. This lets man evolve in a milder
way, more harmonically, conforming to harmony as it is an information of development.
In addition, the spiritual tendency absorbs into itself both of the above, taking only
their positive content. From the first tendency an inclination towards the diversity of creativity
is absorbed. From the second, use of the best achievements of science and technology is
absorbed. But there is a third tendency which does not conform to two others: the elaboration
and realization of the spiritually genetic potential of man and the revelation of the possibilities
of spiritual genetics.
The problem of the rethinking of man’s subjectness naturally fits into the issue of
the anthropological revolution.
It is necessary to distinguish between subjectness and subjectivity. This is the
methodological basis for further thinking. The difference is connected with a distinction in
the understanding of freedom and creativity. Subjectivity contains an element of free will,
the contraposition of man to an objective being, whereas in the notion of subjectness the
personality of man is accented together with his spiritual, moral and creational dignity.
In this case a new and rather unexpected sounding anthropoid principle obtains,
which was established in cosmology a long time ago. Earlier, this appeared to most as a
‘banal tautology’, but it is gentler and quite deep issue. Man is not only a ‘microcosm’, but
he is also a ‘microteos’, as Nikolai Berdyaev rightly emphasized in his time.
This can be seen if we examine the architectonics of the Universe from the point of
view of Man’s architectonics. Man has everything that the universe has, in so far as man has
to some extent a spiritual quality the source of such a quality ought to have an objective
status, an ontological root. Man and the World are equivalent and equally powerful.
It is necessary continually to bear in mind the wider – that is, fuller – understanding of
anthrop principle that already extends not only to the World, but to man: man brings the
World in himself, ‘holds’ it, and bears responsibility for it.
This means that man’s subjectness has to be understood, not just as activism,
pluralism, free will and «creativity» of a destructive character. It is necessary to understand
that the Truth is unique and people are in agreement in spirituality and in the universally
creational possibilities. The unity of truth consequently means an internal spiritual unity among
people, their ability for mutual understanding and accord.
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All these confirm that man is not just naturally universal, but spiritually universal as
well. His endless, diverse and inexhaustible creative possibilities are mainly connected
with, first of all, spirituality, which in its essence is dedicated to a man’s aspiration to sacrifice
his talent to the environment. Then the universality of spirituality should be understood as a
common substantial basis of man’s content in an individual, that is, as man’s origin, which
is peculiar to all people and which defines man, that is, it is his pivot or core.
Consequently, man’s subjectness today has to be a responsibility for world harmony.
It must not be just culture, but, first of all, spiritually moral creativity for the sake of the
blossoming of the harmony of being.
On the notion of spirituality we can say that the first, albeit very superficial step towards
an adequate understanding of the notion of spirituality is that the spiritual is something
contradictory to the material. This is the roughest way, but it is right on the whole, because it
is based on the primordial etymology of a word and historically thoughtful genealogy of the
notion of the spiritual.
It is obvious that spirituality has a direct relation to the essence of man. Man is not
just a body, is not just a physical structure, but he is also a soul: he is a spiritual creature. He
is ambiguous, and his spirituality is his delicate and profound definition, and materiality is a
more empirical and external definition.
Let us accept a definition of ‘spirituality’ as man’s internal world that differs from the
outside world.
It is often consented and saved: spiritual production is the production of spiritual
values. In other words, creativity is the creation of the excellent and eternal.
Such an opinion is very widespread, but it can be rejected. Among ‘spiritual values’
are monuments, museums, temples, pictures, and so on.
 But then we contradict our own definition of the spiritual: it is the internal world of
man, but not the external production. It is clear that museums, monuments and so on are the
objectified result of some internal attempts; however they cannot be spiritual in themselves.
They are the result of man’s activity that obtained an external being, and are not on their own
a profound definition of man.
This logical contradiction is aggravated by the next idea.
If values are understood as something external, estimated by man and often having
a certain price, then values belong to culture and not to spirituality.
Spirituality is man’s internal world. What about culture? By any understanding culture,
even if it is internal, is the processing of some material or quality. Culture is the polishing,
correction, skill, handicraft, keeping of the external correctness, achievement of some
creational results and their immortalizing in generations of people, that is, strictly speaking,
a shape, even internal and sometimes very substantial.
What is the content of this shape? It is obviously spirituality or its absence.
This very ‘or’ shows that culture is neutral with respect to the spiritual content in itself:
201
it can be lofty and low, culture and ‘anti-culture’, ‘contra-culture’, ‘mass culture’, and so on.
Culture is like the phenomenon of beauty, which can be aspiring and frightening, kind and
wicked, pure and monstrous. By the way, the traditional division of culture into the material
and the spiritual also testifies that culture and spirituality are not synonyms.
Except for the power of life (which manages our physiology) or the energy of active
functioning, there is something in man over and above these: the power or energy which is
able to raise him over the material conditions of life, to elevate him over Nature, but to
elevate him by good qualities. And under such circumstances when it seems that man
should be subordinate to the common trend of events in the material world, when it seems
to be more useful and rational for man to move by the logic of that necessity which makes
him care about his food and self-preservation.
But the matter is that this spirit of genuine humanity presents itself as another in
contrast to the spirit of Nature.
The spirit of genuine humanity, that internal power which makes man Human with a
capital letter, is not just a vital power or a physical ability, or natural harmony, or instinct or
something like that. This spirit is man’s moral origin. It may also be called the sacred or
divine in man. It interfaces with internal feelings, like the feeling of the sacred, faith
(confidence), love, awe of human life (and not only of his life), a feeling of eternity, and a
feeling of the soul’s immortality.
Thus, there is something in man that can not be vital energy, consciousness or psychic
life at all, but something deep, internal, essential and different from all material, however
subtle it is.
This very essential, light and spiritualized origin rather differs from the rest of the
Universe. This very quality is infinitely valuable for the world. Man is valuable, first of all,
because he is unique among those laws and phenomena of the material Universe with his
spiritual qualities.
From this point it is obvious that the purpose of man in the world is to bring spirituality into
the world, that is, cordiality, love, and a caring attitude towards the Harmony of natural being.
 Consequently, spirituality has to be practical, that is, it has to be creativity for the sake of
people. And the converse: only spiritually developing man acquires the full right to create.
The conclusion of all the above is that subjectness is not wilfulness, and it is not
man’s dissolution into objective being. It presents by itself a dialectic unity of personal self-
standing and a caring attitude to the environment, a unity of creativity and responsibility for
the results of such creativity. In other words, the modern understanding of man’s subjectness
is that subjectness is the spiritually moral origin of man, which is realized and objectified in
culture, ennobling them and making culture and creativity genuinely lofty, full of exclusively
positive meaning.
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SUMMARY IN GEORGIAN
adamianis subieqturoba, rogorc
sulieri da moraluri fenomeni
a. nizanbaevi
folosofiisa da politikur mecnierebaTa instituti, almaata, yazaxeTi
reziume da komentari
dRes, roca Tanamedrove adamiani cxovrobs rogorc sulierebas mokle-
buli pirovneba, aucilebelia, rom Cvens samyaroSi moxdes antropologiuri
Semobruneba. amitom, avtoris azriT, upirvelesad unda gavarkvioT gansxvaveba
subieqtad yofnasa da subieqturobas Soris. subieqturoba adamianis Sinagan,
fsiqoemociur samyarosTanaa dakavSirebuli; subieqtad yofna ki pirovnebis aqti-
uri qmedebaa, roca misi Tavisufali neba pasuxismgeblobis grZnobiT moqmedebs.
kultura adamianis qmedebis da Semoqmedebis Sedegia, igi SeiZleba iyos
sulieric da materialuric, sikeTis mTesvelic da borotebis mqmnelic; anu
kulturis fenomeni, rogorc sakuTriv adamianis qmedebis Sedegi, TavisTavad
neitraluria sulierebis, sikeTisa da moralis mimarT. antropologiuri Semob-
runeba niSnavs, rom damyardes dialeqtikuri erTianoba adamianis subieqtad yofnasa
da gare samyaros Soris, mis Tavisufal nebasa da pasuxismgeblobis grZnobas
Soris, moxdes kulturis interpretacia im sulier RirebulebaTa mixedviT,
romlebic kulturis fenomenis arsobriv ideacias ganaxorcieleben moralisa da
sikeTis TvalsazrisiT.
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In this paper we will discuss the phenomenon of abstraction and its impact on human
consciousness in general, and also the mind’s abilities to interpret, determine and project
an objective reality. This issue will be discussed in two basic dimensions of human mental
development: the mythological (or theological) and the economic. During this discourse we
will attempt to ascertain the discriminative abilities of the mind with its logical consequences
– artificially constructed fictions that appear as reflections of a subjective character, but
ones which actually play a basic role in the projection of an objective reality for human
consciousness. The central issue in the above statement is: Do human-created fictions
objectively exist and are thus primary phenomena, or are they merely secondary reflections
of a factual world?
We start by examining Greek abstract personifications or ‘gods’. The reason why
we give Greek mythological personified images as examples is that they express the
psychological nature of abstraction as the ability of the mind to discriminate its own elements
(emotions, impulses and mental states) most clearly. To convince the reader of this assumption
we give some examples of mythological personified images which are primitive human
reactions and emotions: Dike – justice, Eris – discord, Eros – love, Hygienic – health,
Hypnosis – sleep, Lyssa – rage, Mnemosyne – memory, Nemesis – divine retribution, Nike
– victory, Peitho – persuasion, Phobos – fear, Soteria – salvation, Thanatos – death,…
As we see from these examples, there exist appropriate psychological images (gods)
for each known mental state. It is not difficult to see that these images are reflections of
ordinary human emotions and impulses. As personified mental conditions and basic instincts
were spontaneous and not subordinated to conscious control, they turned into fetishes,
alien elements within the human mind and completely dominating it. Presumably, these
kinds of alien elements (psychological images) within consciousness gave rise to neurotic
experiences which needed to be brought under control, and this is why the ancient Greeks
sublimated their natural impulses into mental fetishes, which they called ‘gods’. Consequently,
these strong emotions used to form the main driving force and motivation in human life. As
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for current mental conditions and instincts (basically, unconscious destructive emotions),
these are suppressed and brought under control by means of different stimulants and
antidepressants, the so-called ‘painkillers’. Literarily speaking, the ancient gods have turned
into modern zombies within the human mind.
We can discover a link between ancient abstract personifications and the image of
a monotheistic god (the Creator). The assignation of personal features and characteristics
to the Supreme Being is a typical example of an alienated psychological process. We can
talk about concrete personal predicates which are assigned to God: merciful, just, strict,
caring… As we see from our example, monotheistic personified images are more complex
and deal with a higher level of emotions, while the ancient Greek gods are reflections of
primitive human reactions and impulses and so are less sophisticated. However, in both
cases ordinary mental conditions are being transferred outside consciousness and placed
in different – and thus independent – ranks. From this point personified mental images start
to dominate almost all psychic processes. Indeed, it is of great interest how ordinary
emotions, impulses and mental states transform themselves into ‘gods’ within the primitive
mind and what is the psychological mechanism that inspires the mind to believe that the
supreme and absolute being carries its spiritual character and not any other characteristics.
This question has something in common with the statement given in the article of
previous issue: it concerns an interesting political problem, the transformation of ordinary
natural activities into artificially created dimensions that are classified as ‘political’. These
activities may range from fundamental biological facts to the conventionally-based deviations
of the ‘political animal’. It is obvious that natural phenomena transform themselves into
conventional terms. This is not to say that these changes are ‘metaphysical’, but they are
quite tangible empirical facts if observed carefully. The important point is how these natural
phenomena reflect and reveal themselves in conventional categories. As mentioned above,
natural activities are turned into political ones: competition between individuals, which is a
manifestation of the ‘struggle for survival’, gains a political feature. In such a dimension
every natural phenomenon is turned into political terms. A political feature can be assigned
to such a natural fact as death. This phenomenon can even be classified in as ‘political
death’ and ‘political assassination’. Actually, political antagonism is a cause of the
phenomenon under consideration. This fact once more proves the significance of the political
way of perception of objective reality and its impact on human life in general.
Erich Fromm has made a deep analysis of this mental activity in his examination of
the nature of alienation and the creation of ‘idols’, psychological images within consciousness.
‘An idol is an object created by ourselves on which we make a projection of our own powers,
thus impoverishing ourselves by this act of disposition. We come under the influence of our
own creation and by means of such influence we conduct an act of relation in an alienated
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manner with ourselves. So just as I posses an idol, the idol possesses me as I am under its
influence.’ (Erich Fromm. To Have or to Be? 1977, p.50)
The interesting point for us in this discourse is the emphasis on a specific attitude of
individuals towards their inner spiritual world that is based on the ‘possession’ of mental
images that are their own creations. We find here close ties with the materialist attitude
towards objects that is typical of consumerism in general. Here the mind convinces itself
that it ‘possesses’ a concept of god and, accordingly, faith in this is just like the ‘possession’
of any other product of mental activity.
Questions arise as to whether abstract personifications exist in the minds of modern
individuals, and what are the forms by which these reveal themselves. In order to understand
this complex psychological phenomenon we refer to the issue of fetishism, specifically to one
of its forms, the personification of commodities. Probably this kind of fetishism appears as
the most widespread form of alienation. What does the term personification of things
(commodities) and its side effect (fetishism) mean? Through the mass media various products
(objects) are presented to various groups of individuals (consumers). Consequently, stereotyped
images of these products are created. If one observes carefully, one may notice that subjective
(human) features and characteristics are assigned to products in advertisements. For example,
in many advertisements products ‘speak’ to consumers, they are the ‘sponsors’ of different
programmes and social facilities. ‘Indeed these characteristics are typical of human beings
but, in the minds of ordinary consumers, the message is being perceived and interpreted for
the most part in a direct way without realizing that their consciousness and imagination are
being manipulated. As a result, consumers engage in subjective interactions with products
(things). Subjective interactions with objects mean emotional attachment to the products on
offer. This is a stimulus for the consumer to engage in a pattern of behaviour (buying the
advertised product) that is intended and foreseen by the producers who are ‘hidden’ behind
the goods they produce and who use indirect means of communication with their consumers.
This kind of interaction is anonymous in character’ (E. Solovyov. Mass Culture – Illusion or
Reality?1975), meaning that interactions between consumers and producers are being
realized through, and by means of, objects (products), so that consumers engage in direct
interactions with commodities and in indirect ones with producers.
The process described above is a fetishist attitude towards commodities, which is
the basic reason for consumerism and shows the ‘mental blindness’ of consumers.
This paradoxical pattern of social interaction is described in Marx’s Capital: “The
labour of the individual asserts itself as a part of the labour of society only by means of the
relations which the act of exchange establishes directly with the products and, indirectly
through them, with the producers. To the latter, therefore, the relation connecting the labour
of one individual with that of the rest appears, not as direct social relations between
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individuals at work, but as they really are: material relations between persons and the social
relations of things.’ (Karl Marx. Das Kapital. Theory of Value)
As mentioned above, in this converted psychological process subjective
characteristics are being assigned to things (objects), that is, ‘they derive social phenomena
directly from technical phenomena’. The personification of things, as a consequence, appears
as a process when the ‘social characteristics of things (value, money, capital) are considered
as natural characteristics which belong to the things themselves.’ (I. Rubin. Essays on Marx’s
Theory of Value. Ch. 3) To demonstrate the assumption that ‘social phenomena are derived
directly from technical phenomena’ we adduce another example of the subjectification of an
ordinary conventional means, known in economics as ‘price regulation’. According to the
free market approach to economics, markets regulate prices, which is a reflection of a
fundamental psychological error. It is obvious that market regulations and the economy itself
are the results of human activity. These are social interactions which aim to create material
values. Following from this profound (objective) definition, it would be irrational to assume
that ‘the market regulates itself’, as there is nothing in social processes that ‘creates and
regulates itself’ and, if not, we have to confess that social phenomena are of an unconscious
and self-creatable character. Every particular pattern of social interaction is the result of
concrete human activity. However, as a result of such mental errors and misunderstandings,
social processes are perceived and therefore interpreted in a distorted manner. From this
point of view, personified patterns of social interactions become dominant in human
behaviour, as if not dependant on their regulation. Logically, personified (or alienated) social
phenomena start controlling human behavioural patterns. In the case where ‘the market
regulates itself’ there is no place for human endeavour to change any error existing in the
system. This would literarily and directly mean that humans cannot control the market, while
the market controls and regulates itself regardless of human interference.
These statements demonstrate the assumption that social processes are of
unconscious origin (Lévi-Strauss) and form patterns of homogenous self-regulated systems.
It seems really curious that humans – who imagined and believed in their superiority over
nature and who even try to explore space (in order to find our place in universe!) – cannot
believe in the ability of their minds to control an ordinary pattern of social interaction called
‘price regulation’ which ought to be an entirely conventional phenomenon, just like any other
pattern of social interaction. The two types of alienation discussed above refer to Marx’s
statement of ‘material relations between persons and social relations of things’ while it
ought to be the other way around: that material relations should be conducted between
persons by means of their social relations.
We can determine common features of the two types of alienation: just as the ancient
Greeks believed that the ‘gods’ were directing all their behaviours and they had no power
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over themselves, modern individuals consider that economic systems are self-sufficient
and function independently. The phenomenon shown here is a fiction which is a side effect
of converted physiological activity. Ancient abstract personifications were personifications
on a mythological level, while modern personifications are connected basically with an act
of consumerism. In other words, it is alienation on an economical level of human mental
development.
Ancient abstract personifications and monotheistic personified images can be given
a common name: religious fetishism. This is a specific level of human mental development
when humans assign their own (subjective) features to the personified Supreme Being,
God, created by them. Fetishism on an economic level of human mental development reveals
itself in assigning subjective characteristics to commodities (objects) which cause an
emotional attachment to things in individuals (consumers). Here the act of purchasing and
consuming transcends its functional aspect and gains an emotional character. The interesting
point here is that, if for the ancient Greeks their own personified emotions were the main
driving force, for modern individuals it is a consumerist-acquisitive psychological attitude
that plays the same role.
 When people believe that economic systems are functioning self-sufficiently, they
become homogenous entities that are not subordinated to human regulation (the ability of
money, value and capital to function independently and within themselves, the market
regulating prices by itself, and so on). Eventually, fetishism appears on this level of human
mental development in the form of the personification of commodities (things).
It can clear how significant the role of abstraction is for the human mind in general, as
it determines the ability of interpretation and projection of objective reality. The central issue
is that ‘mankind could not distinguish and determine the “social contents” of things
(commodities) for many thousands of years, considering those contents as characteristics
they had been already given.’ (E. Solovyov. Mass Culture – Myth or Reality. Moscow, 1975)
Here we come across differences in abilities of discrimination, interpretation and
projection of reality in different religious and economic perspectives. The interesting point
is that each ideological framework has its own ways of interpretation and projection of the
factual world, meaning that the means of satisfaction of material needs and their
psychological reflections are different. In orthodox Christianity, gaining material wealth
greater than what is needed is considered a sin, that is, behaviour that is not encouraged
and is an object of shame, while in Protestant ethics it is the contrary: the limitless
acquisition of material wealth is one of the highest virtues and such an individual is believed
to be supported by God.
Another comparison can be made: socialism and capitalism have different
approaches to the satisfaction of material needs. Socialism stresses systematically
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planned production, distribution and consumption, while in the capitalist system there are
no practical limits of consumption (satisfaction of needs). Satisfaction of material needs
in socialism is not an ‘end in itself’, and appears as a means of achieving a concrete
socio-economic order, while in capitalist economic formation the process of production
and consumption appears as the highest standard and measure of existence, forming an
endlessly repeating circle within itself. Considering these fundamental ideological (or
psychological) differences, we may assume that they are the result of a specific feature of
the human mind – abstraction – and its logical end-projection of reality. From this statement
follows the conclusion that each ideology has its own ways of projecting reality, so that we
can talk about different projections: an Orthodox projection, a Protestant projection, a
Nazi projection, and so on. But what is the nature of the projection of reality and why do
different forms of projection exist? What are those images and mechanisms which
represent and reflect outer reality inside the human mind? Presumably, the characteristics
of sensorial stimulus are not represented in consciousness, but rather reflections of the
process of coding of a factual reality, links between its components, and also the conditions
of a percipient (subject) itself. So this type of representations should be understood as
the representation of phenomena and links of an objective reality within the consciousness
(I. Hoffmann. Das Aktive Gedächtnis. Berlin, 1982, p.57). We emphasize the term
‘conditions of a recipient’ to reinforce the statement of the subjectivity and conditionality
of projection as of a mental process. Following on from this definition, we can assume
that all types of projections are reflections of the coding of different semantic signs within
the consciousness, thus Orthodoxy has its own coding system of reality, just as socialism,
capitalism or any other ideology have their own.
It is of interest that humans create fictions on which they become dependent and,
eventually, these fictions determine how they perceive and interpret objective reality, and
also their behavioural patterns. There exists a curious disposition (interaction) of human
consciousness towards the outer world where factual reality reveals itself in the form of
fictional reality. Here we refer to A. Adler’s perspective of the individual’s psychological
constitution, which he calls ‘lifestyle’. (Another expression which he uses is ‘leading fiction’.)
According to Adler, an individual’s lifestyle is a fiction, but one that is necessary for existence.
Fictions, as a rule, are not realized by an individual, which means that they may remain
unconscious during an entire life. (Issues of Philosophical Anthropology. Part 2. Tbilisi,
1971, p.79) A reason for giving this example is its correspondence with the assumption
above that, within the context of fiction, all ideologies appear as a product of the imagination.
As mentioned above, fictions are the basics of collective unconsciousness, by means of
which social relations function. This kind of co-relation is clearly seen in the social contract,
when people transfer their natural rights to the supreme power, which is the state, and
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eventually this energy returns back to them in form of the compulsory power of the state.
Here the state appears as a dominant element, but one that was created by humans
themselves. As a rule, in all observed cases human-created fictions dominate over them.
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SUMMARY IN GEORGIAN
abstraqtuli personificireba
da realobis dasaxva
givi amaRlobeli
“Savi zRvis” universiteti da Tbilisis saxelmwifo universiteti,
saqarTvelo.
reziume
mocemul naSromSi ganxilulia abstraqciis fenomeni da misi gavlena
cnobierebaze zogadad; aseve dasaxulia azrovnebis mier obieqturi realobis
interpretirebisa da proecirebis SesaZleblobebi. sakiTxi ZiriTadad ganxilulia
mentaluri ganviTarebis or safexurTan mimarTebaSi. esenia: miTologiuri (an
Teologiuri) da ekonomikuri safexurebi. msjelobis procesSi gamoikveTeba
azrovnebis ganmasxvavebeli unarebi, romlebic warmoiqmnebian mentaluri aqtivobis
procesSi, saTanado logikuri SedegebiT, xelovnurad Seqmnili fiqciebiT, romlebic
warmoadgenen subieqtur refleqsias, magram TamaSoben mTavar rols obieqturi
realobis proeqciaSi. Ziebis mTavari sakiTxi SemdegSi mdgomareobs: arian Tu ara
azrovnebis mier Seqmnili fiqciebi obieqturi bunebis Tu isini warmoadgenen
faqtiuri samyaros mxolod meorad anareklebs?
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IDEAS FOR A “DEMOCRATIC” FUTURE
XABIER INSAUSTI UGARRIZA
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INTRODUCTION
In the last two decades of the 20th century the period of reaction to the past happen-
ings started, at least in Europe. In this period the illusions of emancipation of the previous
years vanished, a global or planetary capitalism developed and a feeling of impotence and
resignation spread. It is the epoch, when so-called a mercantile and capitalist “globaliza-
tion” developed, from which the “globalization” has been spreading to the various spheres,
like politics, culture, etc. A new world scene arose.
  On the ground level, this new world scene polarizes the dynamics towards two
ends that are facing opposite directions: one of them leads to a progressive social frag-
mentation, in which societies will see their competences diminishing, their autonomy lim-
iting itself, and increasing external interferences. As a reaction, societies will generate a
defensive attitude. On the other hand, ambiguous messages on universal rights secure
themselves as if they were valid, no matter of the context. This situation is going to gener-
ate a tension between the both ends, unknown until now, at least in the proportion in which
they are now given. All these will make it necessary to establish new rules of the game in
order to resolve the new conflicts. Among these tensions and conflicts, a new path is
opening in the new millennium, along with the new possibilities. But they will also gener-
ate new serious risks. Moreover, as Habermas has declared recently, if Europe were not
able to find its own space, if it couldn’t reach an agreement in the form of a common
constitution for the year 2009, it would definitively be trapped in the claws of neoliberalism
and the European future would be uncertain and dark.
    The defenders of antiglobalization have many arguments in their favor. Robert
Shiller, professor of economics in Yale, warns us in his work “Irrational Exuberance” of the
danger that exists in the “tremendous instability” created by the growth of the population
after the economic boom of the past years. This economic boom is precisely which has
made flourish what we were naming: “globalization”.
It is evident as well, that development of the culture has not escaped the grip of the
economic “globalization”. Rather, in spite of our efforts to seek cultural commonalities (though
only within the Europe), the achievements are minimal and the critical voices continue to
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rise. Philosophy must play a part in this scenario. Otherwise, the dynamics of the world may
be doomed to exist within an uncontrollable environment that is favorable to irrational con-
ceptions and “dogmatisms”, and that, once installed, will block any possibility of our having
a truly “democratic” future.
THE CULTURE
When an inequality increases, it is our habit to appeal to education, to culture as a
means of correction. The plurality of cultures, the so-called “multiculturalism,” that today
shows itself more than realizes, is real only if it emerges and develops within some particu-
lar culture that always has its own traditions. This dynamics is the opposite of the one that
has been imposed up until now in the process of globalization. The case of Iraq is not an
exception, but rather a good example. Human rights only make sense to us if they are
understood as a goal achieved after a conscious effort. The problem tends to crop up when-
ever a culture considers some feature or practice that is opposite to the so-called “universal
human rights”. For example, the ablation of the clitoris. The liberal solution supposes, that
the women suffering from it, will be able to decide freely on the subject,  like Habermas
thinks. It is the typical case or model of “ forced choice or election”, since the framework of
“human rights” has been chosen in advance as that which it will be necessary to chose later.
Apparently, there is only of correct choice and if the thought, that it is considered necessary
to choose, is, in fact, not chosen, then the choice is not free. This scenario closes itself into
a complex paradox that is impossible to settle in the liberal way of thinking. So, what is
supposed to be “correct” is actually the problem. First, the subject that “reports” or “edu-
cates” tends to be the “westerner”, who considers his culture “above” those which he in-
forms and shapes. And that brings us to the second problem: what can be done when the
attempt to disperse “correct” information actually reinforces precisely those convictions that
they were trying to change or correct for being supposedly erroneous or opposite to “human
rights” - since, for example, in scenes of warlike confrontation the conquered party usually
feels a growing hate for their alleged “saviors”. And in the same way, to affirm that values
are absolute or universally valid tends to provoke a reaction in which the particular is doubled
and dogmatic defense arises of that which is one’s own, against that which is different. This
doubling of the particular has many aspects, but the dynamics is always the same: doubling
of particularities, of tiny nationalisms, of religious sects, of culturally limited small groups,
which do not have any other aim than to affirm their own uniqueness.
But within this trend lies something real: the need to affirm “absolute” singularities,
the truly singular. We reject mercantile globalization in the sense that we pay attention to the
singular phenomenon to the things that break the rigid world order. The phenomenon of
anti-globalization is the true face of globalization, its logical response. They are tied to-
Political Philosophy
214 Culture & Philosophy
gether. The abstract character of the world market and doubling on small particularities are
just two faces of the same phenomenon. We could speak about anti-globalization as a
syllogism between two possible ends: a fierce submission to the hegemony of the capital
or anarchy.
TO THE SEARCH OF A CURRENT DEFINITION OF THE SUBJECT
In 2000 Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau y Slavoj •i•ek published a book titled: Contin-
gency, hegemony, universality.
The book, somehow, gathers dispersed reflections on topics related to the new situ-
ation that confronts us in the new millennium. The topic of the subject occupies a dominant
place. I would say the most privileged place. It is necessary to redefine the subject, to re-
think it, since identity addresses a new challenge to an old problem. The subject cannot
diminish unilaterally, neither in its individual dimension nor in the social dimension. It is a
question of bringing together both dimensions in order to find one identity. Psychoanalysis
has been proved helpful in unraveling this difficulty. The failure of Heidegger wouldn’t have
been penetrated into the budgets of his own approach (for which he would have left his
project of Sein und Zeit), to have confused the “ontological” level with the “ontic”, not have
been able to articulate adequately the individual and social dimensions of the subject, the
establishing an unfounded short circuit between them.
The common thread between the authors is that the “identity” is never something closed
and definite, that identification can never become identity, that between the two there is a tre-
mendous gap. But precisely this statute, far from being a weakening of the joint of a general,
universal or global, is rather the articulate force of the strictly democratic one; the negativity in the
heart of identity would itself be the engine of dynamics capable of articulating the different
singularities between themselves. The specific problem is the conception of the concept of
universality: “Universality is neither a static concept, nor a given a priori, and it should be dealt
with as a process or an uncompromising condition to any of its manners determined by appear-
ance. “ (Butler, Laclau, Zizek, 2000. Introduction). A substantive and procedural conception of
universality, such as, for example, that of Habermas, turns out to be inadequate, abstract. The
philosophical speech of the modernity anathematized by Habermas seems to conspire now
against himself. Habermas´s effort is characterized for “a pre-established universality discover-
ing or conspiring to be a presupposition of the act of speech, a universality that supposedly
concerns a rational feature of the act of speech, a universality that supposedly concerns a ratio-
nal feature of man”. It would be a question, then, of an abstract substantive conceptions of uni-
versality that retains a cognizable and predictable determination and a procedural way of con-
ceiving universality, according to which it is presupposed that the political field is made up of
rational actors.
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CONCRETE UNIVERSALITY
What Hegel says of the philosophy might also be worth describing here. According
to the German philosopher, any authentic philosophy takes into his bosom the mark of “uni-
versality made concrete”. This means that every singular philosophy undergoes self regula-
tion as well as regulating other; every era is, somehow, all the eras. It is not a question of a
complete external subdivision, but of the same apprehended in a specific way. It is not a
question of a reduction of the universal to the particular, but of the fact that every singular
has its own universal; each has a specific perspective of the entire field. Every universal is
tied to a certain singularity, and without it, the universal is not possible. Definitely, the prob-
lem consists in determining what is a “universal singularity”, how a truth, which is always of
the order of the singular, can simultaneously be valid for us all.
Alain Badiou, a modern thinker who with has considered this problem with much
rigor, speaks of the possibility of that of a “universality makes concrete” by what he defines
as an “event”. The event differs, according to the way it deals with a “situation”. The situation
defines the field of the multiplicity of ever is objective and real. It is of the order of enumer-
able, of the discernible, of nameable; that is to say, of the field of knowledge. Morality be-
longs to this order. The “event”, on the other hand, is of an entirely different order. It is de-
fined as radically unrepresentable with the situation, as emptiness. The event breaks the
order of the situation, bringing to light what the situation conceals. It is suppressed within it,
and it is always singular (not individual, not universal abstract), since it cannot be carried
back to any previous order, to any situation. For the event, the relation between the two is
one of “subtraction”: the event avoids the situation. Ethics is tied to the concept of event.
The event opens up a new perspective, for it is still indeterminate, we can either
accept it radically (then we speak about “loyalty” to the event), or can deny its radically new
perspective, in which case of an “evil” arises, as a perversion or corruption of the truth that
encloses the event.
An event is always oriented to the emptiness of the situation. “What makes a real
event become the origin of a truth, the only thing that is always and that is eternal”, writes
Badiou, “lies upon the fact that is tied to the particularity of a situation only through the
emptiness. The emptiness, the multiple, neither excludes nor forces anybody. It is the abso-
lute neutrality of being - so that the loyalty originated by an event, in spite of being an imma-
nent break in a singular situation, it still points at universality.” (Badiou 2004, p. 146).
The event is founded in what is radically unrepresentable within the situation, which
constitutes its emptiness. The event is the declaration of the emptiness, a radical break
from the situation that makes visible only what the situation can conceal. Whereas knowl-
edge is the inscription of what happens within previous objective categories, the truth – the
series of implication derived from the emergency of an event – is singular: the nature of the
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event cannot surrender to a preexisting rule. In this way, the event is incommensurable with
the situation; its break from the situation is truly foundational.
From this conception, briefly outlined above, some authors have developed a politi-
cal theory, lately turned out to be very controversial, that I would like to mention at least in its
most basic form. The concept of democracy, which arose in Greece, is tied to the possibil-
ity that things have been happening. According to Rancière (that is one of the critics of
Badiou), in Greece, the disadvantaged classes, those who were excluded from power (the
empty set that does not count as such) rose up demanding their participation in the public
arena. Democracy was born, then, as a revolt of the disadvantaged class in order to be
held into account, so that they might had been included. The more capable is a society to
open up integration processes for those who are not currently involved, the more demo-
cratic it is. Some classic examples are Antigone’s fight to make her “law” valued in opposi-
tion to Creon; or during the French Revolution, the struggle for the recognition of the voice of
a third party separate from that of the nobility or the clergy; or the proletarians seeking to
achieve a corresponding place in the capitalist society; or the women wishing to be in-
cluded in the roles dominated by men; “illegal” immigrants “sans papières” are now the new
force in the global world; and the model repeats itself.
The truth of the ones is situated in the others. Likewise, the truth of globalization
could only become real if it answered its own particular interests, at the cost of an imbal-
ance increasingly accentuated among human beings.
Antiglobalization has two enemies: those who understand the globalization as being
unilateral and scarcely globalizing at the end – since they only want their own profit; and those
who stick to their own particularities, wishing to stand up to any external pollution. The “trickery of
the reason” is precisely what makes the antiglobalization movement stand for the interests of a
real globalization “with a human face”, in which singular interests are not annulled. On the con-
trary, these are turned into the concrete universality, owing to the miracle of the event of global-
ization and against globalization itself.
Similarly to the subject that it supports, democracy is always a process, never a final
point, in which those who have taken part in its production can now savor its fruits.
Thus, the paradigmatic dialectics of the owner and the subject that he supports is
then always a process (never a final point), when those who have taken part in his produc-
tion, can savor now his fruits. Here the paradigmatic dialectics of the owner and of the
slave, or of Antigone and Creon (opened by Hegel in the Phenomenology of the Spirit),
have the perfect current importance.
THREE FORMS OF EVIL
According to Badiou, when the truth of an event perverts the evil, the evil can adopt
three different forms: the form of the perfidy (abandoning the loyalty to the event), the form of
217
the sham (substitution of the emptiness with the fullness of the community for the act of
naming) and the form of a dogmatic totalization of the truth. We will not analyze this compli-
cated topic, since it would lead us to perfecting the scalpel to differentiate, for example, a
real event, since it is the French Revolution, for mentioning only the evident one, and not real
forms, since it is the Nazism or invasion to Iraq. A more extensive analysis might give us a
key to separate democratic authentic processes from others that obey only forms of perfi-
dies, shams or dogmatisms.
A CRITICAL NOTE: LACLAU
Badiou’s exposition has a weak point that has been a position of relief in diverse
discussions, the clearest of them probably be that of Laclau. This one criticizes the rigid
opposition that Badiou establishes between situation and event, between emptiness and
fullyness. Both categories, according to Laclau, are already always mutually contaminated
and it is not possible to separate them completely. For example, the demands of “without
papers” are particular demands; their particular character never disappears completely, though
none of it fights for stop being able to stimulate an emancipating movement more widely that
goes beyond the particular interests. That is to say, the tension between “universalism” and
“particularism”, which can never be broken completely. The emptiness has potentially certain
content: the universal thing. Any event appears as potential vehicle of a new order; the sense
of the event is suspended between its content and its ontological role. The pollution between
the eventual thing and the situational thing is the fabric of the social life.
INSTEAD OF CONCLUSION
Badiou himself goes beyond his ontological basic opposition between situation and
event, whose unique foundation is given by the category of “subtraction”. So, according to
his budget, it is necessary to leave aside the material contents of the situation and to re-
duce it to a purely formal principle (the organization of the countable thing, the differential
thing as such). According to this logic, it is possible to contain only one of the events, like
pure subtraction is the presentation or the declaration of the unrepresentable thing; as if the
loyalty to the event cannot have any concrete content, it only has a formal order. In such a
case the distinction between event and sham (simulacrum) must be a formal distinction.
The response to the problem of establishing a criterion to distinguish an event of a sham is
that the event is orientated to the emptiness of a situation. The sham - for example, the
Nazism - links itself with a situation conceived as fullness or a substance. According to the
logic of the sham, the pseudo-event does advent the being, naming not the emptiness of
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the previous situation, but its completeness. Not the universality of what individual does not
support, exactly, in any outline (in no multiple one), but the absolute particularity of a commu-
nity, takes root in the features of the land, the blood, the race.
Everything what the subjects can do compromised with a truth, with a real event, has
clearly of what the perfidy of an event would consist - but this is not enough to establish a
criterion of distinction between the truth and the sham. The distinction truth/sham only can be
kept resorting to something that goes beyond them. The truth only can be understood as the
process of integration of the event and the situation. And this supposes articulating dialecti-
cally both poles, the situation as the place of the particular thing and the event as the place of
the singular thing, in whose an average term places the only possible place of definition of the
“universally I make concrete”, the unique “real” cell of the process of globalization.
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SUMMARY IN GEORGIAN
ideebi “demokratiuli” momavlisaTvis
francisko habier insausti ugariza
baskeTis universiteti, espaneTi
reziume da komentari
avtoris msjelobis sagans warmoadgens Tanamedrove adamianuri samyaros
sagangaSo mdgomareoba. erTi mxriv, dogmatizmi da meore mxriv iracionalizmi,
waRma-ukuRma atrialebs msoflios politikur urTierTobaTa scenas, sadac scenaris
mixedviT, keTilgonieri da racionaluri azrovnebiT dajildoebuli msaxiobebi
unda TamaSobdnen. filosofias da kulturas, avtoris azriT, miuZRvis
gansakuTrebuli roli, raTa moawesrigos arsebuli qaosi da aRkveTos istoriul
formaciaTa sabediswero meryeoba anarqiasa da diqtaturas Soris; warmarTos
msoflio politika WeSmaritad demokratiuli Rirebulebebisken.
avtori ganixilavs habermanis da sxva Tanamedrove filosofosTa mosazrebebs,
Tu rogor gavikvlioT gza da rogor movZebnoT kompromisi globalizaciisa da
antiglobalizaciis saerTaSoriso tendenciaTa WidilSi.
am mxriv, metad sainteresoa, rom avtori mkveTrad ganasxvavebs situaciasa
da movlenas erTmaneTisgan. situacia _ es aris kerZo SemTxvevaTa moxdenis
sivrce, movlena ki iseTi gansakuTrebuli fenomenia, romelic Tavis TavSi zogad
arss moicavs da romelic gamoirCeva situaciisgan. movlena situaciaSi ar Cans,
saWiroa sagangebo Zalisxmeva, raTa dairRves situaciis kerZo SemTxveviTi savseoba
da gaCndes sicariele, rac movlenas situaciidan gamoyofs. sagulisxmoa, rom
movlenis zogadarsobrivi buneba sulac ar niSnavs, rom man unda Seavsos da
daiqvemdebaros mTliani situacia; piriqiT, situaciis floba, sicarielis, rogorc
Tavisufali, sasicocxlo sivrcis mospobasa da movlenis individualuri arsis
dakargvas niSnavs da roca es xdeba, movlena fsevdomovlenad, anu “simulakrad”
iqceva. swored ase xdeboda da xdeba demokratiul RirebulebaTa gaukuRmarTeba;
antikuri xanidan moyolebuli, demokratiis anonimuri mizezi iyo upovarTa
klasis brZola adamianis uflebaTa mopovebisTvis. es, siRaribis zRvarze myofi
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fena, Tavisi umZimesi cxovrebiT, Rrmad iyo CaZiruli gausaZlis arsebobaSi da,
rogorc faruli sazogadoebrivi movlena, ar sCanda istoriul situaciaTa
zedapirze. demokratia daiwyo iq, sadac daiwyo am faruli arsebobis gamovlena
da gamosvla sazogadoebrivi cxovrebis scenaze. magram swored aq gaCnda saSiSroeba,
rom scenaze gamosuli axali, demokratiuli Zala aRar dakmayofildeboda mxolod
sakuTari roliT, daarRvevda individualuri movlenis sazRvars da mTlianad
daeufleboda istoriul situacias. ase moxda demokratiuli arCevnebis Sedegad
faSizmis diqtaturis damkvidreba germaniaSi, ase xdeboda da xdeba demokratiuli
mmarTvelobis wesis gaukuRmarTeba da gadasvla totalitarul mmarTvelobis
reJimSi.
amrigad, dRes, filosofiac da politikac, absolutizmis, anu tota-
litaruli azrovnebis safrTxis winaSe dgas. es rom ar moxdes, gvafrTxilebs
avtori, saWiroa arsebobdes sicariele, rogorc sicocxlis unikaluri
gamorCeulobis Tavisufali sivrce, sadac yofierebis individualobac da
zogadobac, Serwymuli erTmaneTs, ar gadava erTi, arsobrivad gansazRvruli
fenomenis sazRvars, ar gamoiwvevs movlenis zRvardaudebel gafarToebas da
gadagvarebas fsevdo-movlenad, ar ganacxadebs absolutis pretenzias, mTlianad
daeuflos arsebul situacias da ar dakargavs Tavis, rogorc individualuri
da cocxali fenomenis, ganumeorebel saxes.
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International Conference 
“Philosophy Emerging from Culture” 
(July 27-29, 2008 Seoul, Korea) 
 
Sponsored by: 
The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy (RVP) 
The International Society for Metaphysics (ISM) 
The World Union of Catholic Philosophy Societies (WUCPS) 
Soongsil University, Seoul, Korea 
 
 
THEME 
 
The theme of the 2008 World Congress of Philosophy in Seoul, “Rethinking 
Philosophy Today” is most appropriate. The year 2000 proved not only to be the 
beginning of a new millennium, but also the end of the 400 years of the modern era. 
Philosophers had already begun to speak of a post-modern era, and the attempt to 
enter this new global arena in terms of the old coordinates of control for national self-
interests has quickly shown itself to be a formula for disaster. It is truly time to rethink 
the philosophical enterprise, to look for a new paradigm able to integrate the 
achievements of the past while moving into a radically new era. 
As groundwork for this broad task The Council for Research in Values and 
Philosophy (RVP) – with the International Society for Metaphysics (ISM), the World 
Union of Catholic Philosophical Societies (WUCPS) and Soongsil University and the 
assistance of National University of Taiwan – held a conference in Seoul during the 
three days immediately prior the World Congress of Philosophy distinct therefrom 
and focused specifically on “Philosophy Emerging from Culture”. 
Global times now endow – and challenge – philosophy with a broad diversity 
of cultures and civilizations. At the same time the progressive deepening of human 
concerns reaches beyond what is clear and distinct to what is of meaning and value, 
and beyond that which is universal and necessary to free human creativity.That is, to 
persons and communities which over time and space have cumulatively generated 
cultural traditions. These two dimensions; one of global breadth and the other of the 
depth of the human spirit, now combine to open new sources for philosophy as the 
work of human spirit. 
The intent of this pre-Congress conference was to examine this new dynamic 
of philosophy, moving now not only top-down to restrictively apply broad principles, 
but bottom-up from the full breadth of human experience and creativity to evolve 
more rich vision which can liberate and guide. 
224 Culture & Philosophy
Program Overview
July 27
1. The Dynamics of Change; What remains of modernity and why is it no longer adequate for
philosophy?
a. an evaluation of modernity its strengths and weakness
b   the philosophical hermeneutics of the transition to a global era
July 28
    2. The nature of culture and its Potential as a Philosophical Source
a. the subjective turn
b. the new awareness of values and virtues as cultures and civilizations
c. the emergence of philosophy from culture
July 29
2. The Challenges and Opportunities for Philosophy from the Global Interaction of Cultures
and Civilizations
a   philosophy expanded to and by global horizons
b   philosophy deepened to basic meaning and values
c  a new paradigm for philosophy as the integration of radial diversity of persons and peoples;
again, the one and many.
Reprinted from the materials of an International Conference
“Philosophy Emerging from Culture”
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XXII WORLD CONGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY
“RETHINKING PHILOSOPHY TODAY”
July 30 – August 5, 2008
Seoul National University
Seoul, Korea
PROGRAM ( The main topics )
1. Korean Philosophy 1
2. Korean Philosophy 2
3. Plato and Greek Philosophy in the Contemporary World
4. Issues in Ethics
5. Issues in Epistemology
6. Issues in Philosophy of Language
7. Issues in Philosophy of Mind
8. Philosophy in Asia, Africa and South America
9. Philosophical Problems in Medicine: Core Concepts
Reprinted from the materials of XXll World Congress of Philosophy
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(NEO)PLATONISM AND MODERNITY 
 
Materials of the International Conference dedicated to Tengiz Iremadze’s 
book 
“Konzeptionen des Denkens im Neuplatonismus“ 
June 30, 2008, Grigol Robakidze University 
 
Edited by Giorgi Baramidze, Mikheil Gogatishvili, Lali Zakaradze, 
Udo Reinhold Jeck, Duane J. Lacey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PHOTOS: 
 
1. Presentation of the first issue of the journal Culture and Philosophy 
at the World Congress of Philosophy (pre-World Conference), Seoul 2008 
 
2. World Congress of Philosophy (pre-World Conference), 
participants, Professor Hu Yeping and Professor Sergey Nizhnikov 
 
3. World Congress of Philosophy (pre-World Conference), 
Professor George McLean, Seoul 2008 
 
4. Participants of the World Congress of Philosophy, Seoul, 2008 
 
5. The Round Table at the World Congress of Philosophy. 
Professor Anatoly Karas and Professor Mamuka Dolidze, Seoul, 2008 
 
6. Opening of the World Congress in Philosophy, Seoul, Korea, 2008 
 
 
227Main Philosophical Events in 2008/9
228 Culture & Philosophy
229Main Philosophical Events in 2008/9
230 Culture & Philosophy
Main Philosophical Events in 2008/9 231 
 
The World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research 
and Learning 
 
1 Ivy Pointe Way, Hanover, New Hampshire 03755, United States, 
Website: http://www.phenomenology.org 
 
Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, President; Thomas Ryba, Vice-President 
 
 
4th World Congress of Phenomenology 
Jagiellonian University 
 
Krakow, Poland 
August 17-20, 2008 
 
TOPIC: 
The Phenomenology and Existentialism 
of the Twentieth Century 
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The World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research
and Learning
1 Ivy Pointe Way, Hanover, New Hampshire 03755, United States,
Website: http://www.phenomenology.org
Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, President; Thomas Ryba, Vice-President
The 59th International Congress
of Phenomenology
Hosted by the University of Antwerp, Belgium
Represented by: Professor Peter Reynaert, Chairman of the Department of Philosophy
July 8-10, 2009
Topic: Transcendentalism Revisited
Program Presided by: Professor Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, World Phenomenology
Institute
Assisted by: Professor Carmen Cozma University “ALLCuza” Romania
           Professor Konrad Rokstad, University of Bergen, Norway
Local Organizing Committee: Peter Reynaert – Chair, Erik Myin, Liebset Quaeghebeur
(University of Antwerp); Gertrudis Vande Vijver (University of Ghent); Marc Van
den Bossche (Free University of Brussels)
Scientific  Committee: BELGIUM: Peter Reynaert, Gertrudis Van de Vijver; Marc Van
Den Bossche; EGYPT: William D. Melaney; HONG  KONG: Tze-wan Kwan; ITALY:
Daniela Verducci; NORWAY: Konrad Rokstad; ROMANIA: Carmen Cozma; SPAIN:
Antonio Dominguez Rey; TURKEY: Erkut Sezgin; UNITED STATES: Thomas Ryba,
Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, Chair.
